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HEIDEGGER'S ONTOLOGY OF THINGS

by

David Weinberger

Department of Philosophy

A Thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Toronto

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UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

PROGRAM OF THE FINAL ORAL EXAMINATION
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

OF

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HEIDEGGER'S ONTOLOGY OF THINGS

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ABSTRACT

Described phenomenologically, things are those phenomena which appear (to us) as being ontologically independent of our encountering them; they appear to have been there even before we encountered them. Can phenomenology, which restricts itself to experience, deal with the source which lets them seem to have been before we experienced them? Chapter I sets out this problem.

In Chapter II we see that Heidegger seems to rely on the fact that the thing's independence is disclosed to us, but he does not elaborate on it. Indeed, he seems sometimes to forget it, leading to confusions in the notions of Vorhandenheit and Realität. Although Heidegger treats Vorhandenheit univocally, three types can be distinguished. The relation of the Vorhanden and the Zumhanden is explained in terms of time. Section 43 (on reality) is examined in light of the play between the thing's independence and the fact that this independence is itself announced to us, and thus depends on us.

In the artwork Heidegger finds access to a hidden 'ground'-- the earth-- which accounts for the announced independence of the thing. In Chapter III we see that Heidegger has made progress towards accounting for the phenomenological realness of things, but some problems remain. The fourfold (das Geviert) solves these problems.

But to understand the fourfold we must see what kind of account it provides. This leads us in Chapter IV to discuss what Heidegger thinks 'ground' and explanation are, particularly in light of his view of time.

As we see in Chapter V, on the fourfold, the fourfold can only
be what it is insofar as it allows the thing to be. The fourfold is a phenomenological notion: Heidegger brings us to see that the members are intelligibly present in the world although they are not as easily understood as we ordinarily think they are. They are brought to appearance by the thing which gathers them in particular ways and lets them be before us as intelligible.

But Heidegger says that we live in a technological age in which things are present as mere stock for our uses, not as phenomena which show the fourfold forth. In Chapter VI we examine the essence of technology (das Ge-stell) and show that it is one way the fourfold is gathered. The fourfold remains present but withdrawn. The notion of withdrawal also explains how technology's threat can have the same source as the rescue from the threat. Withdrawal is possible in ecstatic time which allows for a type of possibility which in turn allows us to characterize something as present in its withdrawal.

In Chapter VII we find that things open time to us in a way that allows us to have our stretch of time. In announcing what is beyond the temporal horizon, the thing lets the horizon be an horizon. By exploring Heidegger's view of language, we find that ontology can account for a thing as the particular sort of thing it is because to be means to be present as something, to be intelligible and meaningful. Language is the intelligible structure of Being. Finally, we see that disclosure and Being find their highest synthesis in dwelling.

Phenomenology, then, can account for the announced independence of things without forgetting the announcement (and becoming a simple realism which forgets that the thing's Being is disclosed) and without forgetting the independence (and becoming an idealism which forgets that the thing is disclosed as being independent).
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Of course, any mistakes or weaknesses are entirely my own.
REFERENCE KEY

Page references to oft-cited works by Heidegger have been included in the body of the text. Although all translations are my own, I have consulted the available English translations and have at times been guided by them. Because of this, and as a convenience to those who do not read German, page references to the translations follow a virgule which itself follows the reference to the German edition. Complete bibliographic information will be found in the Bibliography.

EN
Präzierung der Händlerins Dichtung/ Postface and Being, Werner Brock, trans.

EM
Einführung in die Metaphysik/ An Introduction to Metaphysics, Ralph Manheim, trans.

G
Gelegenheit/ Discourse on Thinking, John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund, trans.

GP
Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie/ Untranslated.

ID
Identität und Differenz/ Identity and Difference, Joan Stambaugh, trans.

K
Die Lebenskraft in die Technik und die Kehr (Opuscula Series)/ The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, William Lovitt, trans.

SD

SG
Der Sitz vom Grund/ Untranslated.

SZ
Sein und Zeit/ Being and Time, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, trans. (Because Being and Time marks the pagination in Sein und Zeit, only page references to the latter will be given.)

UK

US
Unterwegs zur Sprache/ On the Way to Language, Peter D. Bertz, trans. Except the essay "Die Sprache" in US which is only translated in Poetry, Language, Thought, References to this essay will be indicated by the symbol US after the virgule.

VA:B
"Bauen, Wohnen, Denken" in Vorträge und Aufsätze/Poetry, Language, Thought. (VA = Vorträge und Aufsätze.)
VaD: "Das Ding" in Va/ Poetry, Language, Thought.


Because the English translation is conveniently bilingual, all references to Vo refer to the translation.
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I

INTRODUCTION

When Boswell said that no one had yet refuted Bishop Berkeley’s idealism, Dr. Johnson kicked a stone and said, “I refute it thus.” Whether or not we find this ‘argument’ convincing, Dr. Johnson still had demonstrated that most of us find the presence of ordinary things to be the best _prima facie_ argument against any philosophy which tries to deny the reality of the universe. If anything is real, then surely simple things are.

This belief is still current. John Hick, in an introduction to the philosophy of religion, in a more or less offhand manner comments that “if the word ‘real’ has any meaning for us, we must be able to point to a clear and unproblematic instance of something being real. What can this be but some ordinary physical object perceived by the senses?” Hick does not discuss the meaning of ‘real’, for that is not his purpose. But it is one of ours since there seems to be a strong association of things with the real.

This dissertation will attempt to present, examine and develop Martin Heidegger’s ontology of the thing (das Ding). Our task is expository. We shall begin with a provisional description of the realness of things. (I call it ‘realness’ instead of ‘reality’ because the former term is less encrusted with traditional meanings than is the latter.) We shall see that it is possible to trace the path of Heidegger’s thought about the thing by taking realness as a genuine part of the ontological constitution of things, a part which needs to be accounted for ontologically. Heidegger’s last
writings about the thing provide the fullest and best account of the thing as real.

We shall also see that this realness presents a problem for the phenomenological ontology Heidegger pursues: realness turns out to be the announced independence of the thing from experience and experience is phenomenology's primary field of study. We shall develop this problem and see if Heidegger's ontology can meet the challenge of the thing.

1. What Is a Thing?

It may seem obvious that a dissertation on the ontology of things should first set out exactly what it means by the term 'thing'. But in fact this cannot be precisely or fully done at the beginning, for it is the goal and not the starting point of the ontology of the thing.

Still, some indication must be given. I will give three preliminary 'sightings' of things and one provisional phenomenological approach to them.

First, we can appeal to ordinary language. In ordinary talk, what do we mean by 'thing'? Let us ignore the extended uses of the term, such as when one says "I can't do a thing about it" and stick to the sense which strikes us as stricter. In this sense, we distinguish things from non-things. Rocks and fences are clearly things whereas dreams and thoughts are not. But here I can only point to the reader's own sense for ordinary language and cannot give a firm conceptualized definition of the term, for that definition would necessarily run ahead of the ontological characterization which we seek. That is, if I were to say that things are material objects, my definition would contain and conceal an entire philosophy which might later get in the way of a fresh ontological approach.

But we can perhaps get an initial sighting of what we mean by 'things'.
by referring to the traditional philosophical ways of talking about them. As long as we take these philosophical notions as gestures towards a class of entities (I use 'entity' here to mean anything that is, a broader term than 'things', for not all entities are things, but all things are entities), and not as necessarily being appropriate explanations or characterizations of things, these notions might help. With this caveat, we may say that the class of things includes every entity which has material existence, has substance, is sensible, is in itself as opposed to for itself.\textsuperscript{3} If these references to traditional philosophy do not help the reader, they should be ignored.

A third way will advance our inquiry more than the first two. A thing is that to which we first refer when asked for an example of something real. Few of us will refer to Platonic Forms; most of us will refer immediately to some thing. Things seem to have a type of irrefutable reality about them which can only be denied by reflectively bringing oneself to a state of mind far removed from our ordinary way of existing in this world. As Heidegger points out in "The Origin of the Artwork",\textsuperscript{4} 'thing' refers most clearly to inanimate natural objects; this is because there seems to be less of a possibility that the 'subject' has imagined, invented or created this class of entities, and this is part of what we mean by the reality of things.

What is this reality? In the following paragraphs I hope to present a description of things as we encounter them in everyday life, a description I can ask the reader to accept only if it describes his or her own encounters. Further, what follows will be brief and provisional since the full phenomenological description of the thing is one of the chief aims of the dissertation as a whole.
It is a characteristic of things that when we encounter them they appear to have been there even before we encountered them. When we encounter them, we disclose them. What Heidegger means by 'disclosure' is a major topic. For how let us hope it will be sufficient to say that disclosure is a bringing of the disclosed into intelligibility; to be disclosed means to be found present within a context which lets the disclosed be present as this or that. It may help to think of 'disclosure' as a replacement for the more traditional term 'experience'. Experience seems to go on inside us, whereas we and the disclosed both enter into disclosure.

When I encounter, and thus disclose, things, they not only seem to have been there even before they were encountered and disclosed; they also seem to be ontologically independent of the encounter and disclosure. I come across a rock in the street; I treat it as a real rock, as opposed, perhaps, to an imaginary rock. One could say that I assume it is real, if 'assume' did not carry a philosophic burden with it. Insofar as I disclose the rock as real, I disclose it as a rock which was before I came across it, and as a rock which was, is and will be regardless of my disclosure of it.

Compare this to the rock I imagine when someone says, "Picture a boulder balanced on a cliff." Insofar as I imagine this rock, I disclose it as something which was not before I disclosed it and which will not be after I stop holding it in imagination. The rock (a gem, perhaps) which I wish were in my hand also is not really in my hand precisely because it is ontologically dependent on my wishful disclosure of it.

We now have two ways of characterizing things as real. We can do so temporally by saying that a thing is disclosed as that which already was before it was disclosed. Or we can do so in terms of its ontological source.
by saying that a thing is that which appears to have as its ontological source something other than our disclosure of it. Because of its seeming ontological independence, we can further temporally characterize the thing as that which not only has been but also will continue to be after we cease disclosing it. These temporal and ontological characterizations of one and the same phenomenon give us a first clue that time and Being are intimately connected. We shall try to keep this point in mind throughout this dissertation; the temporality of the thing will be a constant guide for us.

2. Phenomenology and the Thing

The thing manifests reality in that it appears to be and to have been regardless of disclosure. This 'appears' is ambiguous in an important way. On the one hand, it may mean 'gives the appearance of', with the implication that things may not be what they appear to be. On the other hand, 'appears' can be used in a more phenomenological sense. I mean it in this latter sense.

In this latter sense, to appear means to be disclosed, to be present to Dasein (disclosive existence). A subjectivist philosophy might say that I am aware of X or that I am conscious of it. We avoid this subjectivism by instead saying that X appears. X shows itself, and this is its appearing.

In the beginning of Sein und Zeit (especially Section ?A), Heidegger's first major work, he attempts to establish that there can be many different ways phenomena appear. Some of these ways are mere appearances in our first sense of mere seeming. But even something that dissembles itself still appears in its dissemblance. Thus, the second and phenomenological sense of appearance includes the first.

Phenomenology—or at least Heidegger's version of it—is the attempt to let entities show themselves in themselves and from themselves as what they
are. There would be no need for phenomenology if some appearances were not dissembling. But because things may appear, especially to reflection, as what they are not, we need a way of letting the true appearance show forth. Phenomenology does not attempt to penetrate appearances in order to find something behind them which is not itself an appearance. Phenomenology attempts to bring phenomena to appearance (but not to mere appearance, the first sense of the word) as what they are; it attempts to see through mere appearances to a genuine appearance.

Now, this last sentence may sound like a type of nihilism which postulates nothing but appearances; but this takes 'appearance' to be mere appearance. Phenomenology, however, must be thought together with ontology if it is not to become one sort of nihilism or another. To do this, phenomenology must find and assert a strong relation between Being and appearance.

If phenomenology forgets Being, it will have difficulty maintaining that the appearances which are its fruit are to be given more weight than the mere appearances it has seen through. The distinction between mere appearance and phenomenological appearance depends upon saying that phenomena are in their appearing. If Being and appearance are divorced too strictly, since appearance occurs within disclosure, and disclosure is disclosure to Dessein, phenomenology will become a type of psychology, psychologism, or phenomenalism. Certainly it will not be able to be ontological.

Indeed, this is what phenomenology has become in ordinary language. One talks about the phenomenology of an experience in order to talk about the experience without reference to the objectivities involved. The phenomenology of someone hallucinating elephants is said to be "The subject saw elephants"
as opposed to "The subject hallucinated elephants which in fact were not there." A psychologist, Wilson Van Dusen, gives us an example of this. He complains that case histories are not faithful to experience, for they are too neatly categorized:

This is precisely the difference between the phenomenological viewpoint and that usually taken in mental health. If a young person's existence is a lousy drag, it should be described as such rather than attempting a pious observer's outside viewpoint by describing it as an 'adolescent rebellion against conventional mores'. A phenomenological study is an attempt to represent or describe a person's experience adequately by a faithfulness to the very quality and experience of that experience. The point of view, the terminology, the emphasis in a phenomenological study is that of the experiencing subject himself.6

This ignores the difference between mere appearances and the appearances phenomenology (taken as a method of ontology) hopes to lay bare.

In attempting to let phenomena appear as what they are, phenomenology tries to hold off traditional theories about things in order to see how things truly appear to us. One of phenomenology's first findings is that disclosure is not something *Dasein* does. Rather, *Dasein* finds itself in disclosure. In ordinary experience, we are not isolated subjects. Instead, we find ourselves already 'out' in the world. Phenomenology, as the study of appearance, then, is as much a study of the world as it is of *Dasein*. In the world we find things which *are*. We do not find anything which does not in any way appear, for in finding something it appears. All the entities we find *are*, although they may *be* in many modes. Some phenomena are imagined, some are remembered, some are desired, some are feared, some are hoped for.

And some are real. These are things. The realness of things threatens to drive a wedge between appearance (in disclosure) and Being so firmly that phenomenology cannot aspire to ontology.
The threat comes about as follows: the thing is that which appears (in disclosure, not as a mere appearance) as having been even before it was disclosed; it appears as being regardless of disclosure. That is, its Being appears to be independent of disclosure. If that is the case, then it seems that phenomenology—the study of appearance, which is appearance in disclosure—will be denied the access to Being it requires if it is to be ontological and not a doctrine of mere appearance. If the thing's Being is independent of its disclosure, then our study of its disclosure may not lead us to its Being. In that case, we are left with a mere appearance (the first sense of appearance), or with a series of mere appearances each equally genuine and thus vitiating the concept of a genuine appearance.

The direction of the solution is clear, however: the problem only arises if we forget how important it is that the thing appears (phenomenologically in disclosure, not as mere appearance) as independent of disclosure. It is 'part' of the thing's Being that it appear, even though it appears as being ontologically independent of its appearing in disclosure. This seeming paradox is at the heart of the problem of the thing: the thing appears as something that is regardless of its appearing. The appearance as being independent of disclosure is what we mean by the thing's realness. We do not want to discount the realness which appears on the grounds that it is a mere appearance; if we do discount it, we end up with a doctrine of the thing which denies just what most pressinglly engages us about the thing, namely that it appears to be independent of our disclosure of it. Neither do we want to ignore the appearing of the realness, the fact that the thing's independence from disclosure is the way the thing appears in disclosure.

If we do ignore it, we cut Being and appearance asunder in such a way that
phenomenology can say nothing about the Being of the thing.

Understanding properly the relation between Being and appearance is a delicate matter. Thomas Langan puts it well and helps to show why the question of the thing is particularly relevant to the inquiry:

Heidegger renders great service to contemporary thought by warning us against a naive realism that would ignore the inevitable coloration of the thing by the interpretative intentional horizon within which we encounter it, and against a transcendental idealism which, denying access to the thing-in-itself, would destroy the possibility of our proceeding beyond positivism without succumbing to arbitrary subjectivism. He nevertheless leaves us without the principles of a solution to this twofold problem.

For Heidegger seems reluctant to bring phenomenological analysis to bear patiently and accurately on the critical point: the precise nature of the fusion of ecstatic, intentional transcendental horizon with the thing as it is in its brute reality?

Phenomenology must deal with things. If it does not, it cannot be ontological. If we were to say that phenomenology is adequate to deal with the Being of everything except things, we would thereby admit that things are. In that case, we would be positing two sorts of Being, one that holds for non-things, and one that holds for things. But surely both things and non-things are. We would be unable to say in what way things and non-things are, and our ontology as a whole would falter.

Things, as that which appear to be real (where 'real' means independent of disclosure), provide a challenge to phenomenology. If it can meet the challenge, it will survive the charge that phenomenology is just a form of phenomenalism, psychology, subjectivism or psychologism, for the challenge is to account ontologically for the Being of things where their Being is understood to appear to be independent of the experiencing (disclosive) subject. This will be a firming of phenomenology's realist pole, a pole sagging as evidenced by the way 'phenomenology' has entered common parlance.
3. Species of Things

There is another sense in which we can ask about the Being of things. We can ask: when we talk of the Being of things, are we talking about the Being of this and that thing, of species of things (such as hammers, chairs, etc.), or things insofar as they are things? When we provide an ontology of the thing, are we providing an ontology of particular and individual things, of species of things, or of things insofar as they are the same as every other thing? Or some combination?

This is a traditional question. Aristotle raises it when he asserts that the form is primary being. If primary being resides in the form, what are we to make of the particulars? Are they not 'real'? More fundamentally, are they not? Should our ontology enable us to make ontological assertions about different species of things and have those assertions be significantly different from each other? Should this extend to particular things as well?

We shall find this question arising in relation to "Origin of the Artwork" and it will turn out to be important in showing the meaning of language for the Being of things, which we shall discuss in our final chapter.

4. Plan of the Thesis

We shall follow Heidegger's thought by considering his writings. We begin with Sein und Zeit, his first major work; as a choice of starting point, this should be uncontroversial. "Origin of the Artwork" seems to address itself to certain questions which Sein und Zeit implicitly raises. By considering "Origin of the Artwork", these problems will be brought into clearer focus.

To answer the questions we have found, we shall have to consider what type of answers are suitable. Thus we shall devote a chapter to Heidegger's re-thinking of the nature of grounds and explanations. Then we shall turn to
"Das Ding" and "Bauen Wohnen Denken" to see Heidegger's latest thought on the question of the thing. But to understand those essays, we shall have to investigate the fourfold (das Geviert), a notion prominent in them. In a word, the fourfold is the structure of the world which enables the thing to be present in the way that it is. To understand the fourfold, we shall have to see its relation to the framework (das Ge-stell), the structure of our present age in which things appear to be part of the general stock (Bestand) available for our use. Thus we shall start with grounds and explanations, move to the understanding of the fourfold which Heidegger's re-thinking of them allows, consider the framework and its relation to the fourfold, and conclude with a chapter devoted to the two essays, "Das Ding" and "Bauen Wohnen Denken" which will show us the temporal nature of the thing and the thing's role in letting disclosure itself occur.9

5. Exegetical Note

This dissertation is exegetical, but the term needs explanation. I do not attempt to summarize Heidegger's thought, nor simply to translate it into my own language. Instead I have attempted to take as my model of exegesis Heidegger's own way of approaching the tradition. He attempts to think along with the thinker, finding the questions asked implicitly, and the questions the thinker has yet to ask, bringing to bear questions which arise from the careful thought of the thinker. The phrase "from the careful thought of the thinker" is intentionally ambiguous, meaning both "thought which takes the thinker as its object" and "the thinker's own-thought". Insofar as Heidegger succeeds in his project, his Nachdenken, his thought about the thinker's thought and the thinker's thought itself are one. This is because Heidegger's approach to the philosophical tradition
is the same as his phenomenological approach to the world: its aim is to let the phenomena show themselves from themselves as they are.

I have tried to avoid one exegetical trap which Heidegger’s own exegesis avoids: the trap of thinking that one can offer an objective interpretation of someone else’s thought. As Heidegger clearly shows, interpretation is an activity of an existing Dasein; we cannot hope to ‘leap over our own shadows’ to attain an objective viewpoint. Thus it is inevitable that any interpreter will bring his or her own questions, concerns and ways of understanding to the exegetical task. Even when Heidegger himself succeeds in thinking the same as a traditional thinker has thought, he thinks it in his own way, which is also the way of his and our epoch. It is important, then, to recognize that one never interprets ‘purely’.

One cannot escape this simply by laying out at the beginning the set of presuppositions which guide the interpretation; this would be to succumb to the very temptation of thought which the laying out of the presuppositions intends to overcome. The attempt to lay out all one’s presuppositions is an attempt to get ‘behind’ oneself sufficiently to be able to spell out objectively all that is involved in one’s standpoint. But one’s self-interpretation is just as incapable of objectivity as one’s interpretation of another.

One cannot lay out a firm and final set of presuppositions at the beginning. If we are to think along with Heidegger, we will learn about our presuppositions—our situation in the world, to be more precise, for more than cognitive presuppositions are at stake—through this thinking along.

The hermeneutic situation is complex, then. But we must not let the
possibility of going wrong stand in the way of the attempt.

We must find a way in which we can see whether or not we are going wrong, for we do not want blithely to assert anything that comes to mind without regard for the truth. The hermeneutic situation may prevent us from applying cut-and-dried criteria in a check-off box manner, but it does suggest a method, or a way.

We shall interpret Heidegger, attempting to think the same 'subjects' as he. We shall attempt to understand what he says about these 'subjects'. The usual criterion of consistency shall apply, but it is only available to us because we assume that Heidegger's own thought is consistent. We shall look for a consistency of doctrine within any one work, and shall prefer an interpretation of his entire corpus which is self-consistent to one which is self-contradictory, unless there is good reason to think otherwise.\(^\text{10}\)

We shall also prefer the more plausible interpretation, where an interpretation is plausible if it seems to be true.

These are not clear-cut criteria. To decide whether one interpretation is more plausible than another requires first arriving at the variously plausible interpretations, and this itself is a hermeneutic task. We arrive at these interpretations by attempting to think along with Heidegger. The plausible interpretations—which in the actual course of the interpretation are the ones that come most readily to mind, usually—seem plausible insofar as they seem to be true. True to what? True to the way things are? Or true to Heidegger's interpretation of the way things are?

I am writing about Heidegger because I think what he says about the Being of things is true. This does not mean that I have come to some idea about the 'way things are which I have compared to what Heidegger says,
finding a correspondence. Rather, I find what Heidegger says to be true in the sense of Heidegger's own understanding of truth as unconcealment. What is true is what brings out of hiddenness, what brings out of the dark and into the light. It brings out what was already there—this is part of the meaning of un-concealment. Not every enlightening is true, for some light things up in ways that do not reveal how things already were. For example, I can cast a new 'light' on death by saying that death is what people in cemeteries do. But this seems unenlightening. If I were to say, following Heidegger, that death is that possibility which we never escape and which reveals to me that I am an individual (no one can die my death for me) and a possibility factically situated, this brings to light (out of hiddenness) just what death always has been for me already, whether or not I had explicitly recognized it. The criterion of this type of truth is the recognition that accompanies it: what is shown to be true appears to have been true all along, but hidden. The truth of it is that which allows this recognition: the bringing out of concealment that which already is.

To say that what Heidegger says about the Being of things is true, then, is to say that he has concealed that Being. The claim that I find it true means that by thinking along with Heidegger (a hermeneutic task), the Being of things has been unconcealed (to a lesser or greater extent). To interpret Heidegger is to let oneself be guided by his thought, to think along with him, to allow oneself to be taught by his thought.

But thinking along with him and learning from him requires bringing oneself to the encounter. The hermeneutic situation does not allow his thought to enter our heads directly and without mediation, the way pennies enter piggy banks. Rather we must attempt to unconceal just what Heidegger
has uncoiled. The final ‘criterion’ is the ability of the interpretation to enlighten us about the Being of things. This is not something we do before reading Heidegger, nor even something we do simply afterwards. It is something we do with Heidegger.

Heidegger often refers to his thinking as unterwegs, on the way, on a path. Particularly in moving from one work to another, I have attempted to show the questions which move Heidegger along. These questions are implicit in his works. I have tried to bring some of them out, guided by what I take to be genuine Heideggerian concerns. To the extent to which I succeed, Heidegger’s path (on the topic of the Being of things) should become visible. It will seem a proper reading to the extent to which the questions I have said are implicit are seen to be genuinely implicit and not merely read in. They will seem genuinely implicit if they are questions which Heidegger could be expected to find implicit in his own work, and if Heidegger himself addresses these questions in later works.

To follow his path, Heidegger has to push aside the underbrush which obscures it. We follow him on this path by looking for the hints and signs of his passing. We can only do this by beginning on the path.
II

THE THING IN SEIN UND ZEIT

If we want to know what Heidegger thinks a thing (Ding) is, we will naturally first consult Sein und Zeit (SZ), his first major work. Although SZ is intended to prepare the way for fundamental ontology, we find that the term ‘Ding’ plays a relatively unimportant and almost casual role in that work. Furthermore, it does not seem to mean the same as it does in his later works (in particular, “Das Ding” and “Bauen Wohnen Denken”). If we are to seek an ontology of the thing in SZ, then, we must first see if in that work Heidegger talks about what he will later call “das Ding”.

To decide this firmly, we must already know what Heidegger in his later works means by ‘Ding’. On the one hand, the problem is not as difficult as it first seems, for we may provisionally decide that Heidegger later means by ‘Ding’ just what we normally mean by ‘thing’; he is talking about the objects (I use the term loosely here) around us. In SZ he does talk about this class of entities by talking of two categories of Being: Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit. We shall discuss these categories at length in this chapter, but for now we may think of zuhanden entities as those entities which we use in one way or another, and which are usable; vorhanden entities are those which for one reason or another are of no use to us, or even stand before us as obstacles. If we want to see Heidegger’s ontology of the thing in SZ, we should look to his ontological remarks about Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit.
On the other hand, the matter is not quite that simple. We must not think that we are dealing with some set of entities which remains the same although it is given different names in different phases of Heidegger's career. We are not dealing with names, but with categories of Being. If it were just a question of names, then the class of entities under discussion would be seen to remain essentially the same. For example, if you and I debate whether to call a black 'swan' a swan, we take it for granted that we are both talking about the same black bird. But if it is a question of categories (in Heidegger's sense, which is derived from Aristotle's), then it is a question of the very Being of that which is under discussion, for the categories are categories of Being. A category is not a name or a pigeon-hole; it is the way something is.

This becomes clearer if we consider an entity which changes categories. A hammer can be zubehören, i.e., it can take its meaning from its place within a context of projects and the context of other entities (nails, lumber) with which it is used. But it can become vorhanden, unusable, if (for example) the handle breaks or we run out of nails. In some sense, one and the same hammer can change over (umschlagen) from Zuhändehheit to Vorhandenheit and back again. Its mode of Being changes, not just its name or pigeon-hole.

This raises two points that concern us here. First, the question of the relation of the term 'Ding' in the later works to the Zuhänden and Vorhanden is not simply a matter of names. It is not clear that the later term 'Ding' should still be called a category, but there is little doubt that Heidegger is still dealing with modes of Being and not merely with names. To begin to understand S2's ontology of the thing (in its later sense)
we should look at that work's treatment of the *Zuhanden* and *Vorhanden*. We must be aware, however, that if Heidegger later shifts 'categories', he is not just changing names; rather, he is saying something different about *Being*. I shall suggest that his shift from the *Zuhanden* and the *Vorhanden* to the *Dinge* of the later works is a shift to a discussion of the 'one and the same hammer' which can change over in its *Being*.

Second, the question of the categories raises a problem which will concern us throughout the rest of this chapter: What are the conditions for the change over from one category to another? How is it that how we disclose an entity (as, for example, usable or useless) can determine its mode of *Being*? Does not this mean that the *Being* of things depends on our subjective disclosure of them?

This last question is the one that concerns us most, for, as discussed in Chapter I, if phenomenology is to be ontological (and thus is properly to be phenomenology and not phenomenalist or psychologism), it must let things have a source other than simply *Dasein*. Further, in the brief phenomenological description of the thing in the previous chapter, I maintained that the thing presents itself as having a non-*Dasein* source; thus, phenomenology is not true to itself (much less to *Being*) if it accounts for things in a way that locates their source only in *Dasein*.

We shall approach this question by examining *Zuhandenheit* and *Vorhandenheit*. Because the former is straightforwardly explained in *SZ*, we shall focus on the latter: Also, *Vorhandenheit* seems to be the category which most explicitly manifests the realness of things, that is, their announced independence (or autonomy) from *Dasein*. How can the two categories change into each other? I shall argue that they are equally primordial and that
each makes the other possible; each contains a 'moment' of the other. This stands opposed to the interpretation which takes Vorhandenheit to be a thing but failed Zuhandheit and which thus sees the latter as more primordial than the former. I shall argue that the equiprimordiality of the two categories is demonstrated by the possibility of the change over.

Vorhandenheit is not the univocal term Heidegger seems to think it is. Besides failing to distinguish the various meanings of Vorhandenheit, he confuses it with a third possible category, reality (Realität). We shall see that he has available to him a genuinely phenomenological understanding of reality which he uses when discussing one sense of Vorhandenheit, although he does not seem to realize this. According to this phenomenological sense, something is real if it is disclosed as being independent of disclosure. Heidegger confuses this with the traditional (and ontologically inappropriate) meaning of the real as that which is independent of disclosure. The difference rests in remembering or forgetting that the independence of the thing from disclosure is itself announced in disclosure. Because in SZ Heidegger himself ultimately forgets this (although he makes use of it when discussing the Being of tools), he makes no real headway there towards understanding the ontological source of phenomenological reality. That headway is left for later works.

We shall begin by considering Zuhandheit and the various meanings of Vorhandenheit, with an eye towards how the two categories make each other possible; this will require eliciting certain suppressed (or unrecognized) premises of Heidegger's discussion. Then we shall discuss the possibility of the change over from one category to the other. This will mean discussing the relation of disclosure and Being, for the change (in Being) occurs when
there is a change in how we disclose an entity. We shall see that Heidegger's notion of time as ecstatic lets there be a change over. Finally we shall examine the section on reality and find it to be confused because of Heidegger's confusion about the hidden non-Dasein source of the real. This will enable us to turn to a later work, "Origin of the Artwork", where Heidegger deals directly with this source, and rather more successfully than he deals with it in SZ.

1. Zuhendheit

Our world is "a world in which something encounters us to which we respond more properly through request, wish and command than through mere assertions"; it is a world of the Zuhenden. Things are understood in terms of their uses and thus appear as equipment (Zeug). Items of equipment are "those entities which we encounter in concern..." (...das im Besorgen begegnete Seiende..."; SZ, 68). "Taken strictly, there never is an equipment. To the Being of equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment..." (SZ, 68). Strictly speaking, a hammer, as an item of equipment or tool, is not a self-subsistent entity; it can only be a tool within a totality that includes nails and lumber. When considering the hammer in its Being as equipment we are referred (verwiesen) to the total context of equipment. In the same way, we are also referred to a structure of in-order-to (in-zu) (SZ, 68), the context of our plans and projects: there can only be equipment because equipment can be used in-order-to build a house, polish shoes, light a street, etc.

This is not simply a logical analysis of the notion of equipment, for equipment is not just a notion. By the time we read SZ we have all already encountered equipment. Heidegger is interested in showing the
conditions for the possibility of there being equipment. To understand this, it is not enough to analyze logically a notion, for we are not dealing with a category of thought but with a category of Being; to categorize is to take an entity to task with regard to its Being (SZ, 45). Indeed, in analyzing the Being of equipment, Heidegger comes across a structure which a logical analysis of the notion would miss; in the structure of equipment lies a reference to other beings of Dasein's kind of Being. Equipment is used for a work. This work refers not only to its materials (SZ, 70), but also to the context of other beings that have Dasein's own kind of Being who will use the work, who made the work, who will see it, admire it, etc. (SZ, 71). Heidegger finds this reference to what he calls the "public world" ("öffentlichlen Welt"; SZ, 71) not by considering what is logically necessary for there to be equipment, but rather by considering equipment as we already encounter it. As always, he is dealing with the phenomenon as it already appears.

But how a phenomenon appears depends in part on how we let it appear. Inssofar as equipment is used by Dasein in-order-to, in a context of projects for the sake of Dasein, within a context of other items of equipment, and within a public world, equipment appears genuinely as it is when it is used appropriately and not when it is grasped thematically as an "occurring thing" ("vorkommendes Ding"; SZ, 69). "The peculiarity of the proximal Zuhandenheit is that it, so to speak, withdraws itself in its Zuhandenheit in order to be properly Zuhanden" (SZ, 69). Heidegger writes that:

the less the hammer-thing is just gaped at and the more it is grasped and used, the more primordial the relationship to it becomes, and the more unveiled is it encountered as that which it is as a tool. (SZ, 69)

The tool, with which we are all already familiar, withdraws itself in its equipmentality.
Withdraws itself from what? It would seem that it withdraws itself from a certain mode of disclosure, namely that of explicit awareness. When we do not use the hammer but instead make it into an object of study, the hammer ceases to be an item which we use. It withdraws its equipmentality from our explicit gaze.

But surely the hammer we study is still equipment! It still can be used as a tool, just as surely as the screw-driver in my tool kit is still an item of equipment even when I am hammering with the hammer. Its Being as an item of equipment rests on the possibility of its being used, but its disclosure as what it authentically is depends on its being actually used. Is this what Heidegger means?

No, this dichotomy between Being and disclosure is too simple. That it is somewhat accurate is attested by Heidegger's use of "withdraws itself" ("sich zurückziehen"), for presumably even in its withdrawal there is an it (in this case, an item of equipment) which is withdrawing. Heidegger could have used a word that indicated that the Being of the item of equipment is obliterated. If the Being of the equipment as equipment depended solely on its proper disclosure, then there could be no withdrawal but only an obliteration. But, the relationship is not that simple, for the Being of the withdrawn item of equipment is still a Being which depends on disclosure to \textit{Das} within a context of uses, projects, and other items of equipment each of which are similarly characterized. The withdrawal from disclosure is not a 'giving up of the ghost', but is rather a "holding itself in" ("Anschalten"; \textit{SZ}, 75), to use a phrase from a different context.

This withdrawal is essential to \textit{Vorbereitenheit}; the \textit{Zahmend} never comes forth from its withdrawal. For example, when a tool becomes unusable...
equipment becomes conspicuous (auffällig) as not being
zuhanden (SZ, 73). "Pure Vorhandenheit announces itself" ("Die pure
Vorhandenheit meldet sich"; SZ, 73) in such equipment. We would expect
that when a tool becomes unusable, it loses its Zuhandenheit. But, Heidegger
tells us:

In conspicuousness, obtrusiveness and obstinacy [the three
modes of unusability Heidegger discusses] the Zuhanden
loses its Zuhandenheit in a certain way. But this Zuhanden-
heit is understood, although unthetically, in our dealings
with the Zuhanden. Zuhandenheit does not simply disappear,
but rather in the conspicuousness of the unusable it takes
its leave, so to speak. (SZ, 74)³

The distinction between disappearing (verschwanden) and taking leave (sich
verabschieden) becomes less enigmatic when we consider the nature of withdrawal.
Heidegger is here denying that Zuhandenheit simply is no more in unusable
equipment. Rather, it withdraws and is still present as withdrawn. This
withdrawal is announced—leave is taken; farewells are said—and this
announcing is the appearing and presence of what withdraws.

In Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GP), based on lectures given
in 1927, the year SZ was published, Heidegger deals at greater length with
missing equipment; i.e. something zuhanden which has become abhanden. He
uses this to discuss the presence of that which is present as being absent.
Here we see clearly a type of leave-taking: the abhanden tool announces its
absence. (GP, 432ff).

We must, however, distinguish two types of withdrawal. (1) On the one
hand, we have the constant withdrawal of the Being of equipment, a withdrawal
from thematic disclosure, a withdrawal which always characterizes Zuhandenheit.
(2) On the other hand, we have the announced withdrawal of Zuhandenheit from
an item of equipment which has become unusable. In every case the Zuhanden
withdraws itself; in the specific case of the unusable item of equipment, the withdrawal announces itself. The first type of withdrawal is due to the fact that equipment can only properly (eigentlich) be what it is when it is used, but when it is used it is not made explicit. The second type of withdrawal does not necessarily announce the first type: it is perfectly possible that a tool might become unusable without thereby announcing that it is part of the ontological character of the Zuhänden to resist thematic disclosure. The first type is characteristic of the appearance of the Zuhänden; the second type is a withdrawal of Zuhändenheit in which another category of Being (i.e., Vorhandenheit) can appear. The two withdrawals (insufficiently distinguished by Heidegger) stand in a definite relation: a tool becomes unusable (the second withdrawal) and thus becomes conspicuous. Yet, as per the first withdrawal, the Zuhänden cannot withstand this conspicuousness and so it withdraws its very mode of Being in the second withdrawal.9

In both cases we are talking about a withdrawal which challenges any conception of Being as something 'in itself' or as simply real. The Being of the Zuhänden is a Being which lets the Zuhänden be even when it is withdrawn from appearance. This is not possible in a metaphysics which takes reality (in its traditional sense of actuality) as the highest principle, for the real must either be or not be; it cannot be both. The notion of withdrawal does not make sense within the fiercely disjunctive (it either is or it is not) notion of the real.

This notion of withdrawal gives us our first hint about the relation of Zuhändenheit and Vorhandenheit. When thematically disclosed, the Zuhänden changes over to Vorhandenheit. This change over, we shall see, is a withdrawing in the second sense. In this withdrawal and change over, the
Zuhanden remains present as withdrawn. We shall see that this is only possible if both categories of Being are thoroughly possible and not simply actual.

2. Three Types of Vorhandenheit

Heidegger tells us what he means by Zuhandenheit but he is much less forthright about the meaning of Vorhandenheit. He tells us that "existentia ontologically is tantamount to Vorhandensein, a kind of Being which does not befit entities of Dasein's character" (SZ, 42). In GP, he again refers us to the Schoolmen's notion of existentia and adds that Vorhandenheit is the title for the way of Being of natural things in the widest sense (GP, 36). This refers us to a history of thought which has not been able completely ontologically to clarify what 'existentia' means: "Because as yet the ontological problematic of Being has primarily been understood in the sense of Vorhandenheit ("reality", "world"—actuality), the Being of Dasein has remained ontologically undetermined..." (SZ, 183). Because there is some relation between reality and Dasein, and in fact Dasein's Being may be necessary for there to be reality (SZ, 212), the tradition which has forgotten this cannot have made the category of existentia clear.

If we want to progress past this reference to a traditionally unclear category, we must turn to Heidegger's discussions of how Vorhandenheit is disclosed. Unfortunately, these discussions, while usually clear enough in themselves, are not entirely consistent with each other. Heidegger discusses three ways in which Vorhandenheit is disclosed: through cognition (Erkenntnis), unusability, or anxiety (Angez). He does not seem to realize that the Vorhandenheit he says is disclosed in these various ways is not in fact the same. We shall examine these three types of Vorhandenheit.
The first is the Vorhandenheit we find through cognition or knowing. Knowing, Heidegger tells us, is "grounded beforehand in a Being-already-alongside-the-world which essentially constitutes Dasein's Being" (SZ, 61). He goes on to say:

Because of this kind of Being towards the world which lets us encounter entities encountered within-the-world purely in the way they look (eidos)... an express look at what is thus encountered is possible. Looking at something in this way is sometimes a determinate taking up of a direction towards something, an aligning of our sighting of the Vorhanden... In this kind of "dwelling" as a holding-one-self-back from any manipulation or utilization, the perception of the Vorhanden comes to pass. (SZ, 61-2)

This perception is itself a way of Being-in-the-world (SZ, 62).

It is for this reason that Heidegger can write that Zuhandenheit is not to be understood as merely a way of taking them, as if such 'aspects' were read into the 'entities' which we proximally encounter, as if some world-stuff which is proximally vorhanden in itself were 'given subjective colouring' in this way. Such an interpretation would overlook the fact that for this to be the case these entities would have to be understood and discovered beforehand as something purely vorhanden, and must have priority and take the lead in the sequence of those dealings with the 'world' in which something is discovered and made one's own. But this already runs counter to the ontological meaning of cognition which we have exhibited as a founded mode of Being-in-the-world. (SZ, 71)

Here Heidegger seems to be saying that only cognition discloses the Vorhanden. We can see this if we put the argument slightly more formally:

(i) Cognition is a founded mode of Being-in-the-world.

(ii) Cognition discloses and discovers the Vorhanden.

(iii) We can only give an 'entity' 'subjective colouring' if we have already disclosed it as vorhanden.

(iv) But, because the Vorhanden is disclosed and discovered by cognition, and because cognition is a founded mode, we do not first (i.e., 'already') have 'entities' vorhanden.

(v) Therefore we do not constitute the Zuhanden by throwing 'subjective colouring' over vorhanden 'entities'.
Notice that this argument only works if we take (ii) as saying that only cognition discloses and discovers the *Vorhanden*. This seems to be at odds with Heidegger’s discussions of anxiety and unusability (to which we shall soon turn) which are not modes of cognition and yet which disclose *Vorhandenheit*. We are led to suspect that there is an equivocation about the term *Vorhanden*. If that is the case, we must ask about the character of that which is disclosed by cognition as being *vorhanden*. We just look at this type of *vorhanden* entity. But even this is a way of taking it up, a way of directing oneself towards it. Just-tarrying-alongside (*Nur-noch-verweilen-bei...*; Sz. 61), is still a form of comportment by *Dasein*. The *Vorhanden* disclosed through this comportment is still looked at as being very much a part of the world in which *Dasein* finds itself. In the “holding oneself back from any manipulation or utilization”, one withdraws oneself from the usual world in which our concern finds a context of implements and projects. *Vorhanden* entities here are made present through *Dasein*’s adopting a special attitude towards them, and thus the disclosure of their *Vorhandenheit* depends on *Dasein*. The entities *vorhanden* in this manner—what we shall call cognitive-*Vorhandenheit*—are not totally devoid of meaning. As we have seen, perception (Vernehmen) comes to pass (*vollzieht sich*) in the kind of ‘dwelling’ which holds itself back from using entities. “Perception has the kind of coming-to-pass of the address to and the speaking about something as something. On the basis of this interpretation—interpretation in the broadest sense—perception becomes determinate” (Sz. 62). Here Heidegger denies that perception is a neutral and fundamental way of *Being in-the-world*. It is instead a way of interpreting, and so we cannot use perception to explain the
presence of a pre-interpretive 'given'. For our purposes it is important to notice that knowing, perceiving and Vorhandenheit are phenomena found within one particular mode of Being-in-the-world, and that this mode is interpretive. The meaning of the Vorhanden will be different from the meaning of the Zuhanden, of course. "Meaning is the ... 'upon which' of a projection in terms of which something becomes understandable as something ..." (SZ, 151). The Zuhanden is always understood in terms of a totality of involvements. The cognitive-Vorhanden is not understood within the same totality. If the workshop (the context of tools within which we find zuhanden entities) becomes an object of cognition, the possibilities for using the tools fall to the side. The cognitive-vorhanden hammer just looks so-and-so, and this look contains no reference to the rest of the zuhanden context. Yet the cognitive-vorhanden hammer has meaning. It is perceived as something.

If it is seen purely in terms of its geometric form, for example, that is itself a meaning and the form is understood only in the context of regular and irregular geometric shapes.

Further, the cognitive-Vorhanden still contains a reference to the Zuhanden; the cognitive-vorhanden hammer still contains a reference to the zuhanden hammer. Consider how we would react to an entity which had no possible reference to anything zuhanden. Imagine an entity which we encountered purely through cognition, and in that cognition we discovered that it in no way could enter into any possible context of projects, uses or other items of equipment. Although I cannot imagine such an encounter, it would surely be different from the vorhanden entities we have so far considered. Part of the meaning of the cognitive-Vorhanden, then, is its possible reference to an 'upon which' in which we could find it zuhanden.

Now, what about the Vorhandenheit that is disclosed when we deal with
The tool becomes conspicuous when it is discovered as unusable. The **conspicuousness** presents the **zuhanden** tool in a certain **Unzubehördigkeit**. But this implies that the unusable just lies there—; it shows itself as tool—thing that looks so—and—so and in its **Zuhandenheit** as looking so—and—so was constantly also **vorhanden**. This pure **Vorhandenheit** announces itself in the tool, but only in order to withdraw itself again into the **Zuhandenheit** of that with which one concerns oneself, that is to say, the **Zuhandenheit** found in that which has been repaired. This **Vorhandenheit** of the unusable tool has not simply dispensed with all **Zuhandenheit**; the tool which is **vorhanden** in this manner still is not a merely occurring thing somewhere. The tool’s damage is still not a mere alteration of a thing, not a mere change of properties which occurs in a **Vorhandenheit**.  

(Se. 73)18

Unusability seems to be the broadest character of all **zuhanden** entities which reveal something of **Vorhandenheit**. What is unusable because the tool "proves to be damaged, or the material unsuitable" ("stellit sich als beschadigt heraus, das Material als ungeeignet"; Se. 73) shows itself conspicuously.

Yet conspicuousness is just one of the three ways tools may show themselves in their unusability. The others are obtrusiveness and obstinacy (Se. 74). **Vorhandenheit** shows itself differently in these two.

In this discussion of the conspicuousness of the unusable, Heidegger is at pains to show that we do not encounter mere things essentially devoid of any of the meaning we find with the **Zuhanden**. The broken, unusable tool reveals its **Vorhandenheit** as the **Vorhandenheit** of something which retains its reference to its possible **Zuhandenheit**; it is an entity which was **zuhanden** and which will give up its **Vorhandenheit** once it is repaired.

It is important to notice that here **Vorhandenheit** appears as a category of **Being** which was always present (if unnoticed and/or withdrawn) even when the tool was usable.

It is in the second possible mode of unusability that we come closest
to a pure Vorhandenheit. A tool is obtrusive (aufdringlich) when another tool is not simply broken, but is not there at all. The more we need the missing tool, the more the other zuaendent entities show themselves as vorhanden. For example, when I really want a beer but have no bottle opener, the beer loses its Zuhandheit and appears to be simply—and maddeningly—vorhanden. This "unremediable standing-there-before-us uncovers the Being-nothing-but-vorhanden of a Zuhand as a deficient mode of concern" (SZ, 73).

Concern (Besorgen) is one form of care (Sorge), and "...Being-in-the-world is essentially care" ("...das In-der-Welt-sein Wesenhaft Sorge ist..."; SZ, 193). Care is a "primordial structural totality" ("ursprungliche Strukturganzheit"; SZ, 193) and "Care is always... concern and solicitude" ("Sorge ist immer... Besorgen und Fürsorge"; SZ, 193). Uncovering Nur-noch-vorhandensein as a deficient mode of concern remains a mode of caring. This can be seen simply by considering our reaction to that which is obtrusive: we do not stop caring about that which obstructs itself. We get annoyed and frustrated. The obtruding tool reveals a nur-noch-vorhandensein about which we care. The Vorhandenheit of the unusable tool is disclosed as a denying of the possibility of the actualization of our project. It depends ontologically on that context of projects. Similarly, a missing tool can only make another unusable because the two tools are understood within their relation, the same relation that characterizes the workshop as a whole. Even this 'pure' Vorhandenheit, this Nur-noch-vorhandensein, ontologically depends on the context within which entities are zuaendent.

The third mode of unusability is that of obstinacy (Aufdringlichkeit).
Here the obstinate entities stand in the way of the fulfillment of our projects (SZ, 73-4). This disturbs (stört) us (SZ, 74), and again we see that this **Vorhandenheit** is not one about which we do not care at all, for we can only be disturbed if we care. Further, the obstinate entity calls for our attention (nach Erledigung ruft; SZ, 74). We must remove the obstacle. Presumably it then has entered into a new context of projects and tools directed at removing it. The nail we have driven badly, the boulder in the farmer's field, are revealed as obstacles only in the context of the house we wish to build and the field we wish to till. Their **Vorhandenheit** ontologically depends on a context of projects and tools.

The **Vorhandenheit** revealed through unusability (in all three forms), then, depends ontologically on the context in which entities may be **zubanden**.

Let us briefly approach this from a slightly different angle. In all three cases Heidegger intimates or tells us that unusable-**Vorhandenheit** is the **Vorhandenheit of the **Zubanden**. The conspicuous **vorhanden** entity shows itself as something that "looks so-and-so and in its **Zubandenheit** as looking so-and-so was also always **vorhanden**" ("so und so aussieht und in seiner **Zubandenheit** als so aussehendes ständig auch **vorhanden war"; SZ, 73). The **Vorhandenheit** of what is obstructive is "**Being-nothing-but-**vorhanden of a **Zubanden**" ("das Nur-noch-**Vorhandensein eines **Zubanden**; SZ, 73). The **Vorhandenheit** of what is obstinate is "the **Vorhandenheit of the **Zubanden**" ("die **Vorhandenheit des **Zubanden"; SZ, 74). This indicates the ontological indebtedness of **Vorhandenheit to the **Zubanden, and perhaps vice versa. But that is precisely the question this chapter must answer.

These passages raise an important question: Heidegger seems not to have fully explained the presence of the **Vorhanden**. In the section from which
these passages are drawn, Heidegger intends to show how "the wordliness of the environment announces itself in entities within-the-world", to cite the title of the section ("Die an innerweltlich Seienden sich meldende Weltmässigkeit der Umwelt"; SZ, 72). But we want to know how there can be vorhanden entities which disrupt our projects. Clearly unusable-Vorhandenheit discloses itself only against the context of projects and tools. But this does not constitute a full explanation of the presence of the unusable any more than it would be enough to say that clouds can only reveal themselves within the context of the sky; we still want to know "how the clouds got there". Why are we not free to will the boulder away? How can equipment become unusable? Unusability can announce itself only if there is a context of uses, granted. But surely even this context of uses depends upon something that entities themselves 'bring' to our encounter with them: the hammer can be useful or useless only if it has definite possibilities which we may disclose within the context of projects and tools. Both the usable and the unusable ontologically depend on more than our projects. We shall return to this problem.

In what sense is unusable-Vorhandenheit a type of Vorhandenheit at all? I take it to be a main point of Heidegger's discussion of unusable-Vorhandenheit that although what is unusable (and vorhanden) may seem to have slipped free from our world of projects and uses, it in fact has not, for it can only be unusable within that world. Unusable-Vorhandenheit is still beholden to the world. What is unusable does not sit there as a lump of pure and meaningless matter. Rather, it retains its reference to the context of projects it has rendered (at least temporarily) unachievable.

We should notice, however—and I do not think Heidegger makes enough
of this—that the unusable Vorhanden entity does more than refer to
the context in which we find Zuhandenheit. The broken hammer, the boulder,
the bottle which lacks an opener, all are present as having certain
definite characteristics: the boulder cannot be cultivated, the broken
hammer drives no nails, the bottle cannot be emptied of its contents.
These possibilities need not be phrased only negatively. The boulder has
hardness and bulk which resist the plow, the hammer has an internal tension
which both lets it be used as a hammer and means that if it breaks it
cannot be easily repaired, and the bottle has a balance of forces (cap
against the pressure of the gas) which makes it both useful as a container
of gas under pressure and useless if we lack an opener. What is the ontological
source of the presence of these definite possibilities? This is our central
question, for it is precisely the definiteness (or resoluteness) of these
possibilities which ontologically characterize those entities we are most
willing to call things.

The Vorhandenheit of the unusable is the presence of the definite
possibilities of entities; these possibilities can be disclosed but they
are disclosed as not being essentially dependent on disclosure. Heidegger
seems to mean something slightly different by the Vorhandenheit he finds
when discussing unusability; he finds a Vorhandenheit which is the way of
Being of entities revealed against the context of projects and tools and
which in one way or another conspicuously disrupts those projects. The
unusable—Vorhandenheit which I am proposing is: the Being of entities which
enables them to announce themselves (conspicuously) as not fitting into
our context of projects; this is an announcement of definite possibilities
of the entity which the entity itself has brought to the encounter. Two
points about this amended version of Heidegger's presentation of unusable-Vorhandenheit should be noted; we shall soon return to them. First, the disclosure of possibilities which are not dependent on disclosure is itself a disclosure. That is, this independence from disclosure is itself disclosed. Second, if we take the heart of the Vorhandenheit disclosed through unusability to be the presence of definite and resolute possibilities of entities, possibilities disclosed as being independent ontologically from their disclosure, then there is a sense in which we can say that the Zuhanden themselves contain this Vorhandenheit: a tool can only be useful within a context of projects and tools because it has certain of its own possibilities.

Now let us look at the third way Vorhandenheit is disclosed: through anxiety. "As one of Dasein's possibilities of Being, anxiety— together with Dasein itself as disclosed in it—provides the phenomenal basis for the explicit grasping of Dasein's primordial totality of Being" (SZ, 182). Heidegger discusses anxiety because it is the way Dasein can actually come to grips with its primordial totality, a totality Heidegger has already laid out for us as a 'theory'. Anxiety is an existential state of mind in which Dasein is actually brought before its totality; it serves to disclose to an existing, factual Dasein the truth of what Heidegger has explained. As such, the possibility of anxiety is Dasein's possibility of discovering its own totality. Put differently, it is conceivable that some philosopher could analyze Dasein in its totality and come up with a different sort of totalization. How could we choose between it and Heidegger's? By pointing to anxiety, Heidegger can say, "Perhaps this other philosopher's scheme is logically possible, but it is not the totalization we actually find in factual Dasein. We find the type I have indicated. And we find it
in anxiety."

I stress this because I wish to maintain that anxiety serves a very specific function within S2 and within existence. Anxiety does not reveal the full truth of Being; it reveals Dasein's commitment to the world while masking other aspects of Being.

What is it that anxiety reveals? If it does not directly reveal Dasein's primordial totality of Being, it is at least the condition for the possibility of this revelation. We are told that Being-anxious discloses "primordially and directly the world as world" ("ursprünglich und direkt die Welt als Welt"; S2, 187). Anxiety reveals Dasein's Being-towards-its-end (S2, 254). Anxiety individualizes Dasein and allows it to be come certain of the totality of its potentiality-for-Being (S2, 266, 277). It is "the most elemental disclosure of thrown Dasein..." ("die elementare Erschlossenheit des geworfenen Daseins..."; S2, 276, see also 342). Anxiety discloses the indefiniteness of death (S2, 308). Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its thrownness and reveals the uncanniness of everyday, familiar Being-in-the-world (S2, 342). Anxiety brings Dasein back to its own that-it-is-ness (S2, 343).

Anxiety reveals Dasein, and with it, the world as such. We are anxious. Heidegger tells us, in the face of the world as such (S2, 186-7) and not in the face of any particular thing; this distinguishes anxiety from fear.21

Dasein usually interprets itself in terms of the entities closest to it. I lose myself in my projects, I forget that I am the one projecting these projects. I forget my own role in interpreting the world and the things of the world. In anxiety, however, the things of the world are stripped of their involvement with me. The pen I use to write my dissertation now seems to be just a lump, devoid of significance. I see that my projects are not ultimately valuable;
I have conferred their value. I can no longer lose myself in my projects because these projects no longer are interesting; I am detached from them. There is no thing that claims my attention. This no-thing is the world (SZ, 166-7). The world is not the collection of things of the world; it is rather the relational totality of significances in which I usually find myself.

Before anxiety I had lived in the world as if it were a firm ground. I opened doors and wrote my dissertation as if the meaning of doors and the value of a dissertation were part of a world for which I had no responsibility. In anxiety, however, my responsibility is shown (SZ, 188). The things of the world refuse my projections, and so my projective nature is itself revealed. Further, I cannot escape from being involved in a world (although I seemed to have temporarily escaped involvement with the things of the world) and this accounts for the oppressive emptiness of the mood of anxiety. I am forced to be in a world, yet I am also responsible for that world.

Anxiety, then, strips the things of the world of their involvement and thus shows how deeply we are involved in the world. The primary effect of anxiety, and Heidegger's primary aim in discussing it, is to reveal Dasein's responsibility for itself. It is for this reason that when Heidegger talks of what anxiety reveals he almost always talks of some aspect of Dasein which is revealed. These aspects are inter-related and seem to be aspects of Dasein's being thrown and finite, and thus being capable of being a totality. It is an error to take anxiety as a mood that discloses the things of the world in a primordial way. Rather, anxiety masks categories of Being other than Dasein's in order to reveal that latter type of Being, namely existence.

To support this, let us look at how Zuhändchenheit and Vorhandenheit appear in anxiety. This method is problematic because in attempting to show that...
these categories are not fully revealed in anxiety, I am relying on a
previous notion of what a full revelation of these two categories would
tell us. Yet we have already begun with our discussion of unusable-
Vorhandenheit to work out this fuller revelation. We shall see that
anxiety-Vorhandenheit (i.e., the Vorhandenheit revealed by anxiety) is
different from the two types of Vorhandenheit we have located so far.

Heidegger tells us that we are not anxious in the face of the Vorhanden
and Zuhanden:

... the threat does not come from the Zuhanden and the
Vorhanden, but rather directly from the fact that all the
Zuhandene and Vorhandene 'say' simply nothing any more.
Dasein has no involvement with the environmental entities
any more. The world in which I exist has sunk into insigni-
ficance, and the world thus disclosed can free only entities
in the character of uninvolved. The Nothing of the world,
in the face of which anxiety is anxious, does not signify
that perhaps in anxiety an absence of Vorhandene within-the-
world has been experienced. The Vorhanden must be encountered
in such a way that it has exactly no involvement whatsoever
with it and so it can appear in an empty mercilessness. (SZ,
343)\[22

What are we to make of this passage? Heidegger is at pains to show that in
anxiety we do not tremble in the face of any one entity or even any one
type of entity. We tremble in the face of the world, not in the face of
the Zuhanden or Vorhanden. But Heidegger does not mean to tell us that in
anxiety the things of the world simply vanish in every way. If they did,
we would suspect him of a subjectivism in which the Being of the things
of the world completely depends on our mood. But this clearly is not the
case, for in some sense in anxiety I still do encounter the things of the
world: the Vorhandene are encountered as having exactly no involvement;
they appear as merciless and empty of all the meanings and projects I
wish to thrust upon them.
On the one hand, Heidegger tells us that the anxiety-Vorhanden appears as resisting our every projection, and as having no involvement. On the other hand, this lack of involvement is one that we encounter, and it is itself an appearing as something. It refuses to become involved in our ordinary projects, in our everyday structuring of the world. But it does not retreat into some perfect An-sich; it is still involved with us and we with it. Empty mercilessness is itself a character of Being, one which only makes sense within the possibility of entities not being empty and merciless; for the mercilessness to appear we must recall (retain) the previous mercy of entities (i.e., their availability and suitability to us and our projects, and perhaps their 'willingness' to let us understand ourselves in their terms).

Anxiety-Vorhandenheit, then, is the apparent Being—apart from our projective disclosure which is itself disclosed, and for this reason it may properly be called a type of Vorhandenheit. But it stands in contrast to unusable-Vorhandenheit. When the unusable-Vorhanden announces itself, it does so by announcing certain of its definite possibilities which make it unsuitable for, or actually destructive of, our projects: the boulder reveals its impenetrable bulk and so obstructs our project of tilling the field. The anxiety-Vorhanden does not announce any particular possibilities which could function within a project involving a context of zuhanden implements. Instead it announces a complete lack of definite possibilities. These two types of Vorhandenheit, then, are incompatible, for one announces definite possibilities and the other announces a lack of definite possibilities.

Through unusability Dasein learns that Dasein is not the sole source of the definite possibilities of the thing. In anxiety Dasein understands that Dasein

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is uninvolved with the Vorhanden and thus is not the source of its ontological empty mercilessness. From unusability we are led to believe that entities have some other source for their definite possibilities. From anxiety we are led to believe that entities have no other source for their definite possibilities and thus have no definite possibilities of their own. Anxiety masks the non-Dasein sources of meaning so that Dasein is revealed as Being-responsible for its world's meaning. In unusability the non-Dasein source is brought forth in the definite possibilities of things for which Dasein is not entirely responsible.

The ontological lessons of these two types of Vorhandenheit are different. Which are we to accept? I think we learn more about Vorhandenheit from unusability than from anxiety. Anxiety raises the possibility of choosing either authenticity or inauthenticity (S2, 191); it does not itself make the choice. Anxiety is not the absolutely revelatory way in which the truth of beings is disclosed. Rather, it is the way that Dasein factually finds itself confronted with the possibility of authentically or inauthentically understanding itself and its situation.

In order to make further progress with this problem, let us consider how Vorhandenheit appears in the three ways of disclosing it we have discussed so far: cognition, unusability and anxiety. The Vorhandenheit we find by cognition is one at which we just look. It does not necessarily arise as an obstacle to some project of ours. Indeed, the cognition may itself be the project: we can willfully reflect in order to discover the Vorhende. In a certain sense, sense data theorists do this (and recommend that we do it also) when they perform the thought experiment of 'seeing' our everyday world as coloured patches. The 'just looking' which is the cognitive way of
finding the Vorhanden remains a form of concern, a way Dasein comports itself towards entities in the world. As entities in the world, the cognitive Vorhandene are not an-sich. This holding-onself-back from manipulation which characterizes the cognitive-Vorhanden also distinguishes it from the unusable-Vorhanden which arises as an obstacle to our project; this latter invites our manipulation and then frustrates us. We do not hold ourselves back from the unusable so much as we are held back by it. Our comportment towards it is quite different from our comportment towards the cognitive-Vorhanden. Obviously, the unusable-Vorhanden does not appear as an entity an-sich, for it invites and provokes our involvement. Our comportment towards the anxiety-Vorhanden is yet different from these two other types. The appearance of the unusable-Vorhanden was the appearance of definite possibilities of the Vorhanden, making it possible for us to project other projects involving this entity (such as dynamiting the boulder, using a screw-driver to open the bottle of beer, etc.). The anxiety-vorhanden entity refuses to yield definite characteristics because the context in which they might appear—a context of projects—has fallen away. Instead the Vorhanden appears in an empty mercilessness and our comportment towards it is exactly that of being anxious. As encountered, the anxiety-Vorhanden is not an-sich.

Is there anything in common? First, there is the ontological characteristic that all three types of vorhanden entities are encountered and thus are not an-sich. But this is true of the Zuhanden as well. Thus this does not much further our attempt to understand Vorhandenheit except insofar as it helps to distinguish it from a conception of the real which takes the real as being that which is independent from our disclosive encounter with it. Second, in every case of Vorhandenheit, the Vorhanden is disclosed as
being what it is regardless of its disclosure to \textit{Dasein}. We must look at this second characteristic more closely. First we shall contrast it with \textit{Zuhandenheit} and then look at how it is manifested in each of the three types of \textit{Vorhandenheit}.

\textit{Unusable-Vorhandenheit} is the type more explicitly contrasted with \textit{Zuhandenheit}. When we use a tool, our involvement with the tool, and the tool’s involvement in the context of other tools (the workshop), do not themselves appear. The Being of tools remains inconspicuous. A tool becomes conspicuous when it becomes unusable. Then its character of not being totally subject relative comes to appearance. This is not to say that every person faced with a broken tool becomes an ontologist; it is rather to say that \textit{Vorhandenheit} can withstand our explicit gaze. Reflection can work back from unusability to \textit{Vorhandenheit} and non-subject-relativity and still have a genuine appearing of the \textit{Vorhanden}. But when reflection works back from \textit{Zuhandenheit}, the \textit{Zuhanden} withdraws from genuine appearance for this genuine appearing takes place only when the tool is used and not noticed.

The \textit{Zuhanden} can only appear in \textit{Dasein}’s immediate and unreflective involvement with it, and thus it is subject-relative, although, as I shall try to indicate, it is not totally subject-relative. The \textit{Vorhanden} appears as not being subject-relative.

How does this independence from \textit{Dasein}’s Being appear in each of the three types of \textit{Vorhandenheit}? (It must be remembered that this independence is itself appearing.) We find the cognitive-\textit{Vorhanden} by just looking. We attempt just to look precisely to eliminate the subjective element; we attempt to become ‘pure recipients’. Of course this is not possible; we have brought about a modification of the subject and such a modification is itself.
never neutral. We attempt just to look in order to see how things appear when no one is looking. There is a certain self-deception here (based on a metaphysics which takes reality as the highest category and knowing as the ultimate form of disclosure, a metaphysics Heidegger wishes to re-think) and thus we should not take cognitive-Vorhandenheit as a primordial form of Vorhandenheit. In unusability, things appear to be what they are (as having their own definite possibilities) regardless and even despite of how we have initially understood them. Yet they remain disclosed within a context of projects, projects which have failed. In anxiety, the things of the world seem to resist appearing in any intelligible way, and thus seem to resist every attempt by the subject to invest them with meaning. Yet even this is a way in which things appear to Dasein. Like the cognitive-Vorhanden, the anxiety-Vorhanden is in a certain way deceptive: it appears to have withdrawn from meaningful appearance, yet this is itself a meaningful appearance (although not an appearing of the usual sort of meaning).

In these ways, the Vorhanden appears to be the real, where the real is that which is apart from our encounter with it. Yet in appearing to be the real, they are not the real, for the Vorhanden can only be what it is because it appears to Dasein. This is seen most clearly and most genuinely in the case of unusable-Vorhandenheit. Because the other two types are in some sense deceptive, and because Vorhandenheit as a correlative of Zuhandenhheit is only seen in the correlation in the case of unusable-Vorhandenheit, unusable-Vorhandenheit seems to be the most genuine sort of Vorhandenheit. All three are distinguished from the real by the fact that they each appear; the real can never be brought to appearance except as an abstract category.
Yet I wish to maintain that Vorhandenheit retains much of the function which metaphysics has ascribed to the real. Further, this function is vital to our existence on this earth, and plays an important, if relatively inconspicuous role in the analyses of SZ. To see this, we must explore the temporal meaning of Vorhandenheit. Otto Poggeler asks: "Could it not be that time . . . is the principle for the division of the meaning of Being into possible significations of Being, for instance, Being present-at-hand (vorhanden), Being ready-to-hand (zuliefer), Being as ek-sistence?". 23 It is because of its temporal determination that Vorhandenheit is related to reality.

2. The Temporality of Vorhandenheit

Heidegger does not deal clearly and in detail with the temporality of the Vorhanden. In Section 69A he gives us a description of the type of temporality necessary for Dasein to be able to find equipment to be usable, but this turns out to be an analysis of the temporality of circumsp ective concern, not of Vorhandenheit. The three modes of unusability (conspicuousness, obtrusiveness and obstinacy) can only come to appearance to a Dasein that awaits and retains: we await the 'towards which' within which the equipment is involved, and we retain in this awaiting that which is thus involved (SZ, 353). From these two characteristics arises a making-present (SZ, 354).

There are problems with this analysis, and chief among them is the question: What is it that is retained? Even if we were to straighten out this problem, we would not have a full temporal characterization of Vorhandenheit. Rather, we would have a characterization of the unusability which announces Vorhandenheit. Further, this would only be one sort of Vorhandenheit. The next section (69B) tells us how circumsp ective concern becomes modified into the theoretical discovery of the Vorhanden. Heidegger
here shows how circumspective concern becomes modified into 'theoretical' concern, within which the character of the Vorhanden which he has already discussed becomes manifest. But we do not here learn of the temporal character of the Vorhanden, but rather of the temporal character of a type of cognition which discovers the Vorhanden. Further, this deals only with the cognitive-Vorhanden.

Similarly, Heidegger's temporal analysis of anxiety does not tell us of the temporality of the Vorhandenheit disclosed within it. And even if it did, we would still want to know about the temporality of that category of which anxiety-Vorhandenheit is one mode.

Too strictly dividing that which lets something be manifest and that which is made manifest may result in misunderstanding. Still, in the final analysis this need not stop us from maintaining the distinction. If we say, for example, that when something that we expected to be zugehanden is missing we are not 'not-making-present' (Nichtgegenwartigen) but instead are 'making-unpresent' (Ungegenwartigen) something which one has expected (Erwarteten), and that this is a deficient mode of the present (Z, 355), we may have answered the question "What are the existential conditions for the appearance as missing of that which is missing?" but we still want to know the ontological conditions for the missingness of what is missing. It can be disclosed as missing only because we expected it to be there, but how can it not be there in the first place? Something can only appear as obstructive because we have 'projects' which it obstructs, but how can it obstruct those projects? While we must bear in mind that the existential and ontological conditions are not totally independent of each other, surely we must still be able to distinguish them. If not, if the ontological is reduced to the existential,
we will have been untrue both to Heidegger and to experience.

We will have been untrue to Heidegger because he certainly does not propose reducing the ontological to the existential. Rather, the existential gives us access to Being without being identical with that to which it gives us access. Further, we would be left with no way to explain the Being of that which is existentially. Yet it is just this Being at which Heidegger aims in §2.

And we will have been untrue to experience. To see this we must perform our own phenomenological analysis of Vorhandenheit since Heidegger's remains unclear. This we have already begun in the earlier portions of this chapter. It was the guide of our attempt to see what each of the three modes of Vorhandenheit have in common. If this had been a purely logical analysis, it would not have mattered if we had come up with something that seemed completely foreign to experience.

In all three types of Vorhandenheit, the Vorhanden appears as that which is independent of our disclosure. We shall soon discuss the fact that the Zuhanden is also implicitly taken as being independent of our disclosure and as having its own possibilities; here it is important only to notice that the Zuhanden withdraws from this explicit appearance whereas the Vorhanden does not.

Can we perform a temporal analysis of this phenomenon? The Vorhanden appears to be present. Its presence seems not to depend on Dasein; regardless of whether Dasein encounters it or not the Vorhanden was already there all along—or so it appears to Dasein. The boulder seems to have been there all along, even before I disclosed it. It seems to have an ontological source other than Dasein, for it seems to have been before Dasein disclosed
it. In experience, then, the appearance of the *Vorhanden* strikes us as a revelation of how things really were all along. As Wolfgang Müller-Lauter puts it, "Being in the mode of *Vorhandenheit* manifest themselves as that which previously, before all useful dealings with them, already were." 24 Although we might want to say that *vorhanden* entities appear also to be that which will continue to be after *Dasein* has stopped disclosing them, it seems to me that this projection of their future is based on our primordial revelation of their pastness; this is not a central point. My interpretation has the advantage of drawing a connection between *Vorhandenheit* and what is hidden in untruth (which we shall discuss later) as well as seeming to me to be more phenomenologically accurate.

Phenomenological considerations, external to the content of S2, tend to support this analysis: We seem to be heading into our future while the things of the world recede into the past. I live and grow in my future possibilities while the things around me get older and the things I encountered in the past grow further and further away from me. For example, the stand of trees chopped down when I was twelve seems to be receding further and further into my past. My locus, as *Dasein*, is the future, whereas *vorhanden* entities have their locus in the past. 25

4. The Realness of Tools and the Temporality of Independence

Before we point to various places where Heidegger observes the non-subjective character (i.e., the determinate possibilities of things announced as being independent of *Dasein*'s disclosure) of things, we should note that Heidegger is quite explicit about the non-subjective character of certain other phenomena. These phenomena are ones which *Dasein* cannot will away.
although they could not be without Dasein. For example, the existentials, the 'formal structures' which are the grounds for the possibility of Dasein, are not the simple products of Dasein's whim. They are subjective in that without Dasein they could not be, but they are not up to the discretion of Dasein (except insofar as they must be modified in an existenziell manner by every existing Dasein). Second, the necessity of the world for the Being of Dasein and the particular world into which Dasein is thrown are not subject to the whim of Dasein. Third, one is not free to escape one's heritage; it is something we inherit (SZ, Sect. 74). Finally, we may wish to include our language as something which is not simply subjective.

This is to say nothing more than that Dasein is factual and thrown. It is in facticity and thrownness that we find Heidegger's most explicit recognition of the resistance of certain phenomena to reduction to simple subjectivity. Of course, we have here been underplaying the fact that thrownness is always thrown possibility, and that we bring freedom to facticity. But the fact that we can be thrown into our factual situation only because we are fundamentally free does not mean that freedom has the upper hand. Freedom and thrownness are equiprimordial. We are free for our thrownness, and thrown into freedom.

It will be observed, of course, that these phenomena into which we are thrown are not, in any significant sense of the word, things. We shall now discuss the non-subjective and, so to speak, thrown character of things. But it should be noticed that if we succeed in finding at least tacit acknowledgement that things have possibilities of their own which appear to be independent of Dasein, this will not give us a fully adequate characterization of the thingness of things, for it will fail to distinguish the above non-subjective
phenomena (existentials, world, heritage, language) from things. To do this it is necessary to locate the ontological source of things, a task Heidegger only begins fully to accomplish in "Origin of the Artwork" with its discussion of the earth (see Chapter III).

Phenomena have a proper mode of access to which Dasein must submit itself or else be in error. Thus, the phenomena of phenomenology "must . . . show themselves with the kind of access which genuinely belongs to them" ("muss sich . . . in der ihm genuin zugehörigen Zugangsart zeisen"; SZ, 37). Similarly, "The character of possibility corresponds, on each occasion, with the kind of Being of the entity which is understood" (SZ, 151).28 This is true of non-thing-like phenomena as well: for Being-in there is "a sense appropriate to the phenomenon itself" ("einen echten, dem Phanomen selbst angemessenen Sinne . . . "; SZ, 58). Phenomena (including things) have their own kind of Being which dictates the appropriate way of approach for Dasein. Dasein must approach them appropriately or else miss the phenomena as they genuinely are. If this were not the case, phenomenology would have no purpose at all, for any one approach, resulting in any showing of the phenomenon, would be as good as any other.

But the sort of "kind of Being" Heidegger has in mind is what other philosophers would call categorial. Dasein, the Zuhanden and the Vorhanden (and any other kinds of Being along these lines) have their own proper modes of access. In experience, however, and I believe at least tacitly in SZ, this notion of a proper mode of access applies to more particular phenomena.

A hammer, for example, is not just something zuhanden: it is also a hammer. As something zuhanden, it has its own proper mode of access, namely unreflective use of the hammer, for reflection is inappropriate
to the genuine display of the hammer as *zuhanden*. But I can approach the hammer appropriately as something *zuhanden* and still approach it inappropriately as a hammer: I can unreflectively grasp it and try to use it as a saw.

Any case where I use a tool that turns out to be inappropriate to the task is a case where I have approached it in a way inappropriate to the genuine possibilities it offers. As William J. Richardson puts it, Dasein lets the instrument be both ontically as a hammer and ontologically as a *Geiendes*. Ontological and ontic appropriateness (if I may so term them) are not isomorphic. There is, for example, only one way ontologically to approach a hammer as something *zuhanden*. But there are many possibilities for using the hammer, most of the ones we would think of being more or less appropriate to the hammer: only a fool would try to fly by holding on to one. We rarely disclose entities in ways completely ontically inappropriate. This is because we already know in advance what the range of genuine possibilities of the hammer are, and these are possibilities which the hammer 'brings' to our disclosure of it. The fact that sane humans do not try to force arbitrarily possibilities on things ("I'm going to use these feathers to build a strongbox") is evidence that we have already submitted ourselves to our world, a world in which there are things with definite possibilities beyond our subjective discretion. The fact that these possibilities of things do not seem to depend ontologically on our way of approach— they are revealed as having been there all along, whereas *Zuhandenheit* withdraws if we approach it inappropriately— indicates just how real these possibilities seem. This leads us to ask if the Being of the hammer resides only in its *Zuhandenheit*, for if it does, how are we to account for these definite and resolute possibilities? We want to learn of their ontological source.
All this is unclear in S2. In CP Heidegger is ready to admit the particular whiteness (Washeit) of equipment to the ontological constitution of entities (GP, 415), but he still does not fully discuss the ontological source of this Washeit. He traces it back to the tool's involvement in Dasein's world (GP, 416-3) (and ultimately to the temporal horizon), but this tells us of the conditions for the disclosure of the Washeit without telling us enough about the conditions for the Being of the possibilities of the tool which are its Washeit.

In S2, Heidegger recognizes that things appear as having their own definite possibilities but he does not discuss it at length. He says, for example, that equipment can only genuinely show its Being in dealings cut to the measure of the tool (S2, 69), and that the Zuhanden "is in any case either suitable or unsuitable" ("sein allenfalls Gesignheit und Ungeeignetheiten ..."; S2, 83), as opposed to being a mere Ding with properties attached. Finally, and less clearly, he tells us that as understanding, Dasein projects its Being upon possibility; this Being-towards-possibility is a potentiality-for-Being "because of the counter-thrust of these possibilities as disclosed in Dasein" ("durch den Rückschlag dieser als erschlossener in das Dasein ..."; S2, 148). In Einführung in die Metaphysik (EM), Heidegger puts it well: The possibility of the chalk's being guided along the blackboard and of being used up is not something we add to the thing by thought. It is itself, as this entity, in this possibility. Otherwise it would not be chalk... Correspondingly, every entity has in it this potentiality in a different way... It has in itself a definite aptitude for a definite use. (EM, 219-23)

Our question is not how can Dasein disclose these appropriate or inappropriate possibilities, but what is the source of that which thus appears in Dasein's disclosure.
In some other passages we can see Heidegger acknowledging that equipment brings its own possibilities to our disclosure of it. He seems to find two characteristics of the involvement of the Zuhanden:

With any such entity [i.e., freed for its Being and its involvement] there is some involvement. The fact that it has such an involvement is ontologically determinative for the Being of such an entity, and is not an ontical assertion about it. That in which it is involved is the 'towards which' of serviceability and the 'for which' of usability. (SZ, 84)

We may wish to add detrimentality (Abtraglichkeit) to the list: "The Zuhanden is discovered as such in its serviceability, its usability and its detrimentality" ("Das Zuhandene ist als solches erdeckt in seiner Dienlichkeit, Verwendbarkeit, Abtraglichkeit"; SZ, 144). The list may not be exhausted, for Heidegger talks of serviceability, usability and detrimentality "and the like" ("und dergleichen"; SZ, 83) as kinds of involvement. On the other hand, it is likely that only objects of fear are discovered in their detrimentality, but Heidegger leaves the issue unclear.

We are safe in saying that the Zuhanden is necessarily discovered at least as serviceable: "The reference 'serviceability for' is... an ontologico-categorial determination of the tool as tool" ("Die Verweisung 'Dienlichkeit zu' ist... eine ontologisch-kategorische Bestimmtheit des Zeugs als Zeug"; SZ, 78). He discusses serviceability and the others in order to show the involvement of a tool in its context, and the possible nature of the references within the context: he italicizes the 'ability' of serviceability to emphasize that it is a possibility. But we are led to ask: Whence serviceability?

Heidegger makes it clear that serviceability is serviceability for Dasein. But more than just Dasein is involved, for not all tools are equally
serviceable. A screw-driver may serve as a can opener, but a can opener would be even more serviceable. Richard Schmitt is undoubtedly right when he says that the properties belonging to gear (Zweck) are "not properties belonging to gear independently of all uses and awareness of gear, for they depend as much on our techniques and skills as on the features of the item of gear." And it is undoubtedly vital to notice that a can opener can only be serviceable within a context of projects and other tools. But this does not remove the question: What is the source of the peculiar possibilities of the can opener which enable it to be appropriately or inappropriately projected?

A serviceable tool— what we would otherwise call a good tool— has certain definite possibilities of its own and maintains those definite possibilities. A good corkscrew is good not only because it has features that enable us to lift corks from bottles, but also because it retains those features despite the pressure we exert on it in repeated use of it. A bad corkscrew (an unserviceable one) might easily lift corks, but might also melt if not refrigerated or start straightening itself out. Good modelling clay retains the feature of holding its shape until we reform it.

Serviceability depends on the tool bringing something of its own to the encounter with Dasein and on its resolutely holding on to those possibilities it offers. It also depends on Dasein's disclosing those possibilities in a project. Heidegger's analysis of equipmentality and our everyday encounter with equipment both depend on the recognition (tacit or explicit) that the tool offers us its own possibilities.

We can encounter tools as resolutely offering their own possibilities (which they have brought to the encounter) because we encounter tools as being
disclosed as being independent of disclosure. I will not attempt a formal
proof of this. Rather, a phenomenological approach will be used. Our task
is to exhibit more clearly the nature of the possibilities (for us) offered
by the tool as if these possibilities were its own. In this case 'its own'
must mean 'not simply created by Dasein'. With the 'its own' I mean to
indicate that these possibilities are possibilities we experience as having
found, not as having created. I begin with the phenomenological observation
that in our everyday comportment towards things, we act as if they were there
all along, as if they continue to be there even when we are not aware of them.

In treating them as if they were there all along, we treat them as
if they were ontologically independent of us. Although formally to say that
certain possibilities are disclosed as being independent of Dasein's
disclosure does not necessarily entail that they are disclosed as having-been
already even before Dasein disclosed them, phenomenologically the independence
has the character of having-been. There are logically possible metaphysical
schemes which could separate the independence from the character of having-
been (e.g., a god who brings entities into actuality only for the duration
of man's gaze), but we are not interested in what is logically possible so
much as in what is phenomenologically true to our experience.

Bertrand Russell, for example, says that it is logically possible that
the world and everything in it was created five minutes ago, for all the
'signs' of its antiquity (including our memories) could also have been
created then. This unfalsifiable proposition is disturbing precisely to
the extent to which we are already, committed to the view (in experience, if
not in reflection) that the world has the character of having-been. If we
modify Russell's proposal so that it says that at every moment of our existence
the world is created anew, we will only entertain this modified proposal as plausible if it states that the world is created anew with all the marks of its having-been already. We insist on this latter phrase because we find the world, in our experience, to be a place which already has-been.

Even if we were to accept the metaphysical notion that a god creates and maintains the things around us only so long as we are aware of them (thus accounting for the independence of things without locating its source in the thing's having-been), we will insist that these things are made to appear as if they already have-been. This is evidence for the notion that phenomenologically we experience the independence of the possibilities of the thing as ontologically located in its having-been; the metaphysical schemes intended to get around this still have to account for the phenomenological description of things as appearing to have-been.

Consider another way of approaching this: When we ask casually how things get their possibilities, we are tempted to spell out a causal chain. If we succumb to this temptation we have answered too easily, for the question asks about the possibilities—not the actuality—of the thing (as we will discuss in Chapter VI). But even this temptation bears witness to the accuracy of the phenomenological remark that we encounter the independence of the thing from disclosure in terms of its having been; the causal chain leads us back into the past to account for the independent character of the thing.

Thus, in our everyday experience we encounter tools as bringing their own definite possibilities to our encounter with them. Only because we encounter them in this way can we encounter them as serviceable, as appropriate or inappropriate to our tasks. To encounter possibilities as the thing's own means, phenomenologically, to encounter them as having-been already.

Two comments before proceeding. First, this does not tell us whether or
not Heidegger was explicitly aware of this when he wrote SZ. He assumes it but it may be a hidden assumption. I think he has been explicitly aware of it, he might have dealt more fully and more successfully with the ontological source of the thing's independence. As we shall see, however, there is reason to believe that he thought he was dealing with it when he wrote Section 43 on reality. The making explicit of this assumption of independence does not, however, materially affect the results of his analysis insofar as they bear on his aim of laying bare the Being of Dasein, for the assumption is, I believe, true. It would be different if it were an assumption that we or Heidegger wanted to reject. Second, in this analysis I have slighted the role of Dasein. This was done in order to bring out what is not due simply to Dasein's disclosure of the world.

This account of the announced independence (from Dasein's disclosure) of the possibilities which allow there to be serviceability (and hence allow there to be equipment) is in fact an account of the Vorhandenheit of the Zuhanden. It now remains to be seen how the two relate. This is a problem in its own right since Heidegger's remarks on the subject are difficult.

5. The Relation of the Zuhanden and Vorhanden

Heidegger poses himself a question:

This cognition pushes on beyond the Zuhandene met in concern to the laying bare of the merely Vorhanden. Zuhandenheit is the ontological-categorical determination of entities as they are in themselves. But there are Zuhandene only by reason of the Vorhanden. But, granting this thesis, does it follow that Zuhandenheit is ontologically founded on Vorhandenheit? (SZ, 71)3

Müller-Lauter points to another passage: "An equipment-thing which looks
so-and-so, and which in its *Zuhandenheit* as looking that way, has constantly been *vorhanden* also ("als Zeuendig, das so und so aussieht und in seiner Zuhandenheit als so aussehendes standig auch vorhanden war"; SZ, 73), and asks if this means what we saw Heidegger saying above: there are *Zuhandene* only by reason of the *Vorhanden*.

But Heidegger goes on not to grant the thesis that there are *Zuhanden* only by reason of the *Vorhanden*. In the next paragraph he grants the opposite thesis:

But even if, in the further progress of the ontological interpretation, *Zuhandenheit* proves itself to be the kind of Being of entities proximally discovered within-the-world, and even if its primordiality as compared with pure *Vorhandenheit* can be demonstrated, have all these explanations been of the slightest help towards understanding the phenomenon of the world ontologically? (SZ, 72)

This paragraph introduces the next section (Section 16) in which Heidegger shows that the *Vorhanden* is disclosed on the basis of *Zuhandenheit*, i.e. as unusable.

We should not take his seeming declaration of the 'primordiality' of *Vorhandenheit* as final, especially since the italicized sentence before it denies it.

Yet there is a real issue here, and Müller-Lauter hits upon it:

Entities appear in the mode of *Vorhandenheit*, referring back beyond their ontological genesis in the *Zuhanden*. But then must this previous-Being of entities as *Vorhandenheit* be the original ground for the possibility of the change over to the mode of *Vorhandenheit* ...?

He begins the proper inquiry:

In the mode of *Vorhandenheit* it is discovered that the entity was already real 'before' its entering the world ... That 'it was' means that it is grounded in the ecstatic of having-been. But this so-called pastness now lies 'before' care and therefore outside of its temporal sense. 25

The question is now one of the ecstatic nature of the *Vorhanden*. Addressing it will help us to see how the two categorial modes of Being are related.
We are tempted to look for a primordial mode of Being and for a simple ground-grounded relation. This temptation is grounded in the quest for a doctrine of Being based on the category of reality, a category on which (we think) we may safely build. As all students of Heidegger know, S2 is not an attempt to build a structure based on some Absolute Truth. Instead it is the elucidation of a circular structure where equiprimordiality is more to be trusted than is a putative fundamentum inconcussum. We need not choose between Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit. We instead need to see how they relate without first assuming that if one is the ground of the other, the second cannot also be the ground of the first.

If we want to understand the relation of the two, the obvious place to begin is Section 69B, "The Temporal Meaning of the Modification of Circumspective Concern into the Theoretical Discovery of the Vorhandene in the world". Heidegger tells us that he aims in this section to give a more concrete demonstration of the temporality of Being-in-the-world. With this aim, we shall trace how the theoretical attitude towards the 'world' 'arises' out of circumspective concern with the Zuhanden. (S2, 386).

Why do we need this additional demonstration? He has already, in 69A, shown the temporality of circumspective concern. It would be a mistake to think that we need the additional demonstration in order to complete the temporal analysis of all possible ways of Being-in-the-world, for while the existential analytic may be intended to show us how any and every way of Dasein's Being-in-the-world is possible, Heidegger does not pretend to carry out an analysis of every possible existential way of so being. Indeed, he tells us that "In seeking the ontological genesis of the theoretical attitude, we ask which of those conditions implied in Dasein's state of Being are
existentially necessary for the possibility of Being's existing in the way of scientific research" (SZ, 357). But there are other possible types of theoretical attitude, including that of philosophers who are not engaged in scientific research.

Heidegger does not offer this analysis, then, in order to complete a set of analyses which, taken together, are exhaustive of our possible ways of Being-in-the-world. Instead it is just what he says, an additional demonstration of the temporal basis of all Being-in-the-world. It is safe to speculate that Heidegger takes the scientific attitude for his example because it is this attitude that must forcefully challenges the phenomenological ontology he wishes to accomplish. The scientific attitude was and is prevalent and seems to be an irresistible force. Heidegger thus stands himself against an objection the philosophical community could be expected to raise against his thought.

I will not offer a complete gloss of this section. Instead let me note two points about it: 1) It is our understanding of Being which changes over, thus changing the Being of the entity. 2) Heidegger wishes to maintain that the entities and their mode of Being discovered by the scientific attitude are not fictions totally dependent on the attitude of the discovering Dasein, even though the discovery of these entities depends on a change in attitude and understanding ‘held’ by the discovering Dasein.

Let us begin with our first point. A subhanden entity changes over when we talk about it differently than we do in circumspective concern (SZ, 361).

When we are using a tool circumspectively, we can say, for instance, that the hammer is too heavy or too light. Even the proposition that the hammer is heavy can give expression to a concerndful deliberation, and signify that the hammer is not an easy one—that is to say, that it takes force to handle it, or that it will be hard to manipulate. But this proposition can also mean that the entity before us, which we already know circumspectively as a hammer, has a weight ... (SZ, 360-1)
The difference between these meanings of the proposition is that the first is a deliberation within a context of projects and uses (the hammer is too heavy for us to use to accomplish our project) while the second makes a statement which ignores the context of projects and uses, for to say that the hammer has a weight is to say nothing about the meaning of this weightiness for our projects.

But, Heidegger reminds us, "what we are talking about—the heavy hammer—shows itself differently when our way of talking is modified" (SZ, 361). This is not because we are looking away (absehen) from the equipment character of the Zuhandend, but because we are looking at it (ansehen) in a new way as something vorhanden (SZ, 361). "The understanding of Being of Being by which our concernful dealings with entities within-the-world have been guided has changed over" (SZ, 361). But does a change in understanding indicate a change in Being? If so, is Being subjective?

Heidegger now poses himself two questions: Is our 'taking' something as vorhanden sufficient to constitute the scientific attitude? And is it even necessary, since some sciences (such as economics) take the Zuhandend as their 'object' (SZ, 361)? The first question Heidegger wishes us to answer in the negative, and this indicates what we already know, namely that Vorhandenheit manifests itself to people other than scientists.

The answer to the second question seems to rely on denying the assertion that sciences like economics truly manage to retain the Zuhandendheit of the usually zuhandend entities they study. These sciences, like all sciences, overlook an essential aspect of Zuhandendheit: the place (Platz) of the equipment (SZ, 361f.). In overlooking an essential aspect, the entities are no longer disclosed as zuhandend. (In our last chapter we will see the
notion of place, in the form of Ort, re-emerge decisively.) We must say then, that in some sense the *vorhan den* is its place, and this corresponds with Heidegger's saying that strictly speaking there is no such thing as an item of equipment, for places are found only in relation to other places. Here the change in understanding does indeed result in a change in Being.

Now we turn to Heidegger's contention that the fact that *vorhan den* entities are discovered through a change in attitude does not mean that they are fictional or totally subject relative. We have just seen him maintaining that we can discover entities as they appear in scientific research by bringing ourselves to the particular attitude described in Section 628. But he also maintains that the entities disclosed by the theoretical scientific attitude are not fictions totally dependent on the attitude of the discovering attitude. "Thematizing . . . does not first 'posit' the entities, but frees them so that one can interrogate them and determine their character 'objectively'" (SZ, 363). He is not anti-science; he seems even to believe that his analysis may help make the scientific attitude and method more secure (SZ, 362).

Why is there a problem with holding both that entities (even in their Being) appear differently according to our attitude towards them and that these various appearances are not deceptive? There is a problem only if we also believe that: if an entity appears one way to a subject at time T1 and another way at T2 (and if have reason to believe that the entity has not changed itself), then one or both appearances of the entity is deceptive, misleading or fictional. But Heidegger denies that the appearance of the entity changes while the 'entity' itself does not. Appearance is not something that some self-constant entity does; it is what the 'entity is'. We shall soon turn to the relation of disclosure (appearance is appearance in and
to disclosure) and Being.

First we must note that the idea that two appearances of an entity may both be non-deceptive denies a certain notion of ontological pre-
eminence (Vorrang). Neither appearance may be more genuine or revelatory
than the other. Heidegger in this section wants to deny the notion of an
absolute preeminence of categories of Being, replacing it with the notion
of preeminence according to our projects.

Neither Vorhandenheit nor Zuhandenhait need be ontologically first.
They are ways we disclose entities and the way entities are. What is the
relation of disclosure and Being which lets this be the case?

6. Disclosure, Being and Time

We shall approach this problem by dealing with a question we have
already asked: In what sense, if any, is the hammer which changes over from
Zuhandenhait to Vorhandenheit the same hammer? We have seen that a change
in mode of Being seems to depend on a change in our understanding. Does
our disclosure of the hammer as vorhanden change the Being of the hammer?
Would not this reduce all to subjectivism?

There is no denying that in the change over from one mode of Being to
another we must be dealing with the same hammer. I am using the hammer when
it breaks; any phenomenology which denied that in some sense I am still
holding the same hammer before and after it breaks would have to had started
with some assumptions far removed from experience. But does this mean that
there is a permanent 'hammer in itself' which is the unchanged subject of
the change?

Manifestly not. It is the hammer that we experience that changes over.
and yet is the same. But if it is not some ap-sich hammer hidden behind appearances which stays the same, which hammer does stay the same? It cannot be the hammer which appears, for that is precisely the hammer which changes.

There are certain metaphysical accounts of this which we shall want to reject as phenomenologically inaccurate. For example, we may want to interpret 'the same' as meaning 'physico-chemically the same', so that it is only our interpretation which changes. But even the hammer described in physical and chemical terms is still a way the hammer appears and can itself change over. Or we might want to say that 'sameness' is just something we attribute to the hammer. But this is belied by the phenomenological fact that we encounter this hammer before and after the change over as being the same hammer. The sameness stands before us as a fact to which our interpretations must accommodate themselves. Indeed, our question "Does the fact that the change over in our understanding somehow brings about (or is correlated with) a change in the Being of the entity mean that Being is ontologically dependent on understanding?" gains its force from the fact that it seems in our experience that the hammer is the same regardless of our interpretations. We have an impulse to deny the implication in the question because we have a sense that understanding does not reign over Being.

That there is a change over implies that something is different about the hammer before and after it changes. If what is different is just our interpretation, then the hammer is the same and there has been no change over in it. If it is primarily a change in the Being of the hammer, then a change in our understanding of the hammer may or may not be 'correlated' with it, for we could be right or wrong. But this will not work given the categories of Being with which we are working. To be zuhanden is to be present to Dasein in a particular way. Something cannot be zuhanden without being
taken (projectively disclosed) as \textit{Zuhanden} since \textit{Zuhandenheit} is ontologically dependent on projective \textit{Dasein}. The same goes for \textit{Vorhandenheit}.

This points to the assumption which is causing our difficulties: the assumption that understanding and Being are separate realms which may or may not be correlated. Now we are faced with a basic problem, one with which Heideggerian thought begins.

Let us take it as phenomenologically certain that the hammer before and after the change over is the same hammer. Is the disclosure of an entity the same as the Being of that entity? When I say that fear is the same as an increase in adrenaline I am reducing fear to chemical terms. I can now translate all statements with 'fear' in them into ones about adrenaline. If this is what we mean by 'sameness', we will reduce Being to disclosure or vice versa. Idealism and realism are both essentially reductive, in their traditional senses. Heidegger wishes to maintain a sameness which is not reductive. This means that we will not be free to reduce one to the other, to translate statements about Being into statements about disclosure, or vice versa. To say that \textit{Dasein} is its disclosure will not be to say simply that \textit{Dasein} is nor that \textit{Dasein} discloses.

Why should we not reduce the two terms? At least because it is phenomenologically false to do so. \textit{Dasein} discloses entities not of its own kind of Being as being non-disclosive and yet as being nonetheless. True, these entities are within \textit{Dasein}'s disclosure, but they are in this disclosure as being non-disclosive and as being regardless of this disclosure. Thus we find, in our experience, a distinction between Being and disclosure. Further, we should not attempt to reduce the two terms because if we did we would be saying too little. What does it mean to say that \textit{Dasein} is? What is
the meaning of 'is' here? And what does disclosure mean here? If we reduced Being to disclosure, could we talk about disclosure without saying that it too is? But what could we mean by this?

What sense can we make, then, of saying that Being and disclosure are somehow the same? Let us ask this still by asking about the sameness of the hammer before and after the change over.

Husserl gives us a clue. He talks about the fact that perceived things have various perspectives:

Every determinate feature has its own system of perspective variations; and... it remains one and the same for the consciousness that in grasping it unites recollection and fresh perception synthetically together, despite interruption in the continuity of the course of actual perception.

Ignoring what is not relevant, the clue remains: we should look to the role of time in sameness. After all, we are talking of how the hammer is at two different times, i.e., before and after the change over.

Traditionally, time has been taken to be composed of discrete moments. In discrete time (as we shall term it), the present is the privileged moment. In it we find what is actual. The past is what was actual and the future is what will become actual. Within discrete time, if X was p but has changed over to become q, then at one point X actually was p and now actually is q. If we deal only with actuality, then we must say that if at any one time X cannot be both p and q, then p and q are contraries.

But are Zuhandheit and Vorhandenheit contraries? Muller-Lauter seems to think so: "The more now Being in its Vorhandenheit comes into view, the more it lets its actuality be seen, the more it incurs the loss of its Zuhandheit, its merely possible in-order-to character." But it has been a main contention of this chapter that the two depend on each other.

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**Zuhandenheit** contains something of **Vorhandenheit**, namely the resolute and definite possibilities which are a thing's own and which enable us to use it as we do. And **Vorhandenheit** contains something of **Zuhandenheit**: something can be **vorhanden** (at least in the sense of unusable-**Vorhandenheit**) only within the context of projects which has been disrupted. So, if they are contraries, they are contraries that depend upon each other.

Further, it is not clear that they are contraries at all. Let us say that p and q are contraries if they cannot both be exhibited by the same phenomenon at the same time and in the same way. Under this definition, it still is not clear that the two categories are contraries, for it may be possible to exhibit the **Zuhandenheit** of something in a **vorhanden** way; Heidegger may be suggesting this when he talks about the 'object' of economic science (SZ, 361). And it may be possible to use something as **vorhanden** in order to accomplish some project. For example, I may want to remind myself that language is really a system of arbitrary symbols by repeating the word 'ketchup' until it loses its meaning. (I am not endorsing this view of language; a project that is misguided is nevertheless a project.) So, it is not clear that these two categories of Being are contraries.

We have a hammer that now is **zuhanden** and a minute later is **vorhanden**. Our temptation is to say that these two are exclusive categories. But they need not be. That the hammer actually is now **zuhanden** is not a statement that tells us everything we want to know about its Being. The hammer may be more than it now actually is. The hammer is also its possibility. If we take possibility as 'what is not yet actual', then we are left only with a very weak sense of it. In discrete temporality something either is or is not at any particular moment of time. This is because the 'is' is taken as 'actually is'.
If we are still committed to the priority of discrete time, possibility will be that which may be in the future but which is not now. Heidegger, however, views time as ecstatic. This allows him a stronger sense of possibility, one which will allow us to see in what way the hammer remains the same.

For Heidegger, each of the three 'ecstases' of time (what we would otherwise call past, present and future) is ontologically indebted to the other two. The unity of time is not the thread that joins the past moment to the present and future moments. It is instead the indebtedness of the three ecstases. Heidegger arrives at this notion of time by attempting to describe how Dasein exists. When we look at our existence and our understanding of existence, we see that the past is not simply gone. Rather we are constantly giving ourselves our past. This is evidenced by the fact that we can always re-interpret the events of the past. We re-interpret them usually in terms of some futural meaning for ourselves. Heidegger's analysis of equipment has shown that we also give ourselves our future; we are pro-jective. When we look at our experience we see also that our interpretations, our way of understanding anything, depend upon a prior 'fore-structure'.

We are never free to interpret the world 'purely', for interpretation is only possible if we already know a great deal about the world. Our past (our 'already') guides us and even guides our pro-jects (futural). Yet our pro-jects also help us to interpret our past: a man plotting (pro-jecting) revenge, for example, sees his past as a history of betrayal. These two dimensions give us our present, and our present helps give us the other two dimensions. The hammer which is now before me is understood in terms of its use in my pro-ject of building a bookcase, which I can project because I already know that bookcases can be built with hammers. Each dimension
(ecstasy) is out of itself and with the others. It stands opposed to discrete time.

Ecstatic time allows a stronger sense of possibility. Discrete time prefers the present because in the now-moment is found what is actual. Ecstatic time gives no priority to any dimension, for each dimension is beyond itself and with the others. (Dasein, however, finds itself more in the future, and thus there is a certain existential preference for that ecstasy.) Priority is to be given to the unity of ecstatic time, not to any of its ecstases. This unity cannot itself be actual or we would still be locked in the present. The unity is possible, and this unity allows the stronger sense of possibility.

Examples abound within our own experience. If I want to become a doctor but do not get into medical school, I will probably find myself living (in the present) as someone disappointed (because of an event, or non-event, in the past) which I had wanted to occur in order that I might be (in the future) a doctor. Or, I am now going to the store in order to (future) buy food for a party to celebrate yesterday's football victory. The has-been and the will-be are not actual; they are possible events before me now, events which have meaning for me.

It would not be accurate to say that someone is actually now a waiter if he is in fact a waiter whose past did not fulfill the future he had hoped for; he is a waiter who is bitter because he is also someone whose dream of going to medical school did not come true. His failed future is still with him. Ecstatic time lets us talk of possibilities in this way; his not-actually going to medical school is a possibility that is always present to him. Ecstatic time breaks the disjunctive deadlock in which we
must say either that something is or it is not at any one moment. This is because discrete time takes 'is' to mean 'is actual'. Within ecstatic time, however, we can say that something is now present but not actual; it is present as a possibility.

It is in this sense that the hammer that changes over contains both categories of Being: both before and after its change. Indeed, the relation of the two categories is one of possibility. The context of projects and uses which the *Vorhanden* disrupts is no longer actual; I will not be able to actualize my project of tilling the field. But it remains as a failed project, and is possible in that sense. The *Zuhanden* is serviceable because it contains the resolute and definite possibilities we have identified as belonging to *Vorhandenheit*. The two categories contain each other as possibilities.

The two categories can change over into each other; they are possibilities of each other. Granted, when the hammer was *zuhanden* its *Zuhandenheit* was present before me in a different way than its *Vorhandenheit* was; after it changes over to *Vorhandenheit*, its *Zuhandenheit* becomes a possibility (one towards which we head again when we start to repair the broken hammer, but one which is in any case present as that which the hammer was before it broke and took all our projects with it). It is not a mere possibility, for we can only recognize an entity as being a broken, *vorhanden* tool if its withdrawn *Zuhandenheit* stays with it. Both the *zuhanden* and *vorhanden* hammer(s) are in the same context of tools and uses, but the *zuhanden* one is in the context as something available for use whereas the *vorhanden* one is in it as something no longer available.

Concern takes the place of actuality here. The *Zuhanden* now is available for use in the context of projects and uses. This 'now' is to be understood less in terms of actuality than in terms of concern. Phenomenologically to
say that a _zuhanden_ entity is now in a context of projects and uses is to 
say that it is available to me for my project. The present is a mode of 
care, not a mode of actuality.

What does this tell us about sameness? In one sense, the hammer is 
the same before and after the change over in that it contains the same 
possibilities in a formal way before and after: the _vorhanden_ hammer, for 
example still has _Zuhandenheit_ as a possibility, although it is a possibility 
that has withdrawn. But this seems to let the hammer which is before us 
vanish into a set of structural possibilities. Yet these possibilities are 
possibilities of the hammer.

I think we are left with a circle of sorts. It is the same hammer because 
its structural possibilities do not change. The structural possibilities do 
not change because those possibilities belong to the hammer in either of 
its categories of Being because it is the same hammer.

Two points arise from this: 1) There is a strong sense in which we should 
say that the sameness of the hammer is its ecstatic unity. 2) We are left 
asking the question we have been asking all along: what is the source of 
the hammer's own possibilities?

It is the fact that time is ecstatically unified that lets the hammer 
be the same before and after its change over. It is because time is ecstatic 
that a thing can be its possibilities, and that its possibilities can 'define' 
what the thing is. It is on the basis of possibility that we are allowed to say 
that the hammer remains the same. But temporality is not just the ground of 
sameness.

It is the hammer that is staying the same. But which hammer is staying 
the same? Not the _zuhanden_ one, and not the _vorhanden_ one, for they are
precisely the ones that are changing. It is the hammer in the possibilities offered by its ecstatic unity that remains the same. But ecstatic unity is not some vague metaphysical event which creates entities like hammers. Instead, ecstatic unity is always the ecstatic unity of something. In this case, it is the ecstatic unity of the hammer, the hammer which stays the same. The two notions—ecstatic unity of temporality and sameness of that which is ecstatically unified in time—need each other and belong together. They make each other possible.

We need one final way of looking at this. What changes about the hammer is its mode of appearance. What does not change is the ground of the possibility of its having various appearances. The ground is, simply, Being. ('Ground' is an approximate expression here; we shall deal more fully with it in Chapter IV). I mention this because it is important not to think that we are dealing only with temporality. What is at stake is the meaning of Being. What we have seen is that temporality provides the horizon within which Being appears in its different categories.

We have been looking at the hammer which remains the same in order to inquire into the relation of disclosure and Being. We are now in a position to inquire into this a bit more closely.

In the discussion above we have left out of consideration Dasein's role in the hammer's remaining the same. Dasein, however, is the primordially temporal entity. The ecstatic unity of the hammer occurs within Dasein's disclosure.

The key to the problem rests in the nature of possibility (which we have seen is intimately connected to the nature of time). Dasein's disclosure is a disclosure of possibility. Even actuality is disclosed as a possibility.
For example, I disclose a letter which is actually before me now. This letter cannot, in its actuality, enter my understanding; one of the reasons for talking about actuality is to distinguish that which is understood from our understanding of it. Instead I disclose the letter's actuality in terms of what that actuality means for me: the telephone bill has arrived and I will have to skimp this week in order to pay it, for example. I understand the actual in terms of its possibilities. Disclosure as a whole is thoroughly possible.

The *Zuhandenheit* and the *Vorhandenheit* of the hammer which has changed over both are ways the hammer appears to *Dasein*; they are both ways the hammer is disclosed. Both are to be understood and described in terms of their structures of possibility. It is in possibility that disclosure and *Being* meet.

This epigrammatic remark should not make us lose sight of the complexity of the situation. Possibilities are themselves disclosed. That is, they are and they are disclosed. We have here a circle, not a hierarchy.

And the circle is not yet complete. There can be possibilities (in Heidegger's sense of the word, of course) because of the ecstatic nature of time.

Can we now answer the question: How can a modification in our understanding of the hammer bring about a change in the hammer's mode of *Being* without making *Being* the slave of understanding? We have seen that a change in *Being*, a change in mode of appearance, will be a change in disclosure; this is made possible by the pervasiveness of possibility which is itself made possible by the ecstatic nature of time. We can see that in some cases, such as with unusable-*Vorhandenheit*, we are not tempted to say that *Being* is the slave.
of disclosure, for the unusable—*vorhanden*—has, as it were, forced itself upon *Dasein*, interrupting *Dasein's* plans and projects. But what about the scientist who wills himself into the scientific attitude which brings about a change over in the mode of Being of the entities he studies? Here someone purposefully changes his mode of disclosure and brings about thereby a change in 'Being. Does not this put Being at *Dasein's* command?

No. The scientist is as much at the command of the Being of entities as is the farmer whose plow breaks against the hidden boulder. They differ not in their mastery of Being but in their attitude towards it. The scientist expects things to hold resolutely to their own possibilities. The farmer was not expecting that particular thing to be in his field with its resolutely held possibility. The scientist in fact aims at disclosing the resolute and definite possibilities (which he may call 'properties') of chemicals, planets and the other objects of his study. If things did not have these sorts of possibilities, science would not be possible. Science can make genuine discoveries because the possibilities of things can reveal themselves to disclose *Dasein* which knows how to find (and not create) them.

The change over in modes of Being that we find accomplished by a change over in modes of understanding does not, that is, indicate that understanding dictates modes of Being. Even in the case of the scientific attitude, we find that the change over in our mode of understanding is dictated by the possibilities granted by Being.

The change in understanding, in disclosure, can leave us assigned to the realm of entities which show themselves as having certain resolute and definite possibilities of their own. As we discussed, these possibilities present themselves as having been there already and as being independent of
our disclosure of them. They seem to be real, as we might ordinarily put it. What is the source of this 'realness'? We now turn to the section in which Heidegger might be expected to deal with this: Section 43 which takes reality as its topic. In that section we will find the troublesome suggestion that not only is Being not the slave of understanding, but there may even continue to be things (the real) after understanding, disclosure and Dasein have vanished from the universe.

7. Reality

We have seen that vorhanden entities present themselves as having had their own definite possibilities before and independent of their disclosure. Let us call this the phenomenological realness of things (for brevity's sake, we may at times refer to it just as realness); it is phenomenological realness because it is an independence from disclosure which is itself disclosed or announced in disclosure.

Why does not Heidegger make more of this phenomenological realness? He has come across it at least when discussing unusable-Vorhahndenheit in which the definite possibilities of things force themselves upon us. But why does he not take it up more thematically? There are two obvious answers to this question, both of which seem to me to be if not wrong, at least insufficient.

We might say that SZ is too existentially oriented to deal with the Being of things other than Dasein, at least at length. The work attempts to understand Being by investigating Dasein's Being. But if we say that the Being of things is beyond Dasein and thus a study of Dasein can never reveal it, then we must also say that no study undertaken by Dasein could ever reveal the Being of things. Heidegger studies Dasein precisely because
he himself is 'a' Dasein and inescapably so: the ontological problematic can only be disclosed if the philosophical question is seized in an existentiell manner by an existing Dasein as a possibility of that Dasein's Being (SZ, 13-4). There is no non-Dasein vantage point from which we can see that which escapes Dasein's view, for Dasein is the vantage point.

Yet in later works, Heidegger has much to say about the Being of non-Dasein things. He does not escape being situated and finite; rather, he finds that he ('a' Dasein) can learn something of the Being of things. Dasein can learn something of the Being of things; thus, it is not SZ's limiting itself to Dasein which explains its slighting of things.

It might be suggested that Heidegger's focusing on the everyday blocks an ontology of things in SZ. To a certain extent, this is true, for in everydayness little of the non-Dasein source of things is revealed as such; rather, in everydayness we unthinkingly accept the gift of the presence of that which is regardless of our disclosure of it. Yet in SZ Heidegger only starts with the everyday, using it as a clue. If he had stayed simply with the everyday appearances of phenomena, the work would have been superficial. It is instead remarkable because of his acuity; he takes us to the quite uncanny: conditions for the possibility of everydayness. Thus, this cannot fully explain why we find no detailed consideration of the conditions for the possibility of the presence (to everyday Dasein) of things which appear to be independent of Dasein's (everyday and extra-ordinary) disclosure.

I believe Heidegger slights the problem of the realness of things because he confuses realism (things exist independent of our disclosure of them) and phenomenological realism (things appear in our disclosure as being independent of that disclosure). The phenomenological realism we found
in Heidegger's discussion of unusable-Vorhandenheit functions very much like a traditional realism: it acknowledges the presence (to Dasein) of entities with their own possibilities (or properties) not based solely on Dasein's Being; it acknowledges a world of entities beyond our subjective discretion, entities on which we rely, entities around which we shape our projects, and entities which can surprise and exasperate us; it allows us to distinguish between disclosures which are genuinely revelatory and those which are not.

Still, traditional and phenomenological realisms differ. In Section 43, "Dasein, Worldhood and Reality" ("Dasein, Weltlichkeit und Realität"), Heidegger denies the primacy of the former, runs across the latter which he does not want to deny, confuses the two of them, and apparently feels he must postulate the existence of traditionally real entities even though his ontology otherwise does not allow this.

The announced main point of the section (which is divided into three subsections) is fairly clear and speedily accomplished. He aims to deny that reality is the most important category of Being. He is countering "an uncritical interpretation of Dasein which nevertheless keeps urging itself upon us, which takes the idea of reality as its guide" (SZ, 212). He thinks through this uncritical interpretation. He tells us that an analysis of reality is possible only because we have appropriate access to the real. But, the real "is essentially accessible only as entities within-the-world" ("ist wesenhaft nur als innerweltliches Seiendes zugänglich"; SZ, 202), for to be is, according to Heidegger, to be in the world. Reality is a derivative category of Being. But what is this reality? He says that Being acquires the sense (Sinn) of reality when the Zuhanden gets passed over and entities are conceived as a "vorhanden context of things" ("vorhandener Dingzusammen-
Now Heidegger shows that the question of the external world which
realist philosophers traditionally have asked is, in effect, pointless,
misformulated and hopeless (SZ, 202-5). Dasein does the asking, and to
ask it must already be in the world. The assurance sought— that there is
an external world— is a condition for the seeking, so it is pointless to
go on with the search. It is misformulated because it assumes that 'external
world' is an ontologically genuine term. It is hopeless because by asking
about the external world we have assumed too much (although, in another sense,
we have not assumed enough). If the world is external to us, we cannot hope
to re-join it through a formal proof. The question of reality is not neces-
sarily the question of the external world. Heidegger poses himself a
more significant question: Why does Dasein tend to understand itself in
terms of the real? Why does the question of reality keep urging itself upon
us? Heidegger has already prepared us for the answer: the rush to reality
is motivated by falling (SZ, 206).

Having removed the question of the external world, he turns to the
ontological question of reality:

If the term 'reality' means the Being of entities (res)
vorhanden within the world— and nothing else is thereby
understood— then for the analysis of this mode of Being
this signifies that entities within-the-world are to be
ontologically conceived only if the phenomenon of in-the-
worldness has been clarified. (SZ, 209)46

He has already discussed the meaning of in-the-worldness, and now he is
defending himself against a realist attack by showing that his conception
is more fundamental than that of his realist antagonists. The rest of this
subsection (b) attempts to clear the ground for an ontological analysis of
reality by showing that other seemingly plausible analyses (namely those of
Dilthey 'and Scheler) miss the ontological grounding of reality in in-the-
worldness.

It is subsection 2 which offers the real difficulties. Heidegger begins with a distinction:

Reality as an ontological term has been related to entities in-the-world. If it serves to designate this kind of Being generally, then Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit function as modes of reality. But if one lets this word have its traditional meaning, then it means Being in the sense of a pure Vorhandenheit of things. (SZ, 211)\textsuperscript{47}

He seems to want the distinction between the traditional version of reality and his ontological one in order to enable him to show that reality does not have the ontological priority (Vorrang) the tradition has assigned it.

Traditional reality—a pure Vorhandenheit of things (pure Dingvorhandenheit)—cannot have this priority because not every entity is a purely vorhanden thing. Thus the category of reality does not cover everything which is (SZ, 211). Further, even if we take reality in the first sense (as an ontological term), I take Heidegger to be saying, then everything zuhanden or vorhanden will be real, but not every phenomenon is either zuhanden or vorhanden: nature and Dasein are neither one nor the other. Thus there are phenomena which are not real but which nevertheless 'have' Being, and so reality is surpassed by Being in ontological priority.

This should complete Heidegger's program of dealing with reality. He has disputed, successfully I believe, the tradition's insistence that reality is the most primordial meaning of Being, and has shown that the traditional realist task of formally proving the existence of the external world is misguided.

Yet he has done more and goes on to do still more. He has already introduced a new understanding of reality: as an ontological term, we may
let it designate the Being of entities within the world, in which case
Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit function as modes of reality. He does not
need this to counter the realist objections. Why does he offer this new
formulation? If we look at the rest of the subsection, we see that it is
because he realizes that he cannot simply dismiss reality as a traditional
error. (It is part of his historical approach never to dismiss the errors
of the tradition; he instead attempts to understand them as destined gifts
of Being.) Heidegger recognizes that even though it has been misunderstood,
reality is still with us and is still an important 'part' of Being.

Heidegger goes on to make some very puzzling remarks. He says:

In the order of the ontological foundation-context and of the possible categorial and existential demonstration, reality is referred back to the phenomenon of care. (1) That reality ontologically is grounded in the Being of Dasein cannot signify that (ii) the real can only be what it is in itself if and so long as Dasein exists. (SZ, 211-212)48

The first sentence summarizes the conclusions of the entire section thus far. The second sentence is ambiguous. Heidegger says that from the fact that
(i) reality is grounded in Dasein's Being we cannot conclude that (ii) the real can only be so long as Dasein is. This leaves the status of (ii) undecided, for perhaps the real is independent of Dasein's existence or perhaps we simply cannot say if the real is independent of Dasein's existence.

Heidegger seems to settle the ambiguity by saying that if Dasein did not exist, it could not be said "that entities are or are not" ("dass Seiendes sei, noch dass es nicht sei"; SZ, 212). In such a case, independence and being 'in-itself' (An-sich) would be neither understandable nor not understandable (SZ, 212), presumably because we would lack the existence by which we could either understand or not understand. But, Heidegger says, it is not
the case that there is no *Dasein*. Now, when there is *Dasein*, "it can be said that entities will still be then" ("Es kann .... gesagt werden, dass dann Seiendes noch weiterhin sein wird"; SZ, 212), i.e., after *Dasein* is gone.

This seems to settle the ambiguity, but in fact it does not, for in both cases it is *Dasein* which now exists which is doing the speaking. If we can now say that entities would continue to be, then it is hard to see how we can also say now that entities will neither be nor not be after we are gone. Furthermore, the very next sentence reads:

As we have noted, the dependence of *Being*, not of beings, on the understanding of *Being*—that is, the dependence of reality, not of the real, on care—safeguards the further analytic of *Dasein* from an uncritical interpretation of *Dasein* which takes the idea of reality as its guide, an interpretation which repeatedly pushes itself on us. (SZ, 212)49

Yes, Heidegger's analysis of reality as dependent on care does safeguard him from realist objections, but he accomplished this in the previous two subsections. Why does he introduce the real? The question gains force as we consider the bewildering way he has introduced it.

Even if we resolve the ambiguity by saying that we cannot say that the real will or will not be after *Dasein* is gone (and thus interpret his remark that the real is not dependent on care as meaning that it is neither dependent nor independent), we are faced with the wide gap between a certain class of beings (the real) and the Being of that class (reality): How could we possibly say that real entities will be after their Being (reality) has gone the way of *Dasein*? It would be nonsensical to make a similar remark about entities in general, namely that entities will be after there is no more *Being*, for what does it mean to say that an entity will be when there is...
no more Being? If an entity is we must be able to ask about its Being; this is what lets the project of §2 go forward. So why cannot we settle the question simply by saying that because reality depends on Dasein, when Dasein is gone it takes reality and the real with it? Why cannot we settle the question now, while there is still Dasein, once and for all? Why is there the temptation to grant even the possibility that the real might outlast its mode of Being?

Let us look at this question by asking what Heidegger means by ‘the real’ when he says that it may (or that we cannot say whether or not it may) outlast reality. He started the subsection with a distinction between reality as an ontological term which he had related to entities in the world and reality in its traditional meaning of a pure Vorhandenheit of things. Which does he now have in mind?

If he has the first sense in mind, we are not helped much because he has not clarified this sense. Reality has been shown to be a putative category related to entities in the world, but how is it related? In what sense do Zuhandehheit and Vorhandenheit function as modes of reality? Does reality subsume Zuhandehheit and Vorhandenheit? This would be a major point, but Heidegger makes nothing of it. Does reality subsume existence as well? Is there something to be said about reality (in this first sense) other than that it includes Zuhandehheit and Vorhandenheit? If so, what is to be said and why does not Heidegger say it? If not, what meaning does the term ‘reality’ have?

Or perhaps he has Dingvorhandenheit— the traditional meaning of reality— in mind when he suggests that the real might outlast reality. But this also does not help, for Heidegger is unclear about the meaning of Vorhandenheit.
Ding, and their relation. The two terms are often conjoined: The 'Vorhandensein'
of Ding which just occur (SZ, 55, 69); useless equipment is an equipment-
thing which just lies there (SZ, 73). But things are not simply the same as
what is vorhanden: a thing is something vorhanden with properties (SZ, 73)
and mere things are opposed to the Vorhanden (SZ, 74). It seems that in
SZ "Ding" at root means the same as "the real". He says:

In this addressing of these entities as 'things' (res) lies
a tacit anticipatory ontological character. The analysis
which starts with such entities and goes on to inquire about
Being meets thinghood and reality. (SZ, 67-8)30

This accords with Heidegger's writing, "If the term 'reality means the Being
of entities vorhanden within-the-world (res) ..." ('Wenn der Titel Realität
das Sein des innerweltlich vorhandenen Seienden (res) meint ...'; SZ, 209),
where entities whose kind of Being is reality are called 'res'. Things
are the real. But things are also said to be vorhanden. Is Vorhandenheit
all that he means by reality and vorhanden entities all that he means by
the real?

But if vorhanden entities are the real, the real cannot outlast their Being,
for to be vorhanden is to be in the world; when there is no Being, there is
no world, and thus no vorhanden entities. Vorhandenheit is a category of
Being and it seems impossible to believe that there could be entities
characterized by a particular mode of Being if there were no Being at all.

Neither version of the real which Heidegger has distinguished seems to
allow us to believe that the real might outlast their mode of Being. The
ontological version relates reality to entities within-the-world; when there
is no more Being, and hence no more world, there will be no entities within-
the-world. The traditional version takes reality to be a pure Dingvorhandenheit.
But what is a Ding? If it is something vorhanden, then it is within-the-world.
If we say instead that a thing is the real, then we must ask in what sense is it the real? If it is the real in the ontological sense of reality, then it is once again within-the-world (and thus cannot outlast Being). If it is the real in the traditional sense of reality, then this traditional sense is in fact empty, for Heidegger's exposition of it turns out to be circular. So, either the real is within-the-world, or it is a vacuous notion, and in either case, it will not outlast the world and Being.

The confusion is not just our own responsibility. It seems inevitable given Heidegger's discussion of the real. It is not accidental that the confusion extends to every term which seems to be related to reality: **Vorhandenheit**, Ding, and the real.

It is important to see why Heidegger confronts the issue at all. As I have emphasized, he accomplishes his objectives before dealing with the real's possible independence from Dasein. Why does he bring in the real at all?

Heidegger deals with the real because he is honest enough to recognize the presence of something like the real. I have attempted to show that throughout **SZ** there is a recognition of the announced independence of entities, independence from disclosure. It is this announced independence, phenomenological realness, which allows tools to break and to function; this announced independence makes it possible for our projects to be disrupted and to go forward; this announced independence makes it possible for us to discover truths about how the world has been and for us to be shown to have been wrong. In this subsection on reality, Heidegger confronts the fact that some entities appear in disclosure as being independent of disclosure. We discover them as having been already before we disclosed them.
He feels he must deal with this.

He goes astray for the same reason that his writings on Vorhandenheit are not as clear as they should be: the appearance of the Vorhanden dissimulates itself. Vorhanden entities appear to be that which are independent of disclosure. This is the 'content' of the disclosure of vorhanden entities. But their condition is that this independence announces itself in disclosure, and thus is itself disclosed. The fact of the announcement is overwhelmed by what is announced. Everyday Dasein ignores the fact of announcement in favor of what is announced, and Heidegger's analysis in this case does not fully compensate for everyday Dasein's carelessness. It is to Heidegger's credit, however, that he confronts the claims of reality even though he does not confront them adequately.

I have said that I find Heidegger's refutation of the realist objections to be convincing. Part of his mistake in dealing with the real, however, is that he confronts the issue on the realist's own ground, even though he has already shown that the realist has staked out this territory unjustifiably. Thus, he treats the real as the realist tradition has, that is, by taking it to be that which is independent of disclosure. Yet the real is not truly independent of disclosure. It is always announced as being independent. And the form of the announcement differs from the announcement of the independence of the vorhanden entities we deal with every day. The real is a concept announced by philosophers. It is a purely cognitive concept, one founded on an error about the nature of Being. Philosophers talk about (announce) the real by forgetting that they are disclosing this realm of entities independent of disclosure. We can postulate a realm of entities which are independent of our postulations, but we will only believe that this realm truly is...
independent if we forget that it is part of their Being that we have postulated them. In this sense, the real can be said to be truly ideal.

When Heidegger says that the real is independent of Dasein, he is thinking of the real as the realist tradition has, forgetting that the real is a concept (and thus already dependent on disclosive Dasein) of that which is independent. When he says that we cannot say whether or not the real is independent, he is remembering the ontological role of disclosure in all that is disclosed (including the real), but is not taking seriously enough that which is disclosed, namely the presence of things which are independent of disclosure. Both interpretations hinder the progress of his phenomenological ontology. The first breaks the bond between beings and Being, for the real is said to outlast its Being. The second leaves Dasein in a world where there are only mere appearances and where Being is dependent on Dasein, for even that which is disclosed as being radically independent from Dasein turns out to be, in fact, just another appearance grounded in Dasein’s disclosure.

8. Hiddenness

How can we ontologically account for the presence of phenomenologically real entities, i.e., for the presence of entities which are disclosed as being independent of disclosure? The beginning of the solution is latent in Sz.

We have observed that phenomenologically the independence is announced as a thing’s having-been already before we disclosed it. This temporal characterization is not foreign to Sz. It arises with regard to Heidegger’s notion of truth. Truth is, for Heidegger, un-covering (Sz, Sect. 44). We can only make true or false assertions because we can uncover the way the world is. Truth pertains to this pre-assertive uncovering, the disclosure of states-of-affairs which allows us to make true or false statements. But
**Dasein** is in un-truth just as much as it is in truth (SZ, 222), and Heidegger assigns this to the fact that we are fallen (SZ, 222): we tend to cover over phenomena by relying on gossip, hearsay, the common opinion, through being lazy and thoughtless. Yet there is more to untruth than this existential characterization suggests.

Heidegger emphasizes that his conception of truth as un-coverededness is privative, based on the Greek sense (SZ, 222): truth brings entities out of their hiddenness (Verborgenheit; SZ, 222). This hiddenness is itself announced and lets there be truth. He writes that before Newton, Newton's laws were neither true nor false. But, he adds, that his laws before him were neither true nor false cannot mean that before him the beings uncoveringly pointed out by those laws did not exist. The laws became true through Newton; with them the beings themselves became accessible to Dasein. With the uncovering of these beings, they showed themselves precisely as the beings that they already were before that. (SZ, 227)

Newton uncovered entities in such a way that they announced themselves as having been that way all along, although until Newton they had been hidden.

If truth is un-covering, then what is un-covered must have been present but covered over (hidden) before Dasein uncovered it. This corresponds to a phenomenological description of what it is like to discover some truth (whether a law of universal gravitation or the fact that 16th Street is in need of repair): when we discover some truth, we reveal the way something was all along. It seems true to us to the extent that it seems to have been that way all along. The phenomenological mark of truth is that what is uncovered is seen to have been present but hidden, and thus the (prior) hiddenness is announced along with what has come out of hiddenness. What comes forward in truth seems true because we see that it had been present but hidden all
along, and it is true because it has been present but hidden all along.

The hidden is announced as having been even before we brought something out of hiddenness; but that is tantamount to its being announced as being independent of Dasein’s disclosure. This independence vouchsafes Dasein’s possibility of living in truth and prevents Heidegger from being a subjective idealist.

In Vorhandenheit resolute and definite possibilities of the thing’s own are disclosed as being independent of Dasein’s disclosure. These possibilities are brought out of hiddenness. In one sense the problem of the real is solved through the hidden, for the hidden is the source of the independence of things (and their possibilities) from Dasein’s disclosure. This in fact situates the problem in another problematic area: the question of reality is one of the questions of truth. Still, we now want to know how there can be a hidden which, as hidden, never is fully brought to disclosure (for then it would have to become un-hidden), and yet which is announced as the prior ‘state’ of all that is disclosed.

Further, we seem to need a special sort of hiddenness to account for phenomenological realness of things, for all that is discovered is brought out of hiddenness, but not all that is discovered is a real thing: physical laws, moral imperatives, character analyses, all are not things and yet they can only be insofar as they are un-covered.

In “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes” he talks of the earth and the world. We shall see that the earth is the type of hidden source which we need to explain the presence of phenomenologically real things. By talking of the earth jutting into the world, Heidegger attempts to work out the play between
the fact that the real is always disclosed to *Dasein* and the fact that
the real is disclosed as being independent of disclosure.
III

THE ARTWORK AND THE THING

In response to our question about the source of the resolute and

definite possibilities which are the thing's own, 52 guided us toward

the notion of hiddenness. If this hidden is to serve as the source of

things, it must be a hidden which is nonetheless announced as hidden;

it must enter disclosure, although it will enter as that which is hidden

from disclosure: As what is hidden from disclosure, the hidden is always

disclosed as that which was there all along but undisclosed. Thus it is

disclosed as that which is independent of disclosure; for this reason it

can serve as the source of the phenomenological realness of things. For

the same reason, the hidden will find in itself the same tension we found

in the notion of phenomenological realness: its appearance as that which

is independent of disclosure can be taken neither simply as a mere ap-

pearance (for then we have lost the independence which has been disclosed)

nor as something the independence of which is uninvolved with its an-

nouncement within disclosure (for then it ceases to be phenomenological

and disclosure and being have been split asunder in a way that makes

phenomenological ontology impossible). Finally, if this hidden is to

account for the phenomenological realness of things, it must be distinguished

from the hiddenness that characterizes every phenomenon that is truly

revealed.
The earth (Erde) as Heidegger describes it in "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" (UK) is just this sort of hiddenness.

By examining UK we will also be able to begin answering another question, one we posed in Chapter I: Does an ontology of things stop once it has accounted for the Being of things in general, or can it go on to account for the Being of species of things? Is it proper to talk of the Being of hammers as hammers and rocks as rocks, or is it only proper to talk of thinghood in general? Because of the artwork’s relation to things in their specificity, we rightly suspect that UK will have something to say about this.

UK presents itself as the obvious candidate for examination also because of its location within the sequence of Heidegger’s works. Although first published in 1950, as part of Holzwege, it dates back to an address delivered in 1935 and 1936.1 It was composed in the same period as Einführung in die Metaphysik which was published in 1953 but was based on a lecture course given in 1935.2 It is thematically part of Heidegger’s middle period at least because of its concern with the earth.

Heidegger keeps the artwork in view throughout most of UK, using it to help disclose the earth and its concomitant, the world. I have abandoned that structure. In the first part of this exegesis, I will consider the thing as withdrawn, the earth as the source of the hiddenness of the thing, the world as the announcement of the hiddenness, and the relation of the hidden and the announcement, while hardly mentioning the artwork at all. In the second part I will look at the role of the artwork, with special regard to what we can learn about species of things. Part I, then, focuses on our first question while Part II focuses on the second. In Part III, I will conclude with a discussion of the various problems.
unaffected by the essay.

PART I

1. The Withdrawal of the Thing

Heidegger is brought to consider the nature of the thing in UK by considering the nature of the artwork. His aim, in this essay, is to discover that "from and through which" the artwork "is what it is and as it is" ("woher und wodurch ... ist was sie ist und wie sie ist"; UK, 32/17). It seems clear that there is something thing-like about the artwork (although we shall see at the end that this is not necessarily the case since, for Heidegger, all art is poetry; by saying that the artwork is thing-like, Heidegger allows us to fall into a trap he has laid for pedagogic reasons). We can hold artworks, destroy them with knives or hammers, or store them in our attic. Heidegger begins by asking about the artwork, not about Art itself. Just as SZ inquires into being by interrogating an entity, so does UK inquire into art by interrogating art-entities. But what is this 'thingly' element of the artwork?

Heidegger tries to answer this by considering what is thingly about things. He criticizes three historical conceptions of the thing: 1) The thing is a subject to which are attached predicates. 2) The thing is what is sensibly perceptible. 3) The thing is formed matter. The first interpretation "keeps the thing at arm's length from us" ("uns dieses gleichsam vollig vom Leibe halt ..."; UK, 15-16/26) because we have to penetrate the predicates to get at the subject and thus never stand face to face with the subject itself. The second interpretation makes the thing "press too hard upon us" ("uns' zu sehr auf den Leib"; UK, 16/26), for as
the thing's feature is what is perceived by the senses, we have lost the	hing which might be apart from our perception; we have interiorized the
thing. In this objection, Heidegger recognizes the claim of phenomenological
realness that the thing is that which appears as being independent of our
disclosure. As Heidegger says, "Much closer to us than all sensations are
the things themselves" ("Viel näher als alle Empfindungen sind uns die
Dinge selbst"; UK, 15/26). Each of the first two interpretations places
the thing itself in some realm beyond our encounters with things.

These first two also do not distinguish things from equipment and
from other categories of Being, for we might just as easily say that other
people are essentially subjects with predicates attached or are what is
sensibly perceptible about them. The third interpretation— that the thing
is formed matter— suffers from the same problem. Indeed, the form-matter
correlation, coupled with the subject-object relation, gives representation
"a conceptual mechanism that nothing can withstand" ("eine Begriffsmechanik,
der nichts widerstehen kann"; UK, 17/26). This means, however, that the
form-matter correlation fails to distinguish things from non-things (UK, 17/27).

Heidegger finds, however, that the form-matter distinction is peculiarly
suitable for the consideration of the nature of equipment (UK, 17-8/28).

Even so, equipment as formed matter is matter formed according to the use
to which it is to be put, and according to the capacities of the matter:

The form . . . determines the arrangement of the matter.

Even more, it prescribes in each case the kind and selection of
the matter— impermeable for the jug, sufficiently hard
for the ax, firm yet flexible for the shoes. The interfu-
sion of form and matter prevailing here is, moreover, con-
trolled beforehand by the purposes served by jug, ax, shoes.
(UK, 17-18/28)

If these three interpretations are inadequate, if they even "obstruct
the way toward the thingly character of the thing, as well as toward the
equipment character of equipment, and all the more toward the workly
character of the work" (UK, 20/31), six just what is the thingly nature of
the thing?

This exertion of thought seems to meet with its greatest
resistance in defining the thingness of the thing, for
where else could the cause lie of the failure of the ef-
forts mentioned? The unpretentious thing evades thought
most stubbornly. Or can it be that this self-refusal of
the mere thing, this self-contained resistance to being
forced, belongs precisely to the essence of the thing?
Must not this strange and uncommunicative feature of
the nature of the thing become confirmed to thought that tries
to think the thing? If so, then we should not force our
way to its thingly character. (UK, 20-1/31-2)

Because the thing stubbornly refuses to give itself to thought, it is not
surprising that the tradition of thought has erred about the thing’s nature.
Furthermore, Heidegger says, the history of the erring about the thing
"coincides with the destiny in accordance with which generally Western
thought has hitherto thought the Being of beings" (UK, 21/32). eight But now
"We perceive a hint in this history" ("Wir vernehmen in dieser Geschichte
einen Wink"; UK, 21/32), for we can ask why the form-matter distinction
has special sway in our thought. Form-matter seems appropriate to the thought
of equipment. What is equipment? To answer this, Heidegger turns to an
artwork that "represents" an item of equipment, Van Gogh’s painting of a
pair of peasant shoes. Thus, his inquiry into the artwork has led him in
a circle—artwork, thing, equipment, artwork— which is the proper
Heideggerian movement.

We are now concerned with the self-refusal of the thing. In another
essay, Heidegger talks of how things are revealed when all-unwarranted
presuppositions are cleared away: "... all things are open to one another.
in their self-concealment. . . ." ("... eines fur das andere, offen, offen in seinem sichverbergen . . .") . The thing refuses itself to thought, but
announces its refusal. The thought here considered is the thought which
attempts to think Being. The thing's Being refuses to come into disclosure
fully. This is a self-refusal because it is the thing's ontological nature
to hold itself back from thought.

In refusing to come fully into thought, the thing reveals something of
its ontological nature, for the thing in this refusal. To understand the
thing in its self-refusal requires a subtlety of thought which the
simple appearance of the thing may overwhelm: "... we never know thingness
directly, and if we know it at all, then only vaguely. . . ." ("... wir vom
Dinghafuen nie geradezu und wenig überhaupt, dann nur unbestimmt wissen . . .
UK, 57/70).

2. The Earth: Hiddenness

We have said that we need a particular sort of hiddenness to account
for the presence of phenomenologically real things. In some metaphysical
scheme, we might want to distinguish between two sorts of actual entities,
one of which is a thing and the other of which is (for example) a physical
law; we might distinguish the thing by saying that it contains matter.
Heidegger will instead say that things are of the earth. What is thingly
about the thing is its earthiness. But what is the earth here? As a
principle of exegesis of Heidegger, I think it always best to take what he
says first in its simplest sense. According to this principle, the earth
Heidegger talks about is not a metaphor or a symbol for something else;
this puts us at odds with Hans-Georg Gadamer who says: "The poetic symbol
of this became for Heidegger Husserl's invocation of the earth."10 To
begin, we should take the earth to be just this earth upon which I stand,
at which I can point, from which springs water, from which minerals are
mined and in which the dead are buried.

But we must look further if we are to understand the earth. We can begin
by applying the form-matter distinction: earth provides the matter of things.
This rock has been thrown to the surface of the earth by volcanic action;
it is literally of the earth. So is this soil. This plastic pen has been
formed from oil distillates which ultimately have their origin in the bowels
of the earth.

But is the earth nothing but the source of material? Heidegger uses
four sources to contradict this notion: Greek, peasant-romantic, everyday,
and artistic.

Let us first consider the Greek source as Heidegger describes it. He
understands this earth as the 'site of physis,' "emerging and rising in itself and
in the totality" ("... Herauskommen und Aufgehen selbst und im Ganzen...");
(see, 32/42). Physis, he writes,

...clears and illuminates... that on which and in which
man bases his dwelling. We call this ground the earth.
Earth is that to where the arising brings back and shelters
all that arises, and indeed shelters it as that which arises.
In that which arise, earth is present as that which shelters.
(see, 31/42).

Physis has come to be called 'nature'. By thinking of nature within
physis, we think of that which allows the things of nature to be and to grow.
The earth shelters in the sense that the things of the earth which arise
are enabled to stay: the tree grows and is until it dies, the stone remains
until it is worn away. Things stay because they are of the earth, and the
earth stays. We shall call this staying 'perdurance', mainly for reasons of
grammar. The perdurance of the things of the earth takes the form of
blossoming, i.e., the following of an inner, hidden, law of necessity; in this sense, even inanimate things may be said to blossom; they arise from and return to the earth in their own way. The earth shelters by allowing the things of the earth to be, even regardless of disclosure, and thus lets them be things. The mountain's perdurance is finally the perdurance of the earth, the earth's self-sheltering. Here we reach a point where all we can do is gesture towards the otherness of the earth. The word 'earth' here itself is not an explanation but a hint about that which is present in its self-concealment.

If the earth is the site of physis and not simply the matter of things, the relation of thing to earth becomes problematic. And physis certainly is not matter. In Nietzsche, Heidegger calls it a power, the "power that arises and goes back in itself" ("aufgehende und in sich zurückgehende Halten"; 12) In Einführung in die Metaphysik he writes that physis:

"denotes self-blossoming emergence (e.g. the blossoming of a rose), unfolding, opening up, unfolding, that which shows itself in such unfolding and preserves and perdures in it; in short, the realm of things that emerge and perdure."

We should not think that the earth is itself a thing. It is instead the site of physis. The earth's sheltering of things is a self-sheltering because it is not some thing which stands apart from the other things. J.P. Fell writes perceptively about earth, physis and thing:

"Physis, then, is a ground which supports an intelligible phenomenon in its full phenomenal reality, as opposed to a meta-physical ground which can support an intelligible entity only if that ground is itself known. One may say that it is precisely by remaining dark and unrecognizable that the source of physis lets the phenomenon be what it presents itself as being."

The ground which is physis must remain unintelligible because..."
Otherwise there is initiated that endless rage for knowledge of causes and grounds... whose real result is the ironic loss of phenomenal reality in the very quest for its meta-physical source: i.e., nihilism.

This support which lets the phenomenon be what it is by remaining hidden Heidegger calls the earth.15

The earth's self-sheltering is both its hiddenness and its independence from Dasein's disclosure. It grants things their hiddenness and their independence. They perdure insofar as they are phenomenologically real.

But the earth's self-sheltering also means that the earth withdraws from disclosure. As Heidegger writes in UK:

The earth appears openly cleared as itself only when it is perceived and sheltered as that which is essentially undisclosed, that which retreats from every disclosure and thus constantly keeps itself closed up. (UK, 36/47)16

The earth is a hiddenness which is announced in disclosure as hidden: "The earth is essentially self-secluding. To set forth the earth means to bring it into the open as self-secluding" (UK, 36/47).17

The earth secludes itself more thoroughly than things do. We can at least feel confident in our examples of things. But it is hard to give an 'example' of the earth. Yes, it is that which is beneath our feet, but if we misunderstand our pointing downwards (as millenia of misunderstanding physi tempt us to misunderstand the earth), we may take the earth to be yet another thing.

The peasant-romantic view of the earth accords with the Greek view as Heidegger has taken it over. Heidegger strikes the reader as being something of a romantic what with all his talk of the simple beauty of peasant life. But it must be remembered that Heidegger, born in 1889, spent his youth in rural Germany where the agri-business had yet to come to dominance. Thus,
what perhaps strikes the reader as romantic twaddle more likely is drawn
from Heidegger's own memories. Further, it is helpful to keep William
Barrett's remark in mind:

The picture of man that emerges from Heidegger's
pages is that of an earth-bound, time bound radically
finite creature—precisely the image of man we should
expect from a peasant, in this case a peasant who
has the whole history of Western philosophy at his
fingertips. 18

Apparently for Heidegger the peasant possesses a simpler and less deceptively
reflective understanding and appreciation of the earth. The peasant who
counts on the earth to bear fruit, who does not take the fruit of the earth
for granted, understands the earth to be a mysterious stranger whose ways
are always with us. The peasant relies on the dependability of the things
of the earth (the shoes, the hoe) and hopes for the harvest. Although the
earth is close to the peasant whose life is spent cultivating it, the
peasant knows the earth outstrips his understanding. It is the presence of
something other which is announced in every crop and blessed in every meal.

The third source of understanding the earth is everydayness. 32 shows
us that our everyday reflective beliefs about a phenomenon may not accord
with our everyday comportment towards it. Our everyday beliefs may tell us
that the earth is one of a billion mudballs spinning through the void,
but according to our everyday way of acting, the earth is a very special
'mudball' and not merely one of billions.

According to our everyday way of behaving, the earth is not a mere
source of materials. Rather, the earth appears as that around which the
places of the world are organized. For example, Manhattan's form depends
to a large extent on its being an island; it has been organized within
the fact of its being bounded by water.

It should be remembered that the peasant-romantic source is itself a

type of everydayness, although it may no longer be our everydayness. Yet
even our modern everydayness is not entirely divorced from what the peasant-
romantic tells us. We grow house plants instead of tilling the fields. But
in doing so, we still marvel at what simple earth can give us. And there is
still a sense of the earth's silent power: we are at the mercy not only of
the Arabs but of the earth which offers this much oil and not a drop more.
This continuity between the peasant-romantic and the modern everyday under-
standing of the earth is perhaps evidence for the continuous presence of the
earth as physie.

The fourth source of understanding of the earth is the artwork. We shall
discuss this in Part II.

Why should we listen to these three sources instead of to the metaphysical
tradition and to the sway of technology when they tell us that the earth
is merely the source of material? The matter is too complex to permit a
full discussion here where our aim is to understand what Heidegger says about
the earth. If we are persuaded by what he says, it will probably be because
what he has said has disclosed the earth as it has always already been for
us, not because we find the source of his understanding to be authoritative.
We need not be convinced, as Heidegger is, that the Greek source is author-
itative because the Greek beginning is our beginning as well, and the beginning
is always with us. We need not believe that the peasant-romantic source is
authoritative because it is free of metaphysical and prejudicial assumptions.
We need not believe that what is revealed by everyday behavior has at least
prima-facie authority. To be convinced all we need to do is see that Heidegger
is revealing the earth to be just what it has been all along (although we never explicitly saw it that way before). If we do not see the truth of what Heidegger tells us, belief that the sources of his understanding are authoritative will not really convince us.

The thing is thingy because it is of the earth. The earth is self-concealing and self-sheltering. It shelters things by enabling them to perdure in their blossoming. Things perdure in that they refuse themselves to thought: they announce their independence. The earth withdraws itself so fully that it is difficult to get even an initial sighting of what it is that we are talking about. Is it this earth beneath our feet? Certainly, but if we colonize Mars, it will be that earth beneath our feet.

Heidegger writes: "Beings refuse themselves to us down to that one and seemingly least feature which we touch upon most readily when we can say no more of beings than that they are" (UK, 42/53). This refusal of all but the meagre "thatness" is the earth's refusal: the earth refuses itself to us and because of this the thingly feature of the thing refuses itself to us also, for the question of the thingliness of the thing refers us immediately to the thing's being of the earth.

Beings also dissemble themselves. Within what is lighted, "One being places itself in front of another being ... a being appears, but it presents itself as other than it is ..." (UK, 42/54). This type of concealment is partially due to the earth. Beings dissemble themselves because we are situated on an earth which is not itself disclosive. We must, as disclosive, take a stand and have a perspective. Within the lighted area of disclosure, the undisclosive earth juts up. It grants the beings which can be disclosed but does not do so in a way that makes all light
through and through. Yet it is the darkness of the earth—its hiddenness, its containing more possibilities than it reveals at any one time or to any one 'disclosive entity'—that constitutes its richness.

3. World: Announcement of Hiddenness

The disclosure of the earth as independent of disclosure occurs in the world. The earth and world belong together, are mutually dependent, and can only be understood if taken in conjunction.

What is the world? In previous works Heidegger has discussed it extensively, but without mentioning the earth. In _SZ_ he gives us four definitions of it, but reserves the term 'Welt' for the third: "...that 'wherein' a factual Dasein as such can be 'said to 'live'. 'World' has here a pre-ontological existentiell signification" (SZ, 65). According to the fourth definition, it may also designate "the ontologico-existential concept of worldhood" ("den ontologisch-existenzialen Begriff der Weltlichkeit") which "embraces in itself the a priori character of worldhood in general" ("beschliesset aber in sich das Apriroi von Weltlichkeit überhaupt"; SZ, 65).

In _Vom Wesen des Grundes_ (WG), Heidegger tells us:

> As a totality, world "is" no particular being but rather that by means of and in terms of which Dasein gives itself to signify what beings it can behave toward and how it can behave toward them... The world has the basic character of the for-the-sake-of... in the primordial sense that it ensures the inner possibility of every factual "for your sake", "for his sake", "for its sake", etc. (WG, 84)

Unlike the earth, the world gives itself to us as our own, as being imbued with our type of Being.

The world is not the collection of the beings of the world. In _UK_, Heidegger uses a formulation he will use again: "The world worlds..."
World is never an object that stands before us and can be looked at" ("Welt
der Welt ist nie ein Gegenstand, der vor uns steht und angesehen
werden kann": UK, 33/44). These three definitions preclude our taking the
world to be the collection of things: as Dasein's "wherein", it is a context
of possibilities; it has the basic character or for-the-sake-of..., and thus
shows itself in terms of our projects; the world worlds and thus is not
a mere collection of things.

The world worlds. Just as the earth is not a lump of material, but
rather is physis, so the world is its activity. The world is the making
available of the things of the world to us; it is the making suitable of
the earth, suitable to man.

The peasant woman ... has a world because she dwells
in the openness of beings. Equipment, in its reliability,
gives to this world a necessity and nearness of its own.
By the opening up of a world, all things gain their linger-
ing and hastening, their remoteness and nearness, their
scope and limits. (UK, 34/45)23

The world is that place, familiar or uncanny, near or "far", in which we
find ourselves and within which we behave. Yet as creatures in a world
(as beings whose Being is in-the-world), we find ourselves on a steadily
thrusting, undisclosed earth. Just as we find the world when we examine
the earth, we find the earth when we examine our world.

It is for this reason that W. B. Macomber says that the earth's necessity
is already apparent in SZ. He says, "The earth announces itself in
every breakdown of the world", apparently finding the same lack in SZ's
treatment of Vorhandenheit which we found, a lack which necessitated the
introduction and development of the notion of the earth.

The world is involved with Dasein's disclosure——the world's for-the-
sake-of... is matched by Dasein's in-order-to -- and is historical because it must submit to the historical nature of Dasein's disclosure. Dasein, as historical, is brought to decisions which create the history historians deal with. But these decisions are in fact responses to the call of Being. Dwelling in a world is possible only as a decision (response) and a self-measuring (taking stock of oneself as a being in the universe) as a mortal (UK, 51/63). For Heidegger, it is ultimately Being which calls and measures mortals and this response and measuring-up are the determinants of the world. The world, like Dasein, is a response to the call of Being.

Unlike the world, the earth is not subject to our decision and measure; rather, it provides the measure of our days, our finitude, for as earthly beings we are mortal. Our decisions must submit to the rule of the earth, the Being of which is beyond our power: we cannot will more oil, we cannot will immortality. Thus, as the world opens-- as we disclose the world-- the earth rises up and stands forth. The earth can come forth as hidden only within a world which as our "wherein" is intelligible. There is no hiddenness unless there is the possibility of disclosure, and the world is this possibility.

The things of the earth appear as Being of the earth and thus as self-secluding. Yet they appear in the world as being of the earth. How can the hidden and the realm of intelligibility co-exist? What is the nature of their relationship?

4. Struggle: Relation of the Hidden and Announcement of Hiddenness

World and earth belong together. But to belong together is to contend:

The world endeavors in its resting upon the earth to subdue it. As the self-opening, it tolerates
nothing closed. The earth, however, as sheltering and concealing, tends always to draw the world into itself and keep it there.

The opposition of world and earth is a struggle. . . In essential struggle, the opponents raise each other into the self-assertion of their natures. . . In the struggle, each opponent carries the other beyond itself. Thus the struggle becomes ever more intensely and authentically what it is. The more the struggle overdoes itself on its own part, the more unyieldingly do the opponents let themselves go into the intimacy of simple belonging to one another. (NK, 37-8/49)25

The struggle is essential to the Being of the opponents. Nietzsche says, "Every talent must unfold itself in fighting. . . The Greek knows the artist only as engaged in a personal fight. . . "26 the artist only is (as an artist) in the struggle.

In order to see the struggle, let us consider equipment. Equipment has the character of reliability, Heidegger tells us; the reliability of equipment is due to its earthiness, due to the constancy and perdurance which is part of the earth's self-seclusion. But the earthiness of equipment is not merely the earth's gift to equipment; it is also equipment's gift to the earth; "the reliability of the equipment first gives to the simple world its security and assures to the earth the freedom of its steady thrust" (NK, 23/14).27 Now, equipment is not as purely thingly as things, for equipment has been formed for some human purpose, a purpose within a world. Clearly, equipment is worldly as well as earthy. Equipment cultivates the earth and lets it appear in its steady, rhythmic bearing of gifts. Equipment is used to bring the earth into the world according to our worldly projects and the earthy resolve possibilities.

The world is that place in which we dwell; the earth is at least what is beneath my feet. Can we locate a simple location of the striving of
the two?

World and earth strive when the peasant attempts to cultivate the earth, to let it yield that which the peasant needs. Earth and world strive when we try to build a house out of the things of the earth in order that we may dwell securely in the world. Here we rely on the reliability of the equipment of the earth and the perdurance of the 'material' of the earth to provide shelter in the world. We acknowledge the sway of the earth in our very attempt to use it: each blow of the hammer recognizes the resolute perdurance of the nail. Each blow brings forth the earth as self-sheltering and each blow brings a house further into the world. Earth and world strive in the effort of our contemporary world to attain mastery over every aspect of the earth (although we may not let the opponents 'go into the intimacy of simply belonging to one another' because we misunderstand the earth).

We see the striving in the artwork which not only manifests the striving but initiates it as well, according to Heidegger. Finally, we see the striving in UK's attempt to let the earth stand forth explicitly in the world of thought.

Earth and world are together through struggle; it is not a struggle with a final outcome and a victor. Rather, "In the struggle the unity of world and earth is won" ("In dem Streit wird die Einheit von Welt und Erde erstritten"; UK, 51/63).

5. The Open: The Place of Struggle

Heidegger warns us not to think of the world as openness and the earth as the closed (UK, 44/55). Rather, each contains the other as a moment. The world is an openness which reveals the the basis of our historical
decisions which are responses to the call of Being (UK, 43/55). The world is an openness of that which keeps itself closed, that which withdraws. If the world cleared all, there could be no decisions at all, but only either arbitrary whim or necessitated reactions. Similarly, the earth is not simply the closed or the concealed, but is rather "that which rises up as self-closing" ("was als Sichverschleissendes aufgeht"; UK, 44/55). It is that which is disclosed as other than disclosure.

"To the open there belongs a world and the earth" ("Zum Offenen gehört eine Welt und die Erde"; UK, 43/55). What is this open? It is not the world nor is it the earth. Why does Heidegger think that there is an open?

Let us consider this in terms of a simple being, a jug, for example.

"This equipment belongs to the earth and it is protected in the world of the peasant woman. From out of this protected belonging the equipment rises to its resting-within-itself" (UK, 23/34). The woman encounters the jug as something reliable and of the earth and yet as something in her world. She performs no philosophical analysis, much less a chemical one. She grants the jug "as it were, a free field" ("gleichsam ein freies Feld"; UK, 15/25) to display its nature as equipment. It is of the earth and in a world. How are the two "moments" joined in their struggle? As in SZ, we are led to ask for the unity of that which has been shown in its wholeness. The simplicity of the peasant's encounter with the jug indicates that there is some simple unity of the earthiness and worldliness of the jug.

Heidegger introduces the open to help us understand the simplicity of the meeting of earth and world. Earth and world grant each other their natures and thus are equally open to each other. It is this Being-open which needs examination:
In the midst of beings as a whole an open place occurs ... the lighting center itself encircles all that is, like the Nothing which we scarcely know. A being can as a being only be if it stands within and stands out within what is lighted in this clearing. (UK, 41-2/53)29

The clearing, the open, lets us have earth, world, thing and self before us as present: "Only this lighting grants and guarantees to us humans a passage to those beings that we ourselves are not, and the access to that being which we ourselves are" (UK, 42/53).30

We have seen in our previous chapter that Heidegger claims that truth is the unconcealment which allows us to make 'true' or 'false' (in the correspondence theory's sense) statements. The open is the realm of unconcealment in which we can find earth and world. The open allows us to dwell in truth, where the nature of truth is "in itself, the primal conflict in which that open center is won within which what is stands, and from which it sets itself back into itself" (UK, 43/55).31 Entering into the open does not guarantee that an entity will be fully revealed, for "a being can be concealed, too, only within the sphere of what is lighted" ("Doch selbst verborgen kann das Seiende nur im Spielraum des Gelichteten sein"; UK, 42/53). Indeed, only within an open can a thing conceal itself and withdraw. The earth secludes itself by withdrawing from the open, although the difference between withdrawal from the open and from the world seems problematic, as we shall see in Part III.

The open is not some metaphysical field which is sufficiently universal or general to accommodate every appearance and interpretation:

The openness of this open, i.e. truth, can only be what it is, namely this openness, if and so long as it establishes itself in its open. Thus there must always be some being in this Open in which the openness takes its stand and attains constancy. By itself occupying the open, the openness holds the open open and preserves it. (UK, 49/61)32
The open needs beings in order to be held open. Thus, beings ground the open as well as vice versa. The open is always open in a particular way (UK, 49/61), presumably according to the different historical epochs.

We may wonder why Heidegger distinguishes the open from its openness. What is the open except the openness of earth, world, men and things to each other? It may be that Heidegger distinguishes openness (or truth) in order to allow for the possibility of our dwelling in the open in a way that its openness (truth) is forgotten. Mortals always dwell in the open, but not every mortal way of dwelling is as uncoining as every other. The open is always present, but it may be present in ways that are misleading about the ontological nature of the open. We dwell in the open in ways that either disclose the openness of the open or do not. Even forgetting or misunderstanding is a way of disclosing and thus takes place in the open. Within the open can be even that which announces its withdrawal from the open, and thus announces its own closedness.

How does the thing appear in the open? Heidegger calls the conflict between earth and world a rift (Riss) (UK, 51/63). He says that the Gestalt of a thing is the struggle that is brought into this rift and is thus set back into the earth and fixed in place (UK, 52/64). Let us take shape as an example. The things of the world have definite shapes. The mountain enters our world in the form of a peak or slope. Let us say we have a (worldly) project of climbing the mountain. The mountain’s shape takes on its meaning from its place in the world. To say that the Gestalt is fixed in place by being set back into the earth is to say that the Gestalt enters the world as being phenomenologically real. To take a broader example, when we see the tree on the hillside as being an entity in its own right as opposed to
just being a part of the hill, this does not seem to us to be just our attribution. Rather, we set the form back into the earth, i.e., we recognize it to be the way the earth really is.

But in the earth as the essentially self-closing the openness of the open meets its greatest resistance, and thereby the site of its constant stand within which the Gestalt must be fixed in place. (UK, 57/69).

The open lets the thing enter as a thing of the earth, and therefore as self-concealing. It is this reluctance to be disclosed that allows the open to set the thing back into the earth, to return it via disclosure to its independence from disclosure. It is disclosed in such a way that its independence from disclosure is not vitiated by the fact that this independence is itself announced in disclosure: this is what it means to set the thing back into the earth.

In UK, then, we find a notion of hiddenness that does just what we wanted done in SZ: it recognizes the independence of the thing from disclosure and sets it free as what it is— as independent from disclosure— without giving up the fact that the independence itself appears. Heidegger's discussion of the earth-world pair constitutes nothing less than an exploration of how the independence of the thing manifests itself in disclosure; this manifestation is also a manifestation of its hidden source, the earth.

This is not to say that Heidegger's account is satisfactory. There are problems with the notion of the open which point to a problem with the idea of the world presented in UK. We shall face these problems in Part III of this chapter. Now we turn to the role of the artwork. In particular, what can it tell us about the specificity of the ontological nature of things?
PART II

Heidegger develops his thought about earth and world by considering the artwork. But the artwork does more than give him access to a 'doctrine' of earth and world. Rather, the artwork is a part of that 'doctrine', for the artwork is the becoming and happening of truth (UK, 59/71) and the beginning or re-starting of history (UK, 64/77). Because the artwork is not simply the medium by which information is transmitted but instead has an ontological stake in the Being of earth and world, what the artwork reveals has a special status for what it reveals will be deeply ontologically indebted to the artwork.

In this section of this chapter, we will consider what the artwork tells us about the nature of things as particulars and as species of things. This will help us eventually to answer the question: how specific can an ontology of things get? We will also consider further the relation of earth and world, now in light of its manifestation by the artwork. Finally we will consider the 'surprise ending' of UK in which Heidegger tells us that all art is essentially poetry, and we will ask about this specifically in relation to the thing.

To see the relation between the artwork and the specific thing (e.g., hammer as hammer, shoes as shoes), let us first see what an artwork is not.

The artwork is not a representation of a being. We often take an artwork to be the presentation of the form of a subject without its matter. The painting of a shoe gives us the form of the shoe without using leather. This interpretation, of course, relies on the form-matter distinction which
Heidegger has already called into question. It would mean that the artwork gains its sense from actual shoes. Thus, the shoes themselves would have to have been intelligible to us before we saw the artwork; the artwork gains its meaning parasitically from the world. If this is the case, the artwork does not ontologically contribute to the creation of the intelligible world. Yet Heidegger thinks it does so contribute. In addition, the form-matter interpretation would have to account for the problematic relation of the picture to what is pictured (a relation that raises genuine philosophical difficulties, as Wittgenstein showed in his *Tractatus*), and it does not seem to help us at all in understanding non-representational art such as architecture.

Similarly, the artwork is not an expression. If it were, that which expresses would pre-exist the expression. In that case, the artwork would serve no ontological function. If it were just an expression, Heidegger would not be able to write, when talking of a poetic artwork (i.e., a poem), "The elegy 'Homecoming' is not a poem about homecoming; rather the elegy itself, taken as the very poetry of which it is comprised, is the actual homecoming..." 35

Heidegger’s "Dialogue with a Japanese" ("Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache") in *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (US) may help us here. We are told that the Japanese word "*Tki* is the breath of the stillness of luminous delight" ("*Tki* ist das Wehen der Stille des leuchtenden Erzuckens"; US, 141/44) where 'delight' (Entzucken) retains its original literal German sense of "what ensnares, carries away—into stillness" ("Entziehen, Hinzucken—namlich in die Stille"; US 141/44).

The delight is of the same kind as the hint that beckons on and beckons to and fro... The hint, however, is the
If it is indifferent, it is not the real essence. The essence we seek then
usually defined as the essence of every particular and thus is indifferent (definitional).

The essence presents itself as the generic and the universal concept, which represents the generic and the universal. This already suffices to cast doubt on its reality, for any thing, but this
is indifferent.

However, it is thought that this is not to be those common
features which are true for things.

In an essay on the essence of poetry, Heidegger claims that a universal
certainly is not sufficient to guarantee truth, but this interpretation of
the painting of shoes does not represent all shoes in their "shoe-ness". This
is not intelligible in itself, but which without, the hint would not be discerned.

The artwork does not portray a particular in its universality. That is,
the painting of shoes does not represent all shoes in their "shoe-ess". This
is not intelligible in itself, but which without, the hint would not be discerned.

The artwork as a hint, is not an expression. A hint is that which precisely
does not express that which it is about. Rather, it beckons us toward what
it wants to say, but that it wants to say is the stillness, a stillness which
would be broken by an inappropriate word.

The essence of the stillness, as it opens up, then

III.
tial essence... The essential essence of something... lies in what the entity is in truth. The true essential nature of a thing is determined by the way of its true Being, by way of the truth of the given being. (UK, 39/58) 40

The artwork does not present a particular in its universal and indifferent essence:

The establishing of truth in the work is the bringing forth of a being such as never was before and never will come to be again. The bringing forth places this being in the open in such a way that what is to be brought forth first clears the openness of the open into which it comes forth. (UK, 50/62) 41

Yet, to a certain extent, this painting of a pair of peasant shoes remains a painting of a pair of shoes. It is a pair worn by a peasant farmer; the shoes are like many other shoes worn by many other peasants. What we learn from this pair of shoes—that mortals dwell, cultivating the reliable earth which lets its fruit perdure and blossom—we could learn from any pair of shoes worn by a peasant. In this the artwork may seem to be presenting the universal essence of peasant shoes.

But if we look more closely at the 'lesson' of the painting of the shoes, we see that the particular 'portrayed' reveals not just what is common to all peasant shoes, but more importantly, that which enables all peasant shoes to share in a universal essence. If all peasant shoes can be universalized, they all have important features in common. In our example, these features would be worn soles, creased leather and dirtiness. How is it that peasant shoes have these features in common? This question will take us past the 'indifferent' universal features, indifferent because they do not tell us of the meaning of the shoes.

Peasant shoes have those features in common because they are shoes that
Have been worn by mortals cultivating the earth. It is our common mortal situation on the earth which makes the shoes similar enough to allow universalization. This common situation is not itself a universal: Dasein is always an individual and its own, the earth is the earth beneath us and not some universal, abstract notion of earth. An understanding of the artwork which draws from it nothing but universals has yet to ask how there can be a common ground which allows for universalization. That which makes the shoes into 'typical' peasant shoes, i.e., the fact that mortals till the earth, is not a universal; it is a common ground. To make a philosophically accurate pun, the common ground is the earth and our mortal relation to it.

The artwork, then, presents a particular to us in terms of its particular way of being; this turns out to be the ground of universalization.

Further, the specific individual shoes which are the 'subject' of the painting are shown in more than their individuality. We do not see a picture of these shoes (shoes perhaps exhibited next to the painting) so much as a picture of the peasant shoes. The artwork seems to deal at least on the level of species of things, more than on the level of precise individuals. We shall develop the meaning of this in our final chapter where we shall see that there is good reason why Heidegger talks in "Das Ding" of the jug and not a jug: we are not yet prepared to undertake this discussion. For now let us only remark that the artwork gives us neither an abstract universal (shoe-mess) nor a concrete individual (this pair of shoes I am pointing at), but rather something 'in between'. In our final chapter we shall see that this phenomenon 'in between' is the word.

There is a play in UK between particulars and the totality of their context which is not itself a particular. On the one hand, "the earth juts
up within the artwork because the work is present as that in which truth is at work, and because truth is present only by establishing itself within a being" (UK, 57/69). Yet the artwork does not "just make manifest what this isolated being as such is..." ("bekunden nicht nur, was dieses vereinzelte Seiende als dieses sei"; UK, 44/56); rather, it lets "unconcealedness as such happen in regard to what is as a whole" ("Unverborgenheit als solche im Bezug auf das Seiende im Ganzen geschehen"; UK, 44/56). The play here apparently swings between the particular 'portrayed' and the artwork as a thing in the world. The basis of this play is the nature of truth.

The following interpretation is speculative. In FR, Heidegger says that art manifests Being in the work as a being (FR, 122/134). The artwork shows more than a particular; it shows the particular in its Being. We can make some sense of this by considering the difference between two phenomena found within frames: paintings and windows. Windows show us a range of individuals, but the artwork shows us more than a range. It shows us something besides the particular entities it 'depicts'. The artwork must at least be a composition, and if it is a true artwork, the composition will be graceful. Its grace lies in no particular member but is rather a function of their relationship. Aesthetics has grown accustomed to taking of the grace the composition as a property the meaning of which applies only to the artwork. To say that painting is graceful would be then to say something only about the painting. I will speculatively maintain that Heidegger takes the artwork's grace to be a function not just of the artwork but also of the world. This would help explain in what sense \textit{Iki}, the gracious, beckons us to and fro. It beckons us from painting to...
world. The grace of the painting graces the world. Ontically this would mean that a graceful landscape painting reveals the grace of the landscape. Leonardo da Vinci’s portraits of deformed humans alter our vision of ugliness. But there may be an ontological meaning as well.

It would be this: the grace of a painting of flowers is the same grace as that of a mountain landscape. The grace is the appearance of that within which the particular can appear. The grace is the breath of the luminous delight which carries us away. We are carried away to stillness, presumably the same stillness whether we are looking at a Klee carnival scene or a Rembrandt self-portrait. We are carried away from the particular 'portrayed' to the worldliness of the world which enables the particular to be. In the words of UK, we are carried to the openness of the open.

But Heidegger is at pains not to dissolve the particular in its context of relations, and this is why the movement is to and fro. We are brought back from the un-thinglike openness of the open to the particular presented by the artwork. This insistence on the presence of beings keeps Heidegger from mysticism. The mystic moves from thing to the no-thing to which the artwork beckons; Heidegger comes back from the no-thing to the thing.

To use the word prevalent in Identität und Differenz (ID), the motion is a vibrating or swinging (schwingen; ID, 30/37). 43

Heidegger insists on this because he is committed to our experience as that which is to be 'explained' and as the standard by which our 'explanations' are to be measured. In our experience the things of the world do not dissolve into their relations. They remain before us even as we swing away from them to an ontological understanding of them which requires seeing them within the open in which they can be.
Yet this matter is not quite this straightforward, for in \textit{SZ} Heidegger has plainly said that strictly speaking there is no such thing as an item of equipment (\textit{SZ}, 68), precisely because an item of equipment can only be because it is within contexts of projects and other tools. This may be a shift in Heidegger’s thought, then. It may be that by the time he writes \textit{UK} he wishes to take back his claim that tools vanish into their contexts. Or it may be that even when writing \textit{UK} Heidegger thinks that this or that tool has no ontological basis although species of tools (i.e., not this or that hammer, but hammers) do have an ontological basis which does not dissolve.

But there is reason to think that a genuine shift is accomplished: with the explicit recognition of the earth, Heidegger has a way of acknowledging the resolute perdurance of things. We can speculate that in \textit{SZ} Heidegger wanted to establish that Being was nothing like the substance of traditional metaphysics. It was so little like substance that things could dissolve into their relations. But with the earth Heidegger has a phenomenon which, like substance, allows things to perdure, yet which, unlike substance, is ontologically dependent on the world. (The world is also ontologically dependent on the earth.) Unlike substance, the earth grants to things a blossoming perdurance which is not eternal, but rather is timely.

The earth, as self-secluding, resists our understanding down to the last and almost empty characterization of “it is” or “thatness”. Heidegger tells us:

\begin{quote}
Where the artist and the process and circumstances of the creation of the work remain unknown, this thrust, this ‘that it is’ of Being-created emerges into view most purely from the work. (\textit{UK}, 53/65)\textsuperscript{44}
\end{quote}

The ‘that’ disappears in the equipment’s usefulness (\textit{UK}, 53/64) but is retrieved by the artwork which is not in any ordinary sense useful at all.
Indeed, when the artwork becomes useful—as an investment, for example—it ceases to be an artwork. "The work moves the earth itself into the open of a world and keeps it there" ("Das Werke rückt und halt die Erde selbst in das Offene einer Welt"; UK, 35/46). That is, the artwork announces the self-seclusion of the earth. This does not merely reproduce an already accomplished fact; it is instead an originary event in which the earth becomes the earth: "The work lets the earth be an earth" ("Das werke lässt die Erde eine Erde sein"; UK, 35/46).

It lets the earth be an earth by setting it into the world; the artwork must also, if it is to be true, set forth the rift of earth and world. The work sets forth the earth's "thatness", but in setting the "thatness" into the world, the pure "thatness" is in some sense disclosed. By looking at the way the "thatness" appears in the work, we should be able to see the rift, for the rift is the difference between earth and world.

The earth's "thatness" is not that of pure material without character of its own. The artwork does not "use up or misuse the earth as matter, but rather sets it free to be nothing but itself" ("verbraucht und missbraucht die Erde nicht als einen Stoff, sondern es befreit sie gerade zu ihr selbst"; UK, 52/64). If the world worlds, perhaps we can say that in the artwork material materializes: "The rock comes to bear and rest and so first becomes rock; metals come to glitter and shimmer, colours to glow, tones to ring, the word to speak" (UK, 35/46). For example, in a painting by the German romantic Friedrich, we see shards of ice in their power and clarity, not as mere matter devoid of character. In Turner's misty seascapes, the fog is brought forth in its subtle colours as being more than just water suspended in air. In the abstract paintings by Mondrian, colour is brought
to appearance. In music sounds are turned to song. The materials of the earth are exhibited in their inexplicable presence. The material exhibited is not indifferent "thatness", nor is it "length, breadth and extension" (Descartes).\textsuperscript{46} Nor is it pure matter devoid of all form.

The "thatness" Heidegger seems to have in mind is the announced hiddenness of the definite and resolute possibilities (or properties, to speak metaphysically) of the things of the earth. Our inability to say more than "that it is" of the possibilities of the things of the earth must not be confused with our purported inability to say more than "that it is" of that which is by definition without its own possibilities, namely matter. In his study of the artwork, Heidegger confirms that about which he is regrettably silent in \textsc{SZ}: things have their own possibilities which they bring to our encounters with them. These possibilities spring from a hiddenness which is ontologically determinative and about which we can say little more than "it is". The "thatness" manifested by the artwork is \textit{Vorhandenheit} as we have understood the term.

Now we can see how the artwork manifests the rift and ultimately sets the rift back into the earth. The artwork uses 'matter' (for the artwork is itself a thing of the earth and thus is earthy) in ways appropriate to its 'matter'. This brings the earth into the world: the sculpture is made of stone and yet it is in the world. The artwork claims our attention, and this brings forth the rift. Kenneth Clark marvels at the rift when he writes:

\begin{quote}
In the two rooms of the \textit{Nymphéas} in Paris [Monet] expands his sensations into one continuous form, like a symphonic poem. This poem takes its point of departure from experience, but the stream of sensation becomes a stream of consciousness. And how does consciousness become paint? That is the miracle.\textsuperscript{47}
\end{quote}
How does consciousness become paint? How does paint become intelligible? That is indeed a miracle. In claiming our attention, in claiming even awe from us, the artwork brings forth the rift between the hidden earth and the disclosed world. We are awestruck by Michelangelo's "David", for how can mere stone teach us so much about mortal heroism? How did a column of marble become a magnificent figure? Our awe is a measure of the incommensurability between the earth and the world. This incommensurability, which the artwork shows forth even in overcoming it, is the rift. In overcoming it, the rift is set back into the earth.

The revelation of the self-secluding earth is also the revelation of the things which withdraw from disclosure. To understand the thingly character of things we must aim at the thing's belonging to the earth. The essence of the earth... reveals itself, however, only in the earth's jutting into a world, in the opposition of the two. This struggle is fixed in the Gestalt of the work and through it becomes obvious. (UK, 57/69-70)48

But the thing's belonging to the earth is just what the artwork reveals:

That we never know thingness directly, and if we know it at all, then only vaguely and thus require the work—this fact proves indirectly that in the work—being of the work the happening of truth, the opening up or disclosure of what is, is at work. (UK, 57-8/70)49

The thing cannot be known directly because it is its ontological nature to appear as being independent of disclosure. It announces a hidden source, which is the earth.

How, then, does the thing ever become a work? The rift must stand before the artist as a rift: how shall, indeed, how can material of the earth be used to set up a world? How can this question be answered before a world has been set up within which the earth may show itself as what it is? The
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their strife, the artwork opens the open. When we stand in awe before the artwork which has brought forth the rift ("paint has become intelligible"), we at the same time respond to the fact of unconcealment; unconcealment seems to occur against 'all odds', for earth and world seem incommensurable.

Heidegger claims that the motive for the happening of truth lies not in some 'creative urge' of the artist, but in the nature of truth itself: "Truth wants to be established ..." ("Die Wahrheit will ... gerichtet werden"; UK, 51/62). He may mean by this simply that earth, world, thing, artwork, open and openness (truth) are ontologically indebted to each other: each can only be what it is because of the presence of the others. The intent of the remark is clear: Heidegger wants to keep us from thinking of the artwork as the subjective product of a subjective consciousness. It is instead ontologically determinative.

I now want to discuss poetry, both because this follows Heidegger's own train in UK and because it will prepare the way for a consideration of language in our final chapter.

Heidegger says, "All art, as the letting happen of the advent of the truth of what is, is as such essentially poetry" (UK, 59/72). This statement startles us not only because of its sweep but because it seems to subvert much of what was said earlier. Heidegger has assumed prior to this statement that the artwork has something thingily about it. It is this thingily nature which makes it the suitable starting point for an inquiry into the being of things. Yet the poem is much less obviously thingily.

What is thingily about a spoken poem? Indeed, what is truly thingily about a printed poem? First let us see what Heidegger means by his sweeping statement, and then we will try to square it with the earlier portions of UK.
We will see that the statement does not actually contradict the bulk of the essay, although it serves as a 'dialectical twist of the knife', bringing the entire essay into a new focus.

Poetry is ontological because language is. In US, he writes, "Saying and Being, word and thing, belong to each other in a veiled way. . . . All essential saying hearkens back to this veiled mutual belonging of saying and Being, word and thing" (US, 237-8/155). We may take 'saying' to be something like essential language. Heidegger writes:

The word's rule springs to light as that which makes the thing a thing. The word rises to light as the gathering which first brings what presences to its presence.

The oldest word for the rule of the word thus thought, for saying, is logos: saying which, as showing, lets beings appear in their "it is".

The same word, however, the word for saying, is also the word for Being, that is, for the presencing of what is present. (US, 237/155) The word first shows the thing to be a thing within the open; it brings into disclosure the thing's presence. "The word allows the thing to presence as a thing" ("Das Wort lässt das Ding als Ding anwesen"; US, 232-3/151). The "as" is crucial there. Language "first brings beings to word and appearance. This naming nominates beings to their Being from out of their Being" (UK, 60-1/73). In bringing the thing to appearance, the word names the thing as what it is. The word brings the thing to its Being as what it is, but this means that the word uncovers what the thing is; this is why the motion is both to its Being and from out of its Being. Poetry here does what phenomenology is intended to do: it allows phenomena to return to themselves as what they are. It is a return because it is a finding, not a creating. If poetry (or phenomenology) simply created entities, there would be no uncovering. Instead there is a finding, which means an uncovering of what
was always already there but hidden.

This all depends, of course, on not taking language as itself being an expression of what everyone already knows. Neither is language, for Heidegger, a system of signs or symbols. It is instead, to be blunt, the intelligibility of Being. We shall discuss this further in Chapter VII.

If all artworks are poetic in that they render intelligible and thus bring to presence, then why does Heidegger spend so much time with plastic artworks? If the plastic artwork is in a good position to bring things into the open because the artwork is itself a thing in the world, how can poetry do this, for it is much less obviously a thing? Or does this get the question backwards? Perhaps it is the case that the artwork can only do this because the artwork is primordially poetry. Perhaps Heidegger starts with the plastic artwork in order to play into one of our prejudices which the final portion of UK is meant to overcome.

The plastic artwork presents itself as the most obvious artwork when we are inquiring into the thingly nature of the thing, for the plastic artwork is obviously itself a thing. But it is obviously a thing according to a prior idea about the nature of the thing. It is obviously a thing if we take a thing to be that which we can grasp in our hands. From the inquiry into the artwork we learn that the thing is not primarily that which is graspable by the hands, but is rather the earth as it juts into the world. To understand the earth as it juts into the world is to understand the basis of its graspability: we can grasp the earth in our hands because we are here on the earth in a world. The earth is in fact a possibility. Within the world this possibility includes within it the possibility of being grasped by the hand and even of being misunderstood as the mere characterless material for our projects.
But these latter possibilities are granted only within that which makes the earth possible: its jutting into the world, its struggling with the world, its granting perdurance in the open. Even if the earth is, as we have maintained, something hidden from disclosure, this self-refusal has itself entered into the open structure of possibility. Thus, the plastic artwork seems most appropriate to the inquiry into things because we start with an understanding of the earth which has not looked deeply enough yet: what makes a thing a thing is not the fact that our hands can hold it but that which makes it possible for our hands to hold it.

PART III

I now wish to develop some problems in UK, problems I believe Heidegger comes to recognize.

We have talked about a play between two poles: in UK, on the one hand, the grace of the artwork carries us away from the particular to that in which the particular can be what it is. On the other hand, we are called back to the particular, and Heidegger affirms the ontological importance of beings in their particularity: the artwork shows us the shoes as shoes. The problem is that the earth-world pair does not seem to give us a way to describe species of things in their particular characteristics. How am I to describe shoes as opposed to nails given only the earth-world pair? The pair enables us to talk about the-thinghood of the thing, but not about the jughood of the jug and the shoeiness of the shoe. Yet the play of the artwork indicates that there is more to a jug than its thinghood. We shall see that the fourfold (das Geviert) solves this problem.
The second problem has to do with the status of the world. In UK, the world is not the open; rather, it enters into the open. We have already briefly mentioned one problem with the open: its relation to openness (truth). We shall return to that and then consider the relation of the open and the world.

Why does Heidegger distinguish between the open (das Offene) and its openness (die Offenheit)? I have suggested an interpretation: with this distinction, Heidegger can maintain that the open can be opened in ways which are more or less appropriate to it. Thus we can dwell appropriately or inappropriately, in truth or untruth, but still we are dwelling in the open. Without this distinction (or one like it), there would be no way to account for the fact that some ways of dwelling are more or less appropriate. All would be bathed in a pure light. Yet, as Werner Marx has argued, Heidegger's thought is distinctive in that he "thinks of the 'realms of darkness' and the 'realm of light' as equal partners in the occurrence of Being...".

Our problem now is: why does Heidegger need the open at all? When we earlier discussed the function of the open in UK, the open seemed to be needed to enable there to be simple and unitary phenomena such as things even though they are 'composed' of both earth and world. Earth and world are brought into a simple unity in any thing. But in fact we do not need the open for this unless we take the world as Heidegger has taken it in UK. If Heidegger had taken the world properly — the way he takes it in later writings — he would have seen that the open is superfluous.

Let us anticipate. Depending on how we take the open, the world either is the open, or the open is the truth (unconcealment) of the world. But in no case should we have the world entering an open which is not the
same as the truth of the open.

The problem in UK stems from Heidegger's understanding of the world. It would seem the world enters the open, and the open has its openness. But what is the difference between the openness of the open and the openness of the world? If the world were the aggregate of what-is, then perhaps we would need the additional term of the open to explain how this aggregation could ever be intelligible, how it could be accessible to Dasein, how Da-sein could ever stand out into its "there" in such a way that the "there" is a meaningful whole. But we know that Heidegger does not want us to think of the world as a mere aggregate. In the words of UK, "The world worlds ... The world is never an object that stands before us and can be looked at" ("Welt weltet ... Welt ist nie ein Gegenstand, der vor uns steht und angesehen werden kann"; UK, 33/44). The world is that intelligible "wherein" within which beings find their Being. If we need to talk about the openness of the world, let us talk of its unconcealment, its truth.

If the world is that within which beings find their Being, it becomes clearer why more than the earth is necessary to account for the presence of what-is. If earth is the only ontological principle to account for the definite possibilities of things, we will not be able to distinguish things ontologically from each other. Thus, it is not surprising that Heidegger introduces the fourfold as ontological principles. As we shall see, they are ontological principles which are in the world. The world is not itself a part of the fourfold, according to Heidegger. The world is instead the 'intersection' of the ontological principles. It is that "wherein" in which the principles are gathered in a 'thing which is' in the world. The world is what the ontological principles must explain.
Further, the world seems unlike the members of the fourfold: earth, sky, gods and mortals. The four are not abstractions or generalities. We can even point to the earth, the sky, to mortals. Because the gods are absent, they are a limiting case of pointing, but we can at least point to their shrines where they are present as absent. The world is not like this. Where do we point when we want to indicate the world? It is the context which makes pointing possible. It is the place in which we find earth, sky, mortals and absent gods.

But why would Heidegger make the error I have imputed to him? I can only speculate. I have argued that Heidegger introduces the earth in order to acknowledge explicitly the hidden nature of the things of the world, their announced independence from disclosure. Perhaps Heidegger overemphasized the foreignness of the earth from the realm of disclosure. If this were the case, it might seem that the earth could not be brought into disclosure except by something equally forceful. Here we have the basic distinctions of UK: something hidden (earth), something which discloses the earth and renders it intelligible (world), and that into which the earth is dragged (open).

Having separated what discloses and disclosure itself, it is but a simple step to talk of the disclosiveness of the realm of disclosure into which the earth is dragged, and this would correspond to earth, world, open and openness. By thinking of the earth as emphatically self-secluding and by thinking that the force which drags the earth from its self-seclusion must be different from that into which the earth is dragged, we can generate the schema of UK.

The objection to this schema is that that which discloses is the same as the realm of disclosure. What discloses, in this case, is not itself a
principle, force or being, but is instead the possibility of disclosure.

In UK it is as if Heidegger is thinking of the relation of world and earth along the lines of the relation of Dasein and entity. Dasein discloses an entity within a site in which Dasein and entity meet, namely the world. In UK the world, in effect, discloses the earth within a site in which world and earth meet, namely the open. But the two cases are not truly analogous. World and earth should be discussed not as beings but as that which enable there to be beings. If they were beings, we might need a site for their meeting, an open. But as that which enable there to be beings, they are the site.

The origins of the error are a matter of speculation. UK seems to stand alone in its treatment of the world and the open. For our purposes it is more important to see how the error can direct us to a new understanding of the thing, an understanding developed by Heidegger in his later essays.
IV

GROUND AND EXPLANATIONS

In the previous chapters we have not only arrived at some ontological questions we want Heidegger to address himself to, but we have also seen that the form of our disclosure has an effect on what is disclosed. Asking a question is a way of bringing something to disclosure; asking "What causes human behavior?" instead of "What motivates human behavior?" discloses human behavior in a particular way. We must pose our questions carefully, then, and consider not just what the answer says but also in what sense it is an answer at all. This is especially true of ontological questions, for we are situated within a tradition which has forgotten or misunderstood Being and thus which tends to ask the wrong questions. In this chapter, we shall consider how we should take the answers Heidegger presents us.

In Part I, I will offer a brief and general consideration of what we usually take an explanation to be. It is intended only to provide something to which we can contrast Heidegger's views.

In Parts II and III we shall look at the two obvious sources for an understanding of Heidegger's view of grounds and explanations: Von Wesen des Grunudes (WG) and Der Satz vom Grund (SG). We shall see that in these works Heidegger questions the notion that an explanation must show a necessary connection between what is to be explained and its ground; rather, explanations offer possibility more than necessity.

To understand possibility, we shall have to consider Heidegger's notion
of ecstatic temporality which makes possible Heideggerian possibility. This we shall do in Part IV. We shall look again at S2 in order to show that for Heidegger grounds are temporal. That his earliest major work provides the direction toward an answer to a question which his later works implicitly pose may indicate that Heidegger’s thought forms a coherent whole.

PART I

What do we normally take an explanation to be? Since our main goal is to understand how to understand Heidegger’s explanations of things, let us start with how we might ordinarily explain how something is.

Let us say we want to know how bread mold forms. Depending on the sophistication of the questioner, we will say something like: spores of mold float in the air. When one lands on bread, and when the bread is moist and in a dark place, the mold is enabled to germinate and reproduce itself. Now, what have we done in this explanation?

We have said that there are certain entities (spores) which under certain circumstances turn into that which we are trying to explain (bread mold). If we did not know about spores, we might have said that old, moist bread gets moldy. Our explanation would be incomplete, and accordingly unsatisfactory, because it will not explain why some old, moist bread gets moldy and other does not. We will not have specified conditions which necessitate the occurrence of bread mold. We consider our explanations to be complete and full when that which is to be explained (the explanandum) is shown to be necessitated by the conditions and facts cited in the explanation.

We explain the existence of bread mold by referring to phenomena other than the explanandum: spores, moisture, nutrients, the presence of
absence of light. If these necessitate bread mold, they also exist whether or not the mold forms. They are ontologically independent of the bread mold, although the bread mold is ontologically dependent on them.

In this case, then, we explain \( X \) by showing the phenomena which necessitate the existence of \( X \); the necessity is one-way, for \( X \) does not necessitate the existence of the explanatory phenomena. The explanatory phenomena exist before \( X \) does.

Since we are trying merely to generate a model of explanation we can contrast with Heidegger's, we need not worry that there may be other models of explanation so long as this one seems familiar. But there are reasons to think that this model is fairly typical of ordinary explanations. If we ask for an explanation of the existence of an entity, it will not be enough to say "It simply is"; we want some further information and so we will be referred to other phenomena. (That the quest for an explanation of God's existence may end with a simple assertion that God is because He is, or because He is God, does not show that explanations need not refer us to some other phenomenon. Instead, the peculiar quality of the answer to the question about God's existence points to what holds most generally for explanations: we seek to understand \( X \) by looking at \( Y, Z, \) etc.) It would be nonsensical for us to be referred to phenomena which have nothing to do with the explanandum. The phenomena cited must have "explanatory relevance", in Carl Hempel's phrase.\(^1\) What makes a phenomenon relevant? It certainly will be relevant if it is a necessary condition for the existence of the explanandum. If these phenomena necessitate the explanandum, they must be ontologically prior to and independent of the explanandum. Thus, it makes sense to say that we usually explain something by referring to other
phenomena which necessitate it, and which are ontologically independent of it.

We need to consider this in some more detail. Let us look at Hempel's deductive-nomological (henceforth called DN) model. What makes DN explanations explanatory? Does it contradict the general nature of explanations we have so far suggested?

Hempel writes about an example of a DN explanation he has given:

The explanation fits the phenomenon to be explained into a pattern of uniformities and shows that its occurrence was to be expected, given the specified laws and the pertinent particular circumstances.\textsuperscript{2}

It does so by specifying a law (or laws) of universal applicability, specifying particular circumstances capable of factual verification, and concludes by validly deducing that which is to be explained from the laws and circumstances:

The explanations just considered may be conceived, then, as deductive arguments whose conclusion is the explanandum sentence, $E$, and whose premiss-set, the explanatory, consists of general laws, $L_1, L_2, \ldots, L_r$ and of other statements, $S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_k$, which make assertions about particular facts.\textsuperscript{3}

The phenomenon being explained is more particular than the premises of laws which explain it.

Hempel's DN model falls within our generalizations, although it interprets some of them in its own way: in the DN model, necessity is logical necessity, and the phenomena to which we are referred must include at least one law. Hempel recommends the DN model precisely because it fulfills our expectations about what an explanation should do:

Deductive-nomological explanations satisfy the requirement of explanatory relevance in the strongest possible sense: the explanatory information they provide implies the explanandum sentence deductively and thus offers logically conclusive grounds
why the explanandum phenomenon is to be expected.

... And the testability requirement is met as well, since the explanans implies among other things that under the specified condition, the explanandum phenomenon occurs. 4

We expect an explanation tendered within the realm of science to be testable. Testability is a means of demonstrating explanatory relevance, or necessity.

But what of the ontological independence of the explanatory phenomena (and the concomitant ontological dependence of the explanandum on the explanans)? In one sense, Hempel simply assumes this. He is content (quite reasonably so) to let scientific explanations be incomplete in the sense that they need not explain that which is used in the explanation. As Wittgenstein says, "Explanations come to an end somewhere." 5 Testability implies the existence of the explanatory phenomena prior to the existence of the explanandum; the test is carried out by assembling the putative explanatory phenomena and seeing if the explanandum phenomenon occurs.

He is undoubtedly right that we are referred in an explanation not just to other phenomena, but also to something of a different type than that of the explanandum: a law. The law is not itself a particular. In giving simple explanations (such as our example of the bread mold), we often do not make the law explicit, but any account of explanation must take this non-particular something into consideration. As John H. Anderson writes, "From the point of view of the metaphysical tradition, disclosure is understood to occur when a particular is grounded by a relation to the whole . . . ." 6 We explain a particular by referring to something which is not a particular.

Hempel calls this non-particular a law. While we may want to say that the non-particular in scientific explanations is (or should be) a law--
enabling us to establish a criterion of testability for scientific explanations—we have a more general term: grounds. Indeed, we have already heard Hempel use this term: A DN explanation "offers logically conclusive grounds why the explanandum phenomenon is to be expected...". The ground is that phenomenon whose being is not of the same sort as the particular's, and which accounts for the particular explanandum. The ground necessitates the explanandum phenomenon, which we can now call 'the grounded'. As Husserl says, "To know the ground of anything means to see the necessity of its being so and so." The ground is ontologically independent of the grounded, but not vice versa. Because of this, the ground has been thought to have a higher ontological status than the grounded. A ground is most fully a ground when it is a final ground, i.e., a ground which cannot itself become an explanandum phenomenon.

There is an obvious connection between ground and explanation. Explanation explains by referring to a ground. A ground may be necessary and self-explanatory (e.g., God), contingent and inexplicable (e.g., history, if we think of it as a series of accidents which determine human action), or which will itself figure as an object of explanation. When attempting to give a full explanation, we accept the last two only when we find we can go no further.

A ground is a ground only if it figures in the explanation of what it grounds. Of course there may be grounds of which we are entirely unaware and which therefore figure in no explanations so far. But an unrecognized ground that could never figure in an explanation is not a ground, for the variety of explanations exhausts the ways in which grounds can ground. That there may be unrecognized grounds means only that we may not have finally explained
everything fully yet. A ground which grounds its grounded in a way beyond conception is a ground which is itself beyond conception and ought to be discounted. A critique of explanations leads to a critique of grounds.

We find, then, that an explanation explains a particular by referring us to something non-particular. This latter (given certain factual conditions) necessitates the grounded and is ontologically independent of it. We see a relation between grounds and explanations.

We must note that not every statement that looks like an explanation is one. Thus, we need not interpret "God created the earth" as an explanation of the earth. Earth may not be the explanandum; God may not be the necessitating ground of the earth. The statement "Dasein is the shepherd of Being" is not necessarily an explanation of Dasein. To use Heidegger's language, these statements may perhaps be better understood as invitations to dwell on the earth in an original way.

We shall see that Heidegger's 'explanations' are not of the usual sort we have been discussing. For one thing, Heidegger's explanations will not refer us beyond the particular to something else in such a way that the something else necessitates the particular. He resists the temptation to say that that to which we are referred is 'higher'. He writes:

The final, but at the same time the most difficult step of every exposition of poetry consists in vanishing away together with explanations in the face of the pure existence of the poem. 9

If we are referred beyond the entity, we may end up simply turning away from the entity. Heidegger's explanations, on the other hand, intend to bring us face to face with the things themselves in such a way that we dwell with them and preserve them. This may mean leaving the particular unexplained in
the usual sense. For example, colour "only shows itself when it remains undisclosed and unexplained. Earth thus lets every invasion of it dash itself to pieces" (UK, 36/47). He says that "we never get to know a mystery by unveiling or analyzing it; we only get to know it by carefully guarding the mystery as a mystery".

We shall see that some of Heidegger's profoundest thought on the topic concerns the relation of grounds and explanations. Explaining is one activity among many possible for humans. How can humans offer explanations at all? Hempel, dealing with explanations as verbal arguments, lets the question of the status of the grounds invoked in explanations remain undecided. For his purposes, he need only say that certain universal statements are true. He need not consider the question of the phenomena 'represented' in the statements. But Heidegger, as an ontologist, cannot let the matter go. We shall see that his works on grounds—the German "Grund" referring both to the ground which is and the reasons invoked in an explanation—takes this topic to be of the utmost importance.

PART II

Heidegger ends "What Is Metaphysics?" ("Was ist Metaphysik?") with Leibniz's question, which Heidegger calls the metaphysical question: Why are there things rather than nothing? In the opening pages of WC Heidegger again turns to Leibniz, this time to his principle of sufficient reason (der Satz vom Grund) which may be read as a guide to answering the metaphysical question. The question seems to ask for the ground of that which is. The principle of sufficient reason seems to address itself to the nature of the "why" which begins the metaphysical question. "What Is
Metaphysics?". WO and Der Satz vom Grund (SG) are variations on the theme of the metaphysical question and the principle of sufficient reason. (We shall deal with the last two because the first essay serves our purposes simply by posing the metaphysical question in a way that makes it philosophically inevitable.)

Heidegger begins WO by locating the problem of sufficient reason in Dasein's transcehdence. This may make us suspect that we are to be confronted with a subjectivism which claims that human consciousness is the necessitating cause and ground of all that is. This is not the case, however. In WO, Heidegger aims to re-introduce the 'subject' into the discussion of grounds, and to show the implications of remembering both that the quest for the ground is a questioning and that "the questioner-- as a questioner-- is called into the question" ("der Fragende-- als ein solcher-- in der Frage mit da, d.h. in die Frage gestellt ist"). By remembering that the quest for the ground is a questioning, the ground may be seen to be something other than some entity. Heidegger finds Dasein to be central in the occurrence of grounding, but because he also discovers that the ground is not an entity, he escapes subjectivism. Dasein lets entities be as they are by responding to the appeal of something 'larger' than Dasein.

Heidegger, in WO, immediately contrasts his position with that of Leibniz who found the principle of sufficient reason in the essence of truth which he took to be an identity of predicate and subject (WO, 16). Heidegger here begins a process of tracing phenomena back to their deeper ontological grounds, i.e., to what makes them possible. This furnishes an example for us of what Heidegger considers grounding finally to be: the making possible of that which is. In this case, in accordance with what he has said about
truth in SZ (Section 44), he finds Leibniz’s notion of truth not to be
primordial. Before we can predicate P of S, P and S must be manifest to
us. This unconcealedness of entities and their properties is ontical truth.
But, as SZ leads us to suspect, ontical truth is only possible because
being is disclosed also: Dasein is the entity that understands that its
being is at issue. This disclosure of being is ontological truth. Heidegger’s
ontologically understood truth grounds Leibniz’s notion of truth not because
it necessitates Leibniz’s but because it allows it, it makes it possible.

Heidegger traces the principle of sufficient reason from Leibniz’s
notion of truth to the prior disclosedness of being and the ontical dis-
closure of beings, and traces these to the ontological difference (between
being and beings) which makes truth possible, and then to Dasein as the
being that opens the space between being and beings. This accomplishes
Heidegger’s intention of showing that the realm within which we are to
treat the essence of grounds is transcendence (WG, 8-10). In later works
the role of Dasein is de-emphasized, perhaps because the requisite re-
awakening to our existential involvement in being had been achieved by the
earlier works. But even in WG Heidegger steers us away from thinking of
Dasein as a final and subjective ground by reminding us that Dasein’s
transcendence is in fact a reference and a referring to the world in which
Dasein has always already found itself (and not a world which Dasein has
created). Dasein’s transcendence is its surpassing (übersteigen) of the
things themselves (das Seiende selbst) (WG, 38) and of itself (WG, 100).
Because Dasein’s transcendence is its Being-in-the-world (WG, 40), we can
say that Dasein is its transcendence.

The world is disclosed to and by Dasein as having the character of
being for-the-sake-of (Umwillen), in accordance with Dasein's projective character (WG, 84). In SZ we are introduced to the Umwillen in the course of a phenomenological analysis of how the world appears to us (SZ, 84).

In SZ and WG, Heidegger goes beyond this simple factual statement to ask about the ground of the Umwillen: Why does the world have this character? In both works the answer is: Freedom is the ground of the Umwillen. If freedom is our ability to choose what we want, then the world will appear to be grounded in subjectivity. The inquiry in WG therefore turns to the question of freedom, particularly in its relation to grounds.

Heidegger tells us that freedom's relation to ground is that of grounding (WG, 104). Again we see the move away from conceiving of the ground as some self-sufficient entity towards thinking of it as some sort of 'doing'. But this does not yet tell us much about either freedom or grounds. We have looked to freedom to find the origin and reason of the Umwillen. Freedom, Heidegger says, is the origin of grounds overall (überhaupt) (WG, 104). This does not mean that freedom is the final ground. At the bottom of grounds we will find a strange sort of grounding (Gründe), a relation between freedom and grounds, and not yet another ground. The relation, grounding, "gives freedom and takes ground" ("gibt sie Freiheit und nimmt sie Grund"; WG, 104).

Heidegger talks of three ways grounding occurs: endowing (stiften), taking root (Boden-nahmen) and founding (begrunden). Briefly, the first grounding is transcendence's letting the world be in its character of Umwillen. It is Dasein's projective nature which lets the world be an horizon which is for-the-sake of something. However, in Dasein's project are revealed non-Dasein entities as well as Dasein. Thomas Langan argues
that in the second grounding (Boden-nahmen) Dasein takes root in the factual presence of things revealed within the first grounding which is Dasein's project of the world, and that with this second grounding Heidegger therefore acknowledges the non-idealist source of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. 14

Dasein takes root in a world not of its own making. Heidegger tells us that the three groundings correspond to the moments of ecstatic time (WG, 108). The obvious supposition is that endowing, as projective, is the future which reveals the soil (Boden) which was already present as the past. These two construals of grounding give rise to the third (WG, 112), founding.

This third form makes the “Why?” possible and transcendentally necessary (WG, 114), for Dasein’s project has revealed the presence of that which outstrips Dasein’s projection of possibilities, namely the presence of factual things. Things are found through possibility to be actual. In asking “Why”, which for Heidegger means asking “Why things rather than nothing?”, Dasein confronts this tension between the freedom of its project and the necessity of that which the project reveals as being beyond Dasein’s projective powers. In the third grounding, “The transcendence of Dasein takes over the making-possible of making beings manifest in themselves, i.e., the possibility of ontical truth” (WG, 112).15 This taking-over is the asking of the “Why?” which asks for the Being of the beings which have been revealed by Dasein as being independent of Dasein.

The “Why?” is possible insofar as transcendence opens Being as that wherein the “Why?” can find an answer. The “Why?” is possible because it brings with it the possibility of a response. Dasein is this “Why?” which is Dasein’s freedom for grounds. In transcending, Dasein lets entities outstrip it; Dasein’s freedom uncovers that which is beyond it. Only a free entity
can ask "Why?", and it only asks if it has uncovered something beyond it
which needs 'explanation'. Thus, the first two groundings give rise to
the third, for the third is the "Why?" which asks for that which lets
both freedom and that which outstrips it be: Being. In the words of John
D. Caputo, "The comprehension of Being is the hidden ground of all Dasein's
relationships with other beings and of its ability to question its own
existence." This prior understanding of Being lays the foundation
(begreundet) of all inquiry (MG, 114-6). This is consonant with the
phenomenological findings of S2.¹⁷

The first two construals of grounding give rise to the "Why?" but also
seem to lead us to different types of answers. On the one hand, because we
endow the world through our transcendental freedom, we want to know how we,
as the questioners, can ask the question. On the other hand, because we
take root in a world which already was before we endowed it, we want to
know how this world can be. Every being announces (meldet ... an) its
grounds whether explicitly or not (MG, 122), announces its grounds to us.
How can a Being announce to us the ground of its being the way it is? What
are the conditions for the Being of beings? What are the conditions for our
asking about the Being of beings? The "Why?", a question which arises from
Dasein's free discovery of beings beyond it, asks both questions.

Dasein, in its freedom, finds things which are present as meaningful
and intelligible. There are things present because they are, and to be means
also to be within a world which makes these beings understandable. The
conditions for the inquiry are the same as the conditions for the presence
of things in the world.

Neither freedom nor the things of the world are the ground. The ground
is instead that which allows freedom and beings to be what they are. Freedom
is an Ab-grund (WG, 126-8), Dasein’s Ab-grund. It does not suffice to explain that which it lets be, for it lets entities be as entities which outstrip freedom. Neither is the ground itself an entity, for no entity could ground freedom. The ground is instead Being which allows both inquiry and presence, which grants the prior ontological commitment of Dasein and the presence of what is present.

According to Hempel’s DN model, the ground consists of a set of empirical conditions and a law from which together we can deduce the presence of the grounded. For Heidegger, the ground is that which grants the presence of the grounded. The grounded can only be present to transcendent Dasein within a world. But entities can only be present within the world because they are Being is their hidden source. Further, Dasein can only transcendentally find them because it is always already ready to let things be. The deepest ground is Being, and Being and Dasein given to each other in free understanding.

PART III

We have discussed WG in light of the inner relation between that which allows us to ask for grounds and that which allows something like a ground to be. We shall see that SG discusses this question also (as well as many others).

We can look at this distinction in another way by considering the meaning of the German word "Grund". So far I have translated it as “ground” because WG seems to direct itself mainly against the contention that Dasein has a ground in the traditional sense. But it may also be translated as "reason", as when one might say, "It happened for the following reason: ...". This ambiguity is in keeping with Heidegger’s attempt to show that the giving
of reasons for something and the presence of that something are not essentially divorced. This is because the Being of something is its intelligible presence in the world. The gap between reasons and grounds is closed by recognizing that entities, in their Being, are meaningful and intelligible within a meaningful and intelligible world. Since Heidegger has closed this gap in "DG", in our discussion of "SG" it will be more important to remember that "Grund" now has fully taken on its ambiguous meaning: reason and ground.

In "SG" Heidegger does not deny his attempt in "DG" to show that the truth of the principle of sufficient reason is to be located in transcendence and that transcendence is to be understood as Dasein's own peculiar way of Being-in-the-world. (Heidegger does claim he fell into error in "DG", but the error was in thinking that because the principle of sufficient reason presupposes the self-evident clarity of the notion Grund, therefore the principle has nothing to tell us about grounds.) But, in "SG" he does, as it were, chase the ground of transcendence, showing that Dasein's nature rests upon something 'larger'.

Heidegger quotes Angelus Silesius:

The rose is without why; it blossoms because it blossoms. It pays no attention to itself, asking not whether it is seen. (SG, 68)

Heidegger takes this as a hint and asks about the meaning of the "why" (warum) and "because" (weil). He points out a seeming inconsistency in the verse. The first half of the first line says that there is no "why" and the second half then answers the "why" with a "because". He tells us that with "why" we seek the relationship of something to its ground and with the "because" the relationship is produced. (SG, 70). He addresses this problem. With the "because" we bring the ground into nearness with us; with
the "why" we distance it (SG, 78). To be without why (ohne warum) is not to be without a ground, but to be without a relation to the ground (SG, 78). Thus, to say that the rose is without why is not to say that it has no ground which the "because" then brings forth, but only that it is without a relation to that ground.

If we think of ground in the sense of reasons, it becomes clearer that in this passage Heidegger is once again confronting the tension between freedom and that which outstrips it. The rose does not have a relation to its reasons, but that is not to say that it has no reasons. The rose presents itself to us, in a world, as Being independent of our disclosure of it. Yet it can only present itself that way because it is within our world where reasons can always be brought forth (for the world is a realm of intelligibility and meaning). The rose 'in itself' has no why, for the why is an 'irruption' which only Dasein makes possible. The ground is not something which exists apart from Dasein and its "Why?". The ground is not something which exists apart and in-itself which necessitates the existence of the rose. Reasons are not necessitating causes. Yet Dasein's "Why?" is not something completely foreign to the rose: the rose has its own response to Dasein's "Why?", it has its "because". The rose finds its reasons through Dasein's free "Why?".

By saying that the rose has no relationship to the ground, Heidegger is also saying that ground and grounded are not entities which relate to each other. Rather, they are a relationship which first lets there be entities at all. He is attempting to overcome metaphysic's insistence on starting with actuality and deducing relationships from it. The ground is not some actual being; it is its relationship to the grounded, just as Dasein is its relationship
(of transcendence) to the world.

As Caputo says, "There is a source more origin-al than Dasein." This source is Being and its destiny (Geschick). Heidegger introduces the notion of Geschick in SG apparently to enable him to explain the history of the principle of sufficient reason (SG, 98). Through this notion of Geschick, the appearance of the principle of sufficient reason in history can be said to be not entirely accidental. However, by saying that it was destined, we do not yet know what Heidegger is opposing to historical accident. He uses destiny to achieve the same purpose that asserting necessity would serve, but he is not asserting necessity. What then is he asserting?

Instead of necessity, Heidegger talks of Anspruch and Zustellung, claim and a delivering over to that claim. Being claims (SG, 119). So does the sufficient ground (SG, 98). They do not necessitate. The claim is made for a delivering over (SG, 99); our age is a delivering over to a claim (SG, 99), as every age is. Destiny accounts for the different epochs by accounting for the claims made on Dasein in these different epochs. (In Chapter VI, we will see that in our epoch the claim takes the form of a provocation.)

Heidegger writes, "If we speak of the 'destiny' of Being, then we mean that Being addresses us and lights itself and enlighteningly makes room for the time-play-space in which beings can appear" (SG, 109). Play answers the question of necessity. Heidegger seems to treat play as a primitive. If it is primitive, it is not because it is a basic building block of experience; it is because it is the ground of explanation and thus is not amenable to ordinary explanation.

Being makes itself present as a grounding (SG, 90), and the historical epochs are distinguished by the way Being presents itself. This means that
in every age, humans have asked "Why?"; we can ask "Why?" because things are always present as meaningful (in one way or another) and thus we can ask an ontological question of them. Yet in every epoch Being presents itself (or, more precisely, is granted as a gift by destiny) differently, and so the form of the reasons sought differs. Heidegger uses the notion of destiny to say that the difference is not arbitrary, accidental or necessitated in a way that would allow some clever historian to predict the next development. The sending of destiny plays, and it plays because it plays (SC, 188).

Destiny plays because it plays and the rose blossoms because it blossoms. At the deepest ontological level, the sending of destiny, he repeats the answer to the question about beings: it plays because it plays, it blossoms because it blossoms. The sending of Being is explained in the same way as the presence of beings.

If this is right, let us approach it by investigating that which is closer to us: the blossoming rose. When Heidegger says that it blossoms because it blossoms, he is not saying that blossoming is an absolute ground which contains within itself the grounds of its Being. Instead he is saying that the ground is not be sought in some other being. The question "Why is this?" at the deepest level is to be answered by referring to Being, and Being is not a being. The "Because" has no ground because it itself is ground (SC, 207) in the sense in which "Ground is that upon which all rests, which for all beings fore-lies already as the bearer" ("Grund ist das, worauf alles ruht, was fur alles Seiende schon als das Tragende vorliegt"; SC, 207). The "Why?" of the blossoming rose is possible because it is in a world which already has its meaning through the sending of destiny which grants Being's presence as grounding. There can be a blossoming rose because Being grants
it within a world where to be means to be meaningful; for the same reason
there can be the "Why?". The answer to the "Why?"-- the "because"-- is that
which lets the rose be. What lets the rose be is not different from the
Being of the rose, its presence in the world. The "because" of the rose is
the rose thought in its Being. The answer "It blossoms because it blossoms"
is only empty when we use it as a way of ignoring Being, instead of as a
way of affirming Being's unique nature of not being an entity apart from
that which is. By returning us to the Being of the rose, the "because"
do not take us away from the rose to its 'conditions' or 'explanatory
phenomena'; it returns us to the rose as the rose which it is.

Joseph J. Kokkelmans says, "The intramundane thing . . . already pos-
sesses a reference that is implicitly contained in man's co-understanding of
the world and thus can be articulated by explanation (Auslegung)." A
being can only be if it is in the world which is a relational context of
intelligibility. This does not dissolve the rose into its relations, however.
If it did we could rightly assert that Heidegger is a mystic. Heidegger's
insistence on the phenomenologically real presence of the rose can be seen
in his approval of Silesiius's saying that the rose is without why: it
presents itself as being independent of our 'irruptive' questioning presence.
And it can be seen in the fact that the rose does not blossom because it is
but rather because it blossoms. If it blossoms because it is, we should
expect every "Why?" to be answered with the same phrase: "Because it is".
Instead we are referred to the Being of the rose which is to include the
letting be of the rose as what it is as a rose. The Being of things now
seems to include their presence as the particular sort of thing they are.
Heidegger now seems to believe that ontology can and must deal with the
specific natures of entities (rose as rose, hammer as hammer). At the time
SG was published, he had a way of doing this: the fourfold. He does not
present the account, however, in SG.

The "because" of the rose finally is its Being. It is not a ground
apart from and necessitating the rose. This "because" need never be made
explicit in some assertion; the "because" lets such assertions be made.

To say that destiny plays because it plays is to say, then, that we
are not to look for the ground of the play in something outside of destiny;
but neither is destiny a final, self-sufficient and necessitating ground.
The sending of Being's destiny grants the structure in which there can be
a sending. It is this granting.

Heidegger takes Heraclitus's example of a child playing a game of
draughts (SG, 188). Play seems to be a two-termed relation: the child and
the game of draughts being played. But this is not truly so, for in the
play the player and the played first come to be what they are (namely, player
and played). In this way, play functions as strife does in UK, for it is
in struggle that earth and world come to be what they are. The play has
some intelligible structure, and this structure determines the nature of
the player (qua player) and of the played.

And so it is with Being and beings. Their interplay first lets each
be what it is. The interplay has a definite form (which in this case is the
gift of destiny, which itself sends in play). When we ask the ontological
"Why?", we are referred to Being and this in turn has us think about the
play. When we ask about a player we are again referred to play.

It is because there is a difference between Being and beings that there
can be a player and a played; without these, there is no play and vice versa.

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If the rose and the Being of the rose were identical, there would be no room for a question about the rose. The "because" is the playing between the Being and the rose, and the "because" is itself destined by a destiny that plays. Since the Being of the rose and the rose are different, the rose can be understood in its Being by considering how it is that the entity can be present to us as what it is. If we cannot permit the rose to vanish into its relations, neither can we let ourselves think that the Being of rose vanishes into the rose. The relation of Being and being is a play which allows (grounds) the two to stand apart and be what they are. The play is the difference between Being and being which allows us to inquire ("Why?") into beings and to find ("because") a response. The play is the play-space in which the "Why?" can be asked and the "because" can be brought forth from its hidden presence.

The Being of the rose and the rose are not entirely different. They are the same in play; the relationship of the two precedes them and allows them to be that which they are.

If there is no necessity, only play, what form does ontological explanation take? It takes the form of describing the ways in which things are and in unearthing the relationships to which we are already committed which let the world be as it is. This is not just a reflective activity. In unconcealing the ontological foundations we bring beings into their own, which they have been (in the hidden and grounding "because") all along. Thus, for Heidegger, the philosophic activity of explaining is superceded by the existential task of dwelling in a way that preserves (verwahren) (SG, 146).

We now turn to Sz to follow up a hint in SG. In SG Heidegger traces the "because" ("Weil") to "dieweil" which means "while", a temporal stretch
(SG, 207). The "because" is temporal. Now we must develop this notion.

PART IV

By considering SZ we can develop the hint about the relation of temporality and grounds given in SG. That is the aim of this section. As a by-product, however, if the thought of SZ does in fact contain a response to the hint of SG, this will be evidence that 'later' and 'early' Heidegger are not as far apart as some have maintained.²³

Richardson writes, "It seems superfluous to include here [his chapter on MG] a study of the word 'ground' in SZ, for Heidegger's use of the word there does not call attention to itself, and an investigation of this kind would not advance us much."²⁴ On the contrary, much of SZ is spent considering the meaning of Dasein's ground. While these considerations are not specifically put in the context of the traditional disputes over the nature of grounds, they nonetheless enable us to talk with some degree of certainty about what Heidegger thinks a ground is.

The notion of grounds is not absent from SZ. Heidegger tells us that Dasein is its own baseless basis, its own groundless ground, when he talks of Being-guilty (Schuldigsein): "Thus we define the formal existential idea of the 'guilty' as Being-the-ground for Being which is determined through a Not, that is, Being-the-ground of a nullity" (SZ, 283).²⁵ Dasein is the ground of its own potentiality for Being (SZ, 284) but in this case "A being which is its ground is itself a nullification of itself" ("Grundsiind ist es selbst eine Nichtigkeit seiner selbst"; SZ, 284); this is quite different from the other case, namely God, where His being His own ground is supposed to show the necessity of His existence. Dasein has to provide its own ground;
it is free and nothing else can provide a ground for it. Dasein's ground is missing.

But which ground is absent? If you say, "God is dead", I will want to know which God you have in mind. Similarly, we must see which ground is absent. The ground which Dasein lacks is 1) a necessitating ground 2) which is ontologically independent of what it grounds 3) and which serves as the stopping point of analysis.

The groundless ground makes Dasein possible and Dasein "is primarily possible" ("ist primär Möglichkeit"; SZ, 143). But it does not make Dasein possible in the way that we think hydrogen and oxygen make water possible. H and O make H₂O possible because given the right conditions the two elements combine into water, necessarily. But Dasein's ground does not pre-exist Dasein the way hydrogen and oxygen pre-exist water.

Possibility, for Heidegger, does not mean that which is not yet actual:

As a modal category of Vorhandenheit, possibility signifies what is not yet actual and what is not at any time necessary. It characterizes the merely possible. Ontologically it is on a lower level than actuality and necessity. On the other hand, possibility as an existential is the most primordial and ultimate positive ontological determination of Dasein. (SZ, 143-4)²⁶

We are not to think of possibility as the negation of actuality.²⁷ As we saw in Chapter II, actuality is in fact just one possibility. It is as possibility that Dasein can be in the world (in a different way than peas are in a pod): Understanding projects on to possibilities and projects possibilities (SZ, 145).²⁸ Projection "in projecting throws possibility as possibility before itself and lets it be as such. Understanding as projecting is the kind of Being of Dasein in which it is its possibilities as possibilities" (SZ, 145).²⁹ Dasein is thoroughly possible. This is
revealed by anxiety which "discloses Dasein as Being-possible" ("erschliesst das Dasein als Moglichsein"; SZ, 188). In the words of John Salms, "In projection Dasein throws before itself possibilities-as-possibilities, lets possibilities be its possibilities, and is itself these possibilities as possibilities." 30

Because Dasein is its possibilities, "Ontological interpretation of Dasein does not signify going back ontically to some other being". ("Ontologische Interpretation des Daseins bedeutet jedoch nicht ontisches Zuruckgehen auf ein anderes Seiendes"; SZ, 209-10), for we are 'referred' to Dasein's possibility and Dasein is its possibility.

In Chapter II we discussed the relation of possibility and ecstatic time. "Higher than actuality stands possibility" ("Hoher als die Wirklichkeit steht die Moglichkeite; SZ, 38) because in ecstatic time what is actually now before us takes its meaning from the past and future in which we find it. Its possibility is its meaning within its context which is not itself actual. Dasein projects possibilities on to possibilities, and "Meaning is the 'upon which' of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something" (SZ, 151). 31 A being's possibility is not so much its possibility for actually existing as its structure of intelligibility, a structure only intelligible within the larger context of the world and within its temporal characterization within the three dimensions of time.

Just as the "because" is the ground in that it is that structure of intelligibility already given us which first allows us to ask "Why?", so possibility is the ground of Dasein in that it is the structure of intelligibility which has already been given and which allows us to look for a ground. Dasein, however, is projective and futural. Yet the possibilities
on to which *Dasein* (futurally) projects have already (past) been given—that is, we always already find ourselves in a meaningful world. How are we to hold these temporal dimensions together?

Let us turn to Heidegger’s own question throughout *SZ*, the quest for the unity of *Dasein’s* wholeness. The quest has at least two motivations. First, Heidegger wants to give an account of the entirety of *Dasein’s* ontological structure, and thus he must make sure he has not left some part out. Second, the quest takes the place of the traditional search for a final ground. Traditionally the ground provided the stopping point of analysis: once it was reached, the inquiry must stop, and until it was reached the inquiry must be in some sense incomplete. Heidegger writes, “The phenomenon of *equi primordiality* of constitutional items has often been disregarded in ontology because of a methodologically unrestrained tendency to derive everything and anything from some simple ‘primal ground’” (*SZ*, 131). Lacking a primal ground, Heidegger depends upon finding the wholeness of *Dasein* to demonstrate the adequacy of his account.

This difference between Heidegger’s method and that of analysis is worth noting. Analysis tends to look for a final resting point, something ‘atomic’ which cannot be further analyzed; only then can the analysis be known to be complete. Traditionally the ‘atomic ground’ of human existence has been found to be the given. Heidegger does not head toward the given but instead starts with what is found, what is already there before us. His method can be analytic in that it looks for the structures of what is an essentially unitary phenomenon, but it does not aim at a final, indubitable ground. Rather, it aims at finding the unity of the whole.

Heidegger aims at finding the wholeness of the being under analysis,
but the whole is not enough. For example, in the first division, care (Sorge) is discovered to be the wholeness of Dasein; the structure of Dasein Heidegger uncovers only makes sense if we see that Dasein always cares about its Being. At the beginning we are told that Dasein understands that its Being is always an issue (SZ, 12). By the end of Division One, we see that Dasein’s Being can be at issue for it because it cares about its Being. But care is not enough. First, we must be sure that the whole has been brought to the foreground (SZ, 232). The possibility of authentic Dasein, attested to by the phenomenon of conscience, gives us that assurance. Second, even so we need to understand the unity which makes the whole a whole (SZ, 232). Otherwise we could stop with Division One. But at the end of that division, we are like someone who understands a car in terms of the contiguous nature of its parts. We have not yet found the unity of the car, which we would probably express in terms of its use and function. When Heidegger asks, “What makes possible this authentic Being—a whole of Dasein with reference to the unity of its structural whole?” (“Was ermöglicht dieses eigentliche Ganzsein des Daseins hinsichtlich der Einheit seines gegliederten Strukturganzen?”; SZ, 325), he is pointing to a unity which is more than the aggregation of the parts. The unity of Dasein’s Being is temporal.

The caring of Dasein—its wholeness, but not its unity—is a caring for an issue not yet settled; it is a caring into the future. Just as Da-sein is never spatially just here in this spot described by Cartesian co-ordinates, neither is it temporally just now.

We have asked how the temporal dimensions of possibility are held together. We are now asking how Dasein’s whole structure is held together. Both questions are answered by considering time as ecstatically unified.
That one answer responds to both questions should not surprise us, for Dasein is its possibilities, so its unity will be the unity of possibilities as well. But this means nothing less than that Dasein's unity is also temporality's.

Dasein finds the three temporal ecstatics (what we would normally call past, present and future) gathered in the future: "The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future" (SZ, 329), for the primary meaning of existentiality is the future (SZ, 327). This means not only that we do not dwell primarily in the now, but also and above all it tells us of the nature of the unity of time.

That time is unified in the future does not mean that the unification of time is yet to come in some eschatological sense. Rather, time is already unified because it is primarily futural. Here we see the present and the past (in the 'already') thought ecstatically in the future. Heidegger makes the same claim (not surprisingly) about Dasein: "... so long as Dasein is, it is already its not-yet" ("... ist... das Dasein, solange es ist, je schon sein Noch-nicht"; SZ, 244). Here the 'is' cannot be what we first think it is: the 'is' does not indicate a merely present state of Being. If it did, then the unification in the future would be yet to come. The 'is' is itself an ecstatic 'is'. This gives us a hint about the relation of time and Being which we shall recall at the end of this chapter.

Because time is ecstatic-- each of the dimensions of time can only be what it is-- because of its involvement with the others-- it will not be unified in the way beads on a string are unified. Such an organization yields a chronology, a time-line, but seems to exclude the possibility of finding a unity of the whole. Yet in our experience we do find a unity of
time which is more than a stringing together of now-points. *Dasein* has a life story, and is situated within a history. This temporal stretch is one of *Dasein's* projects and thus remains primordially futural, just as the unity of time at any one 'point' is futural. In any one project, and in the projecting of its temporal stretch, *Dasein's* unity and the unity of ecstatic time are futural; through the future the past is given in its meaning and the present appears in its possibilities.

If *Dasein*’s Being is ecstatically temporal, where are we to find a ground for *Dasein*? A causal ground will not do for it would have to exist prior to *Dasein* in order to yield *Dasein* as its effect. But *Dasein*’s past is made possible by its future. *Dasein* “first makes possible its own authentic potentiality for Being” (“ermöglicht sich das Dasein allererst sein eigentelles Seinkommen”; S2, 268), a rare case in the history of philosophy where an entity is before its potentiality for Being has arrived. Because *Dasein*’s future makes its past possible, there can be no traditional explanation of *Dasein*. Tracing it back to its future gives us no way of explaining particular acts, for the future is free and possible and gives no adequate resting ground for analysis. The future is everything a ground must not be. The search for traditional explanations insists that one temporal dimension—the past, the locus of the pre-existing, necessitating 'explanatory phenomena'—be given ontological preference. This cannot be allowed within ecstatic time. While the future has a certain existential priority, *Dasein*’s future is not a traditional ground for it is already out of itself and made possible by the past and present.

Temporality’s unity is *Dasein*’s unity. “Ecstatic temporality clears the ‘there’ primordially. It is what primarily regulates the possible unity of
all the essential existential structures of Dasein" (SZ, 351). In clearing the 'there', ecstatic temporality "lets there be a world which is a unified whole and which thus can be a world at all.

In what sense does Heidegger's search for Dasein's unity replace the search for Dasein's ground? Traditionally the ground is necessary to the grounded, but the grounded is not necessary for the ground to be. For this reason the ground has appeared to be 'more real' than the grounded, for the real has been taken to be that which is independent. Heidegger's phenomenological description of Dasein finds, however, that the one-way necessity of the ground to the grounded just is not present in Dasein's constitution.

The existentials— the existential structures of Dasein's Being—are not Dasein's ground. They are equiprimordial. This means not only that each is as important as the others, that they are necessary 'conditions' without which Dasein would be unthinkable, but also that they are necessary conditions of each other, not just of Dasein as a completed entity. For example, there can be no understanding without Befindlichkeit and no understanding without interpretation (SZ, Sections 30-32).

This means they are not like normal conditions at all, where "A condition is the existing ground for something which is" ("Die Bedingung ist der seiende Grund für etwas Seiendes"; UN, 231/151). We look for the conditions of something expecting them to be independent of that of which they are the conditions, and of each other. If they are not independent of each other, we have not completed our analysis. The existentials do not meet either of these conditions for the existence of conditions. They are not conditions at all.
If our task is to understand Dasein’s Being, and if that entity has no ground, how are we to understand it? What sort of making-intelligible can we expect? By the end of the first division, Heidegger has come up with a set of existentials. He aims to find the unity of their wholeness, for Dasein is a unitary phenomenon. The constituent parts must be internally related, for if they are essentially discrete, we are back to the ‘atoms’ of traditional analysis. This internal relation must be carefully thought. It is not the relation of actual pieces. As Heidegger says about taking Dasein as the ‘between’ of a vorhanden subject and a vorhanden object, thinking of Dasein’s unity as the relation between actual parts “splits the phenomenon asunder and there is no prospect of putting it back together from the fragments” (52, 132). We are not dealing with actual pieces; we are dealing with possibility.

We have seen that Dasein is a unitary phenomenon because it is its possibilities. It can be a temporal stretch, a life, because time is ecstatic, not discrete. If, in Descartes’s words, “the whole duration of life is divisible into countless parts, all mutually independent,” the unity will be that of a sequence of nows, instead of the unity we actually find in our experience. Ecstatic time allows possibility to be ontologically ‘higher’ than actuality because ecstatic time breaks the disjunctive deadlock of discrete time in which anything in the now actually is or actually is not; with ecstatic time, things can be present although not actual, i.e. can be present as withdrawn in one way or another.

The unity of time is its ecstatic. We understand Dasein when we find its unity, and now we know that type of unity we are looking for: an ecstatic unity. This type of unity only applies to possibility. The existentials are ecstatically unified because they are primarily ways of making-possible. They do not
necessitate as grounds do. They make *Dasein* possible as what it is. Their internal relation is their ecstatic unity. To be ecstatically unified means to be possible only because certain other phenomena are possible. But beyond this, it means to be so thoroughly indebted to the others that there is no possible understanding of the 'parts' on their own, for the parts are possibilities not already-existing actualities. And beyond this, it means that the parts as a whole cannot be properly understood unless the unity of their wholeness—their ecstatic nature—is understood. Ecstatic unity is the temporal unity of possibility. To understand *Dasein*, we must view it as temporal. This means seeing not only how all its parts are ontologically inter-related, but that they can only be 'related' the way that they are because they are temporally ecstatic. This is the meaning of the hint at the end of SG that the well comes from dieweilen.

This form of explanation is only satisfactory because the phenomena involved are ecstatically unified. This is part of the meaning of saying that time is the horizon of Being.

Let us attempt to formulate the implications of all this on the question of explanation:

1) We should not expect to be shown necessitating grounds. Instead we will be shown how the phenomena being investigated are possible.

2) The 'grounds' of this possibility will themselves be made possible by that which they make possible.

3) The 'ringing play' of possibilities will be unified in a relationship which ontologically precedes (i.e., makes possible) the relata.

4) This unity will ultimately be temporal.

5) We should not expect to find a final ground or ultimate, actual, given
constituents. Instead, the constituents will be posterior to their unity, and
will not be ontologically independent of each other.

6) They also will not be ontologically independent of that for which they
account.

7) The inquiry knows to stop when it reaches the unity of the phenomenon
being investigated.

8) Heidegger will not present us with proofs. He quotes Aristotle in SG:
"It namely shows a deficiency in paideia if one does not know what to seek a
proof (Beweis) for and what not to" (SG, 29). 39 We lack the universal and
necessitating ground from which a proof could proceed.

9) 'Explanation' will be the bringing out of hiddenness the relationships
in which we already dwell. This will not be a deduction, but a bringing to light. 40

10) Because we are uncovering what an entity is, we are uncovering its
Being. The profoundest sort of thoughtful 'explaining' is ontological.

11) The aim of explanation is not just to give us the right idea of things,
but to uncover the relationships within which we already dwell. Not all
'explanations' are cognitive. We may uncover relationships within which we
already dwell by dwelling properly. Because we already dwell in these relationships,
the notion of explaining is replaced by the notion of preserving.

One final point: If we look for a ground in Heidegger's thought, we are
tempted to say that Being is the ground. There is much to be said for this
point of view once we have clarified the notion of grounds. But if Being is
the ground, we must wonder about the relation of the ground to the grounded.
We know from S2 that Being is always the Being of a being. It is never some
free-floating mass of actuality, or some such. The Being of beings is not
something apart from the beings. But neither is it one and the same thing; if
it were, there would be no way of distinguishing ontological and ontical inquiries. Explanations which refer to an independent ground which necessitates the grounded without in any way being the grounded bring us away from the phenomenon being explained. Heidegger's 'explanations', on the other hand, should bring us to what is most the phenomenon's own: its Being. The collapse of the ground and grounded helps clear the way for a non-metaphysical thinking about Being.

It also helps clear the way for our own inquiry into the meaning of the fourfold as 'explanatory' ontological principles.
THE FOURFOLD

To understand Heidegger's ontology of things, particularly as it is presented in his essay "Das Ding," we have to know something of das Geviert, the fourfold of earth and sky, gods and mortals. The fourfold is one of Heidegger's most puzzling ideas, one he took over from Holderlin, although Plato in the Gorgias (507-8) makes reference to the four members which compose it. Since this chapter is intended to prepare the way for a consideration of "Das Ding," we shall proceed by posing questions relevant to that consideration.

1. In What Sense Is the Fourfold an Ontological Principle?

Various philosophers have proposed various ontological principles. Thales's water and Anaximander's apeiron count as ontological principles. Spinoza's God and Nietzsche's Will to Power also probably count. It is less clear that we can find ontological principles in Hume's philosophy, but it is also less clear that he was concerned with ontology. What is that we want from an ontological principle?

E.H. Gombrich, in his insightful Art and Illusion, raises the possibility of bifurcating the world into objects that are either ping or pong:

It was Professor Roman Jakobson who drew my attention to the fact that synesthesia concerns relationships. I have tried out this suggestion in a party game. It consists of creating the simplest imaginable medium in which relationships can still be expressed, a language of two words only—let us call them "ping" and "pong". If these were all we
had and we had to name an elephant and a cat, which would be ping and which pong? I think the answer is clear. Or hot soup and ice cream. To me, at least, ice cream is ping and soup pong. Or Rembrandt and Watteau? Surely, in that case Rembrandt would be pong and Watteau ping. I do not maintain that he always works, that two blocks are sufficient to categorise all relationships.

But it is conceivable that this game, played by sufficiently practiced players, could succeed in classifying every possible entity as either ping or pong. At this point ping and pong begin to sound like more standard (and more plausible) ontological principles.

Why do they begin to sound like that? They sound like ontological principles because we expect such principles to refer to every being possible. If any being cannot be understood by reference to the principles, then the principles are not adequate.

Ping and pong are unsatisfactory not because some being might escape them but because: 1) They have no meaning beyond their onomatopoeic suggestions (except their designating the familiar paddle tennis game, a "designation that does not enter in Gombrich's game), and 2) they make no claim to state anything essential about the nature of things, and thus are not principles.

But even if ping-pong met these objections, they would be unsatisfactory as ontological principles, for they are just a game; they are not 'real'. But what sort of reality do we want our principles to have?

If the principle is itself an entity of one sort or another, we will want it to have special status. If it is of the same sort of being of that of which it is the principle, we will need another ontological principle to explain it. Neither can it be simply the name of the totality of what-is because then it would not properly speaking be a principle. We want an ontological principle
to have a meaning not exhausted by a catalogue of the entities it 'covers',
to have a special status, to be somehow 'real', and to account for every
entity. In addition, we must keep in mind the type of grounding it will provide,
given our discussion of grounds and explanations in the previous chapter.

The fourfold bears up under these demands. The fourfold's members are
'items' with which we are already familiar: earth, sky, gods and mortals. These
are all words in common parlance. Each has a prima facie intelligibility.

Unlike ping-pong, they have their own meanings.

But are they 'real' and do they have a special status which distinguishes
them from the world of entities for which they account? This points to a
difficulty in the demands we have made of ontological principles. On the
one hand we want them to be intelligible and real. On the other we do not want
them to have the same status as that which they render intelligible and real.
Because we tend to use 'real' univocally, we seem faced with a choice between
saying that the ontological principle is different from that which it makes
real, and thus is unreal, or that it is of the same sort as that which it makes
real and thus does not have the special status we demand of it. Because earth,
sky, gods and mortals seem to be intelligible and real, they do not seem to be
different enough from the things of the world to warrant picking them out as
ontological principles.

In the next section I will argue that the fourfold escapes this dilemma
if it is conceived phenomenologically.

2. In What Sense Is the Fourfold Phenomenological?

How should we conceive of the fourfold? I shall maintain that it should
be understood as consistent with phenomenology.
Phenomenology (or at least Heidegger's version of it) is a way of inquiring which starts from the intelligibility of the world which is already present to us. Because it starts with this world, it also starts from our experience of the world, for it is the prior community of Dasein and world which makes the world the type of place which can be intelligible to us. To say that the inquiry starts this way is to contrast it with other methods which begin with 'self-evident certainties' which may or not be part of the intelligibility of the world before us. As phenomenologists, we will start with how the world appears to us and not with some prior belief about what the world must be like given facts X, Y and Z.

Earth and sky, gods and mortals are all phenomena which we encounter in everyday experience. (This is not strictly true of the gods, but Heidegger maintains that the gods are present by their conspicuous absence, an absence that may not be as conspicuous to all of us.) Thus, for example, the sky is simply the sky, that blue, black or gray patch that rises above our horizons.

But this is misleading. As Otto Poggeler says, "... the earth is not that which lies beneath the feet of men, the sky is not that which is over their heads, because earth and sky are above all not beings but are rather regions of the world." We are caught in the very dilemma which ended the first section of this chapter: we want to maintain that the members of the fourfold are not mysterious 'somewhats' beyond our ken entirely, yet we also do not want to reduce them to the status of that for which they account.

Heidegger's phenomenological method allows us to grasp the horns. The sky (for example) is nothing but that blue, black or gray patch that rises above our horizons. It is the sky at which we can point in ordinary experience. But that which is before us in ordinary experience does not necessarily disclose
itself fully or easily. We ordinarily think that the sky is something simple to understand. But this 'simple understanding' may cover over the true meaning of the sky, for it takes the sky as a phenomenon not essentially different from phenomena such as jugs, wallets and gas tanks. Yet the sky is different and this difference is what gives it its special status. We shall soon see that the decisive difference lies in its necessary unity with the other three members of the fourfold, but a reflection which knows nothing of the fourfold can still see some differences between ordinary things and the sky. For example, while we can point at both the jug and the sky, we can use the jug but can only take advantage of the sky. This distinction points to another which may help clarify it: the jug strikes us as contingent whereas the sky seems necessary. That is, we can picture a world without jugs, but we cannot picture a world that does not have a sky of some sort (even if it is a black void stretching over the horizons of an airless asteroid). The sky stretches past every thing; under it and within it things are found. Despite this difference, the sky still appears to us within our world, and can even be taken (more precisely, mis-taken) as a thing. It thus has a prima facie intelligibility (as something that appears in our world) and yet is different enough from the things of the world to allow us to accord it special status. It has both an ordinary appearance and a special status with a meaning not exhausted by its ordinary appearance. Its ordinary appearance (and the fact that it appears in our world) gives us phenomenological access to its truer ontological meaning; this latter meaning gives rise to our ordinary experience of it.

The move from the ordinary experience of the sky to the true meaning of the sky remains phenomenological in that one of the criteria of the truth of the 'deeper' meaning is that it must account for the ordinary experience. We start
from the ordinary experience and return to it in our phenomenological account.

Ordinary experience is not enough, as SZ discovers: everydayness is fallen. We need additional access. This additional access remains phenomenological in two senses. First, the intelligibility of the fourfold is an intelligibility which appears. Heidegger does not mean by 'sky' some entity which is metaphysically 'an-sich'. Rather, he describes the members of the fourfold in concrete ways: the sky is the "vaulting path of the sun" ("Wolbende Sonnengang"; WA:B, 150/149), not some entity beyond appearance off in the realm of the Eternally Real. It is just the sky.

But what is the sky? Is it the atmosphere? But that implies a scientific way of conceiving. Is it the site of the wind which is "wind in the sails" ("Wind in den Segeln"; SZ, 70), to use Heidegger's phrase? This way of taking the sky perhaps has more to do with our ordinary encounters with it. Is it that through which airplanes fly? This may be the point of view of an airline pilot. How are we to choose among the many and varied possible 'definitions' of the sky?

So, to say that the sky of the fourfold is 'just the sky' is not to say much, for we do not know as much about the sky as the phrase 'just the sky' seems to indicate. "At bottom," Heidegger writes, "the ordinary is not ordinary; it is extra-ordinary, uncanny" ("Das Geheime ist im Grunde nicht geheuer; es ist un-geheuer"; UK, 43/54). He says that "our relationship to what is near has always been obtuse and stifling. Therefore the way to the near is for us humans at every time the farthest and therefore the hardest" (SG, 26).

The additional access to the fourfold remains phenomenological in that it will inquire into how the sky can appear in the different ways it does, as atmosphere, wind, the medium of flight, etc. The aim will be to let the sky appear as what it is and how it always already has been, instead of how...
it appears to questions posed by Dasein oriented by prior notions of what the sky is like.

The search is phenomenological in another sense. We can only understand the members of the fourfold insofar as they are gathered by the thing (VA:E, 153/153; VA:D, 172/174). Each member mirrors the others (VA:D, 178/179), reflecting the other empty mirrors reflecting it. There is yet nothing there. As mirrors they are devoid of content which can show up in their own reflections in the other mirrors; place two mirrors facing each other with nothing in between, and there will be nothing reflected in them. It is the presence of the thing to gather the members in particular ways and thus to make them determinate and intelligible.

That the members are mirrors without content of their own does not mean that they are 'in reality' empty and indeterminate, for the fourfold does not pre-exist the thing's gathering of it. Rather, the fourfold only is when it is gathered, and it really is as it is when gathered in particular ways. This is a phenomenological notion in that it claims that we can only inquire into ontological principles by inquiring into beings, that ontological principles are always the principles of some being, and that further the Being of the beings is found only in the appearing of the being. It is this relation of appearance and Being which is decisively phenomenological. The members of the fourfold are what they are only in the gathering and appearing of beings, and beings only are what they are insofar as they gather the fourfold into an appearing. The fourfold does not exist somewhere beyond its appearance in the world; it is its appearance. The phenomenological study of appearance enables us to talk also about Being.

It should be noticed that because the fourfold only is what it is when it
is gathered by a thing, and a thing only is insofar as it gathers the fourfold, the 'ground' and the 'grounded' are ontologically dependent on each other; this accords with what we said in Chapter IV about how ground and grounded should relate in an ontological explanation. Further, we begin to see that the members of the fourfold are ecstatically unified: in their mirroring, each can only be through the others.

The Members of the Fourfold

Constitutive Elements?

Do the members of the fourfold account for the presence of things around us, the way atoms do by combining? Are they constitutive elements?

No, we can only inquire into the fourfold by inquiring into things because the members of the fourfold are not forever the same the way chemicals in the periodic table are always the same. Rather, the members of the fourfold appear in terms of meanings of things and for each other.

Let us briefly look at an example. The jug, Heidegger tells us, lets the gods be present as that which are worthy of the libation poured from the jug, the sky as that which grants the grapes, sunlight, rain, air and room for growth which yields the gift to the gods, the earth as that which bears the grapes, and mortals as those entities which can thank the gods by pouring the libation (VatD 170-1/172-3). Presumably the butter churn and the acorn, for example, let the members be present each in their own way.

But in understanding the jug through the fourfold, we have introduced notions that seem anomalous to the fourfold: grape, gift, sunlight, etc. To understand the thing through the fourfold we need terms not immediately part of the fourfold. On the other hand, to understand the physical nature of the jug
(in a scientific sense) we need no extra-physical terms. Is this a reason for rejecting the fourfold as an ontological principle?

No. It means instead that the fourfold is not sufficient to understand things if we think of the fourfold as a group of elements which exist apart from the world which they 'constitute'. But the fourfold is not a constitutive notion. It would be constitutive if the members pre-existed what they 'constitute', but they do not. The fourfold is only intelligible within the world as we already experience it. We already are familiar with grapes and sunlight and have at least a provisional understanding of what it means to say that the jug pours a gift for the gods.

We may assume that, for Heidegger, to understand 'gift' fully would require referring to the fourfold. In that case, the fourfold's gathering (in the jug) is understood through the gift and the gift is understood by reference to the fourfold. This would only be a vicious circle if the members of the fourfold were supposed to be constitutive elements. In that case it would be fatal to have that which they produce 'be itself a prior element. But the fourfold is a properly phenomenological notion: it explains a world in which we already exist. It does not produce that which before it did not and could not exist. It produces nothing. It instead helps to make clear a world that is already familiar and within which can be found that which the fourfold makes intelligibly present. Heidegger's phenomenology does not ask us to reconstitute mentally the world starting with only a few initial principles. He is attempting to account for the intelligible presence of the things of the world, and this intelligibility is always already found, is always already present.
4. How Are the Four United?

This is a difficult question and the following two questions—What is the thing's role? What is the status of the world?—will also be on this topic. There seem to be two directions in which the four are united. On the one hand, they are united in a round dance (Reigen) of mirror play (Spiegel-Spiel), a ringing mirror play. On the other hand, they are gathered into oneness by the thing. These two directions will in fact turn out to be the same when we ask about the fourfold as a 'ground'.

Otto Poggesler writes, "The oneness which as the onefold holds together the fouring of the four is not a static identity but is instead a moving ringing and dance," citing VA: D, pages 178f. He draws an implicit comparison to the ecstatic nature of temporality when he writes: "Earth like sky, the divine like mortals, are never simply for themselves; rather, only together with each other are they in the onefold, in the dance and round dance of the four, in the world play." Like the moments of time, they are each out of themselves and dancing in a ring with the others. Like four mirrors facing each other in a ring, the reflection of one appears in the second, which appears in the third, which appears in the fourth, which appears in the first, etc.

Heidegger gives no specific example of the ringing mirror play, but we may construct one from what he tells us of the jug in VA: D. The jug gathers the sky as that which grants the rain, sun and room for growth, the earth as that which bears the grapes, mortals as those who thank the gods, and the gods as those who can be thanked through the mortal pouring of the libation. We need to see how these designations of the four are mirrored by each other.

I shall contend that the earth, for example, will be understood by seeing how the earth as the bearer of grapes appears as sky, gods and mortals.
If the earth-as-bearer is mirrored by the sky, when we look at the sky within the gathering of the jug we should see the earth-as-bearer reflected there. Bearing is a type of allowing, a carrying or supporting of that which already is. Insofar as the earth bears the grape, it provides the hidden steadiness which grants the grape its ability to stay (perduré) without evaporating or dissolving. This hidden steadfastness is mirrored in the sky's open light. The earth is mirrored in the sky as the surface of the earth which is opened by the presence of the sky; this is simply what it means to talk about the surface of the earth. The sky lets the earth appear as the surface on which rests the grape. But the surface can only be a surface because there is something beneath it: the hiddenness which bears the grape. If earth is the bearer, then the gods are that towards which the grapes are borne: the earth is mirrored in the gods as that which enables the gods to be honored. But the pouring of the libation must not be conceived to be an empty gesture which has no intrinsic relation to the gods. The libation is poured in order to recall the earth's granting of wine to mortals. It is poured to recall that the earth gives abundance. It gives abundance because its hidden nature grants blossoming of every sort in a way that is not simply dependent upon mortals; the earth keeps on bearing fruit even in fields untouched by man. The earth appears in the gods, then, as that for which the gods are to be thanked, and as that bearer whose hiddenness gives fruit to man but not simply because man demands it. Finally, the earth as bearer is mirrored by mortals as that whose hiddenness is to be valued, cultivated and preserved. The jug gathers the earth as bearer; to understand the earth as bearer, we look to how the earth is mirrored in the other 'moments' of the fourfold.

This can also be seen by considering an artwork such as those painted by
Vermeer. We see a peasant woman in her kitchen pouring milk. The bright light from the sky brings to presence the simple beauty and reliability of the earthy implements around her. The mortal need of sustenance is transformed by the grace of earth and sky into mortal gratitude to God for mortal involvement in the world.

The mirror play is a round dance because each member of the fourfold is referred to the others. It is a dance because its movement is free, but this we shall consider when we ask about the fourfold as a ground.

The fourfold is unified in this ecstatic round dance. But for a full-answer to how it is made into a onefold, we must turn to the other direction in which it is unified and ask about the world.

5. What Is the World in the Fourfold, and How Does It Make the Four One?

In Chapter III, we found a problem with Heidegger's treatment of the world in UK. In UK, the world is that into which the earth juts. The world and earth struggle, and their struggle takes place in the open. I objected to distinguishing the world and the open in the way Heidegger does. He seems to think of the relation of earth and world along the lines of the relation between Dasein and entity. Dasein discloses the entity; the world is the site of this disclosure. Heidegger draws an analogous relation among earth, world and open: world strives to disclose the earth; the open is the site of the disclosure.

But world is not a principle which attempts to disclose. It is the site of disclosure, it is the open. Heidegger apparently comes to recognize this by the time he writes about the fourfold. Poggeler apparently agrees, writing
that the world is "the happening of the openness of beings in man" ("das Geschehen der Offenheit des Seienden im Menschen").

"Heidegger writes in VA:D, "We call the appropriating mirror play of the onefold of earth and sky, gods and mortals, the world. The world makes itself present in that, it world's" (VA:D, 178). The worlding of the world is the unifying of the four in their round dance mirror play:

The fouring of the four makes itself present as the worlding of the world. The mirror play of the world is the round dance of appropriation. The round dance lights up the four in the radiance of their onefold.

The gathered presence of the thus ringing mirror play of the world is that which is humble. In the humble of the mirror-playing ring, the four nestle in their unity and in their own presence, which is always their own. Thus pliantly fitted together, they world the world in perfect adaptation. (VA:D, 179/180).

The world is the mirror play of the four; it is their onefold. The play between the four and their onefold is the play between the world as one and the world as manifold. Through it, Heidegger attempts to capture the peculiar relation between ontological principles and that of which they are the principles.

There are four members of the fourfold, yet because they are a fourfold they are united. It is a phenomenological fact that the beings of the world are— or can be— unitary phenomena; in addition, the world is, qua world, one. How can the four account for the one? This is akin to the traditional mystical problem of the One and the Many. The world, as the onefold, is one; the world as the onefold of the four and as the site of the presence of beings, is manifold.

I believe Heidegger's account of this would be something as follows. The members of the fourfold all appear within the world; there is nowhere else for them to appear. But the members of the fourfold are ecstatically unified in the
way described in the previous section: each is intelligible only through the others. This is their mirror play. Their ecstatic unity occurs in the world in particular modes through the gathering of the thing. In this gathering they are brought into their unity. But the world is the gathering of the fourfold as a possibility, in all the possible modes in which things may gather the four. The world is not something entirely distinct from the four which make the world possible. The world is the mirror play, the ecstatic unity of the four. Accordingly, we never find the four outside of the world, controlling it or entering it as already existing constitutive elements. The world is one insofar as it is the ecstatic unity of the four. The world is many in that that ecstatic unity is never universal, but is always a particular unity. The nature of the particular unity is determined by the gathering of the thing, which as the humble and small (Gering) can only be because it is within the unitary world.

This is a decisive shift from Heidegger's thought of the world in *UK* where the world was one of the principles which accounted for the presence of beings. In *VA:D*, the world is a 'result' of the ontological principles (although it also makes the principles possible, for they cannot be outside the world). The world, in the latter essay, is like the open in the former: that within which entities can be.

6. What of the Thing and the Fourfold?

We shall deal with this question more fully in Chapter VII. Here we shall discuss the question insofar as it has bearing on the question of the unity of the fourfold. Because we will discuss this later, this discussion will be very brief.

Heidegger tells us that the thing stays (verweilen) the fourfold (VA:D, 179/
181). (Although 'stay' is usually intransitive, I use it here in its grammatically correct transitive sense according to which one can say that the stays of a mast stay the mast; in the present context, it means that the thing brings about the lingering or lasting of the fourfold.) In 'verweilen' we hear the 'weil' discussed in SG, a word that finally means 'a while, a temporal stretch', through the root word 'dieweilen' (SG, 207). "Each thing stays the fourfold in some while (Weiliger) of the onefold of the world" (VA: D, 179/181).11

We have seen that the world is the round dance. It takes the thing to give a centre to the dance so that it can be seen from some aspect. It stays the fourfold in that it allows the four to appear in the world in some particular way. It gathers the fourfold in that the thing brings the four into a unitary and simple appearance, one among the many possible appearances they may have. August Brunner says that the thing's thingly staying of the four means the presence of the four is announced in the thing, and the oneness is the world and thinghood.12 The four, the regions of the world, are brought together into their particular oneness by the thing.

This means that the thing is not necessitated by the ontological principle of the fourfold: Indeed, most of Heidegger's talk of the relation of the thing and the fourfold centres on what the thing 'does for' the fourfold, and not what the fourfold does for the thing. This would seem to distinguish the fourfold from other ontological principles, and leads us to the question of grounds.

7. Is the Fourfold a Ground?

As Chapter IV maintained, Heidegger fundamentally re-thinks the meaning of grounds. For him a ground is that which allows. It is not the necessitating source of the grounded; it is not prior to or ontologically independent of the
grounded.

Poggele writes:

The world as the fourfold... is not explained from a
'ground' lying beyond it, nor by marching forth one of the
structural moments of the fourfold itself as the ground
of all. The concealing un concealing which holds sway in
the world remains a groundless ground for which no final
ground can be secured. So the world is the play into which
every grounding sinks. 13

The traditional sort of grounding cannot work here if only because the world is
the unity of the four. It is not something distinct from them. The unity of
the four; which is the worlding of the world, first lets the four find their
own presence, i.e., it lets the four be what they are. Thus, the split between
the grounded and the ground is not to be found. And because the thing gathers
the four into their particular appearance and stays the four in the world which
is the only way the four can be, the same holds true for the relation of the
fourfold and the thing. The thing lets the four be and so it cannot simply be
grounded (in the traditional sense) by the four.

As we discussed in Chapter IV, play steps in where necessity used to
reign. The round dance is a form of measured play, not a forced march. The
rhythm which the dancers freely follow is as close as we come to necessity in
dance. The mirror play is a play because it has no ground outside of itself,
although playing may also follow freely the 'rhythm' of the play. In VaD
there are veiled references to Ereignis (which we shall discuss in Chapter
VI) which we may speculate is the ultimate source of the rhythms to which the
epochs dance. In dancing and playing, the world and the four are freed to be
what they are as they are, from themselves and in themselves.

The fourfold serves the function of the traditional 'ground' in that it
accounts for what-is. If we want to know what a thing is, we see how it gathers
the fourfold. But if we want to know what the fourfold is, we must refer to a thing. The ground-grounded distinction does not hold up to this.

Some distinctions, however, do. There is a difference between world, thing and fourfold. Heidegger talks about the presence (wesen) or rule (wollen) of the world instead of saying that the world is (ist). In Ref, Heidegger also says that Being 'is' not. Things are, but the world is not a thing which is. It is instead that in which things can be. The fact that the world 'is' not does not mean that it is fictional. It instead means that the world 'is' present in a different way. The members of the fourfold can be taken to be things, but the fourfold— the onefold of the four— also 'is' not. It is unlike beings in the way that it 'is' present.

6. What Happened to Being?

We are concerned with Heidegger's ontology of the thing, which would usually be taken as the study of the Being of the thing. Yet when we turn to the essay which should be talking about the Being of the thing, we find no mention of Being, only of the fourfold. It is not as if Heidegger gave up talking about Being when he gave "Das Ding" as an address in 1950, for he gave "Zeil und Sein" as an address eleven years later and published it in 1968. Why does Being make no explicit appearance in works where he discusses the fourfold, and particularly in an essay like "Von D" which is unavoidably ontological?

It may be that Heidegger found talk of Being to be inherently misleading. Poggeler says that Heidegger gave up the term 'Sein' because it is a specifically metaphysical concept, and Heidegger himself warns us not to hold on too tightly to the term. But this explanation does not help us much, for we still would want to know if he replaced Being with a different notion or with a different term for the selfsame notion. Is the fourfold his 'new' way of talking about
Being? If so, what has been replaced, the term or the notion or both?

I do not think that the fourfold is just another name for Being. Rather, in *VGA*, Being is present as withdrawn. By talking of the fourfold, Heidegger can talk of that which allows beings to be present in the world in a way that does not tempt us to account for their presence by postulating something beyond the world. The fourfold—earth and sky, gods and mortals—cannot be Being. It hardly makes sense even to suggest it. Is the earth Being? Is the sky? Neither is their unity Being; their unity is the world and the world is not Being. The fourfold allows beings to be present in the world, but in the account in which we find the fourfold, the world necessarily comes forward and Being withdraws. The fourfold is, strictly speaking, an account of the world in which things can be.

The account is incomplete because it focuses on the world. But Being is present through hints. The hints come in the form of hints about time. The temporal references are obvious: the main one is the hint that the thing stays the fourfold.19 No explicit account is given of staying, nor of the temporality which grants staying. Instead of talking about the Being of things we are told that things stay the fourfold and thus are granted a stay themselves. Staying, their temporality, is the true 'replacement' for Being in *VGA* and in talk of the fourfold; the fourfold is not the 'substitute'. Staying, the temporality of things, is the way that things are. The hint about time leads us to the hint about Being. In this inobtrusive way, Heidegger manages to present Being in its temporal horizon, the earliest and one of the profoundest of his intentions.
VI

TECHNOLOGY AND THE THING

The thing gathers the fourfold of earth and sky, gods and mortals and brings them to a simple, unitary, determinate presence in the world. This description of the thing seems pastoral and quaint and certainly out of touch of the world of ballpoint pens and laminated plastics which surrounds us. In "Die Frage nach der Technik", Heidegger comes to grips with the seeming disparity between the thing as it appears in the world of the fourfold and the thing as it appears in our technologically dominated epoch.

Heidegger tells us, in the preface to "Die Kehre" that in December 1949 he gave a lecture series called "Einblick in das was ist" which consisted of four lectures: Das Ding, Das Gestell, Die Gefahr and Die Kehre. The first is the essay in Vortrage und Aufsätze with which we shall be concerned in the next chapter. The second was published in an expanded version as "Die Frage nach der Technik" (VA:T), and it is the subject of this chapter. The third is as yet unpublished. The fourth has been published under that title along with the second. Since his discussion of the fourfold (in "Das Ding") and technology (in VA:T) form part of a series, we must assume that Heidegger wrote about the one with the other also in mind. We shall attempt to find their relation.

In Part I, we will discuss Heidegger's description of the thing as disclosed in this technological age, and will show that technology is a founded mode of disclosure. In Part II, we will discuss the meaning of this foundedness for
the relation of the fourfold and the essence of technology. I shall argue that the technological thing is one way in which the fourfold is gathered.

PART I

1. The Framework

Although our epoch is technological, technology (Technik) is not itself its chief ontological characteristic. Instead, the framework (Ge-stell) is what truly dominates:

Framework means the gathering of a positioning which places man in the position, that is to say, provokes him, to disclose the actual as a stock (Bestand) by way of requisitioning. Framework means the mode of disclosure which prevails in the essence of modern technology, and which is itself nothing technical. (VA:T, 26/302).

The framework is one possible situating of man with respect to Being; it is a peculiarly modern situation. Laszlo Vervegesyi suggests that the framework has always been with us and cites the Sophists as a possible example, but Werner Marx's reply that only in this age have all beings become stock is surely closer to the truth. To say that the framework is a modern phenomenon is not to say that it has no roots, that it sprang out of nowhere. Rather, the framework is sent to us as a Geschick; we can understand it by following the development of it from its Greek roots. As Poggeler says, the framework "is thought of as a constellation that, historically, precisely determines our epoch." What makes this constellation distinctive?

Part of what makes the framework distinctive is that it allows and encourages us to calculate everything. Calculation, as a mode of existence, is internally consistent, comprehensive and at a remove from our ordinary encounters with things. It brings to our encounters an unfailing and uniform
method which can be universally applied regardless of the phenomenon encoun-
tered. Calculation is a way of dealing with phenomena which first of all
takes them as objects to be manipulated for our use. They can be manipulated
because the calculative method is internally consistent and comprehensive.
When we calculate, we step back from things and view them according to a
method we have brought to them, whether or not this is appropriate to the
things as they show themselves. Albert Borgmann provides an illustrative
contrast which shows how concrete things in our world can be seen as
calculative:

As I leave my house, the sun appears from behind the
mountains and the women go shopping for food. They
carry certain vegetables because this is the time of
the year when they are harvested. . . . As I get fur-
ther away from the part of the town where I live, the
environment speaks less clearly. But I still know quite
certainly where I am: the church is to my left and some-
what behind me . . .
Consider now the same enterprise in a big city of
today. I get in my car and head for the A-Expressway.
Going east on the A-Expressway, I watch for the turnoff
to the B-Expressway north. I take that turnoff, and
watch for the cutoff to the C-Expressway north-
west. I take that cutoff, and . . . watch for the exit
of Thirty-first Street south . . . At the traffic light,
I turn west onto Fairfield Drive. The third house on the
north side of the sixth block is my friend's.4

In the modern situation, paths which follow the earth as it shows itself are
replaced by roads which are imposed on the earth. The methodology of numbering
takes the place of letting directions be given by the world of involvements
as it shows itself. We can go the entire way using this method for it is
perfectly consistent and comprehensive.

The framework allows and encourages us to calculate because it is a
situating, like calculation, which is consistent, comprehensive and unfailing.
It is a situation in which we are able to bring one method to all our encounters, and can use that method to disclose the world in a way appropriate to the method but not necessarily appropriate to the world.

In the framework, things appear as stock, as items simply for our use. Because the framework allows us to calculate, we can requisition stock from nature. In the frame "nature reports for duty in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and remains a system from which information can be requisitioned" (VA:T, 30/304). Because nature appears within the framework, nature appears to be a consistent, coherent and comprehensive range which will respond to our requisitions.

The framework is not a structure which we may or may not inhabit: "As the one challenged, man stands in the essential realm of the framework" ("Als der so Herausgeforderte steht der Mensch im Wesensbereich des Ge-stells"; VA:T, 31/305). Our age is the age of the framework and we cannot escape it.

Neither is the framework an abode that just sits there. It is a provocation to calculate, to consider nature in terms of stock, to requisition nature. It does not just make this requisitioning possible by allowing calculation; it provokes the requisitioning.

2. Technology as Disclosure and Provocation

Fundamental to Heidegger's thought about technology is the insight that technology is a mode of disclosure, not the aggregate of technological artifacts. Technology "is nothing technical" ("ist nichts Technisches"; VA:T, 31/305; 28/302). It is a mode of disclosure (VA:T, 20/294). "The disclosure which prevails within modern technology is a challenge; it places the demand on nature to yield up its energy so that it can be extracted and stored up" (VA:T, 22/296).
Even the root of the word "technology", *techne*, "denotes neither art nor technology but a *knowledge*" ("*weder Kunst, noch Technik besagt, sondern ein Wissen*"; *PM*, 13/13-4). *Techne* is a mode of knowing (*UK*, 47/59). Knowledge "in the genuine sense of *techne* is the original and constant; looking out beyond what is before us at any time" (*PM*, 122/133). *Techne* discloses "that which does not bring itself forth and which does not yet lie before us and which consequently can look and turn out now this way and now that" (*VAT*, 21/295). Technology also looks for what has not yet been brought forth and brings forth these hidden 'supplies' by requisitioning them. Requisitioning is a way of disclosing the earth just as being a social-climber is a way of disclosing other people.

There are at least three ways the framework provokes us to requisition. First; we can be provoked because (as we know from *SZ*) our Being is at issue. The framework is the current constellation of man and Being, and within it our Being is still at issue, no matter how reliable is the way the framework gives us for dealing with our world. Within the framework, man understands his Being to be at issue in terms of that which can be calculated. Being itself is not susceptible to calculation; but Being taken as the Real—and when the Real is "disclosed as stock" ("als Bestand entbürst"; *VAT*, 28/302), as it is in the framework—is so susceptible. Man is always 'challenged' and 'provoked' because his Being is always at issue, but now the challenge is to complete the spread of the framework by taking everything as stock which is available (through calculation) for us and our willful desires.

Second, the framework encourages us to calculate because the presence of the framework makes calculation possible at every moment. The framework is so comprehensive that the calculations it allows seem limitless. Our success
at calculating tempts us to calculate everything. Here what we have called
provocation (Herausforderung) is better translated as challenge; the success
of calculation challenges us to calculate everything.

There is a third, and more ontic, reason why the framework provokes us.
As we requisition the earth, the earth is depleted. As it is depleted, our
survival is threatened. We seem, then, to need yet better ways of requisition-
ing the earth, better ways to bring forth oil, better ways to make the
earth yield food. Once on the path of requisitioning, further requisitioning
seems inevitable:

The disclosure discloses to itself its manifold
interlocking routes, discloses them by regulating them.
The regulating is, for its part, everywhere secure.
Regulating and securing are in fact the main features
of the disclosure that provokes. (VA:72, 24/298)⁹

The framework is so self-consistent and comprehensive, its method is so capable
of universal application, that it provokes its own elaboration and extension.
This is indeed its main feature: its appeal is its sure-fire success, a success
it measures in its own terms; a success that stands as a challenge to continue
succeeding within the framework. But its comprehensiveness is finally due to
the fact that it is a constellation of Being, a way Being manifests itself.
Being is comprehensive in that everything that is 'has' Being. The framework's
comprehensiveness comes from Being's.

In the essence of technology, the framework dominates as a mode of dis-
closure which provokes us to requisition nature by calculating everything.
But it is a founded mode of disclosure. In Part II we shall examine the meaning
of foundedness; that is the question of the relation of the fourfold and the
framework. Here I wish to show how the framework's mode of disclosure is
made possible by another disclosure. In order to do this we shall look at how
we as participants in a technological age think things are produced. Then we shall see how this production can only occur if a more primordial type of bringing-forth—poiesis—occurs. We shall then be able to see what technological disclosure fails to disclose.

3. The Founding of Technology's Disclosure: Means

Technology, when it is proper technology, is efficient. In the word 'efficient' we hear our modern way of conceiving technology: technological items are means by which we can cause certain effects. What do we mean by 'means' and by 'cause'?

Technology seems to be a means in that through it we can do what we want. We think of technology as a system of devices which perform tasks which we would not do without the technology. A horse-drawn plow probably does not strike us as being a piece of technology for we know that if we had not yet invented it, we would still plow the fields, even without the horse. But a machine that makes micro-circuits is certainly a piece of technology, for without it we simply could not and would not make micro-circuits. The machine that makes micro-circuits does not save us labour—as does the horse-drawn plow—so much as create a new type of labour. Technology is a means to the ends we desire, a means which provokes us to expand our desires.

Today some people worry that technology has gotten out of hand; technology seems to have become an end in itself or, more frighteningly, has started dictating its own ends. So long as we think that the solution to this possible problem is for us once again to become the masters and technology simply the means for the accomplishment of our will, we still think of technology as being essentially a means.

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But, says Heidegger, technology is a mode of disclosure, not a means. He shows that it is not simply a means by showing that a means, "that whereby something is effected and thus achieved" ("solches, wodurch etwas bewirkt und so erreicht wird"; VA:T, 15/289), is a type of cause and a cause is not what we usually take it to be. We shall discuss this in Section 4. Here I want to discuss in a broader way the notion of technology as a means: technology can only be a means because the world is disclosed to humans in the first place as being beyond our will and thus, in some sense, is not simply subject to human ends with attendant human means.

Technology discloses the earth as a source of material suitable for our purposes. To disclose the earth as stock of this sort depends on a prior and more fundamental disclosure of the earth, a disclosure which we forget. To put this in terms of S2, we might say that stock is a type of 'pure' Zuhandenhheit. Stock is zuehden because it is understood in terms of its uses for us within our projects; it is 'pure' Zuhandenhheit because when we treat something as stock, we disclose it as being nothing but what is available for our purposes and will. With stock we forget the moment of Vorhandenhheit which both lets something be suitable to our purposes and indicates that the thing is not completely ontologically dependent on nothing but our willful projection of it. There can be stock and there can be zuehden entities because the earth is present if hidden. At those times in S2 when Heidegger forgets that Zuhandenhheit and Vorhandenhheit are equiprimordial, and those times when he fails to take cognition of Vorhandenhheit as the announced independence of things from disclosure, we may say that Heidegger was too much under the sway of technological thinking. VA:T attempts to correct this.

In this it is part of the movement of his thinking which we have already
noted. We saw that in §2 there is a tacit reliance on (if not an explicit recognition of) the disclosure in our everyday experience of things as phenomena which have their own resolute, definite possibilities regardless of their disclosure. **Vorhandenheit** can only be in a world in which **Zuhandenheit** is possible, but things can only be **zuhanden** because they appear to have their own possibilities which they bring to our disclosure of them as tools suitable for our projects. In **UK** Heidegger finds a way to deal with this phenomenological realness of things: the earth. Things are maintained in their resolute possibilities seemingly regardless of disclosure because they are of the earth which excludes itself and appears as being independent of disclosure, a hiddenness which is announce. The earth, as the site of **physis** (as discussed in Chapter III), offers the blossoming perduing emergence of things. To see the earth as mere stock, we must forget **physis**. Yet, as maintained in Chapter II, our recognition of that which the earth allows— the presence of things as resolutely having their own possibilities which appear to be independent of disclosure— makes possible the availability and suitability of things for our purposes.

The earth remains present, if hidden, in stock; this is to say that the earth is forgotten. Seen from within **physis** a mountain (for example) appears as a steadfast extrusion which challenges mortal pride but which shelters its flora and fauna. Within **physis**, the mountain emerges and stays in its own way of blossoming; it lingers temporally in its own form of temporality. Seen as stock, the mountain is a source of minerals or perhaps a good place to clear a sky slope. We can ask a question of stock which the notion of stock cannot adequately answer, but which can be answered by thinking of the mountain within **physis**: How can there be a mountain which is suitable for mining?
skiing? What makes the mountain available as stock?

We answer in part by talking of our situation on earth such that we can have projects and thus can disclose the mountain as a source of minerals we can mine or a parcel of land we can turn into a ski resort. 52 deals with this side of the matter. But we also want to ask about the nature of the earth which enables it to enter into our mortal structure of possibilities--the way it does.

Taken in a strictly ontological way, we shall expect to hear a discussion of the Being of the earth. We heard this discussion in UK where we learned the earth is a self-secluding realm which discloses itself as having had its own possibilities all along. But if we ask the ontico-ontological question--which, considering the need of Being and beings for each other, is the true ontological question--we will want a more specific answer. How does the mountain enter into disclosure as a mountain and not just as something of the earth?

We can disclose the mountain in many particular ways: as a source of minerals, ski slope, obstacle, home of eagles, a bad place to farm, a good place in a flood, as the vacant home of the departed gods. The mountain has many possibilities. Yet the mountain is simply one thing: the skier and the climber do not dispute that they are on the same mountain, despite the fact that one goes up to go down and the other goes up to go up. What is it about this mountain that enables it to have (better: to be) all these possibilities? Further, how is it that the mountain has just these possibilities? How is it that it has particular possibilities but does not have all possibilities? The mountain is suitable for many projects, but not for all of them: it is a good place for skiing but a bad place for surfing.
The stock answer to this is: the mountain is made of certain substances which have certain properties. This response seems to reduce the question but it does not answer it. (Indeed, since properties are in fact possibilities, it does not even reduce it; it just reformulates it without gaining any clarity.) We must then ask about the substances invoked in the response. If we receive a chemical explanation, we shall ask how chemicals can have the properties they have. When called upon to answer our own question, we shall not be able to satisfy the technological interlocutor, for we shall have to refer to the hiddenness of the earth which excludes itself just as we want to bring it to light. The mountain withdraws from full disclosure. While the geophysicist may clear up everything down to the last molecule, we shall attempt to preserve (in disclosure) the hiddenness (from disclosure) of the mountain, for this hiddenness is its ontological possibility.

The mountain can have various and particular possibilities because it is disclosed as existing regardless of us and our plans. It is this realness of the mountain that enables it to be steadfast enough for us to include it in our plans. This steadfastness of its own possibilities is expressed by the notion of physis. Within physis the mountain is seen as being part of the earth which grants phenomenological realness and as having its own way of blossoming, as having its own possibilities. Our plans for the stock of the mountain must be cut to the mountain's own possibilities. We can forget this partially because in fact our plans usually have already been cut to the possibilities things offer; we thus would not ordinarily think of going surfing on a mountain.

Taking the mountain as stock depends upon understanding it as being of the earth and thus having its own possibilities. Taking it within physis we remember that there is a hidden source of the particular possibilities offered
by the thing. The disclosure of the mountain as stock rests upon its disclosure
as being of the earth and physis.

The mountain exists as something more than a means towards our ends, but
the stock view forgets this. The stock view forgets more than the mountain's
being of the earth. When all is reduced to stock, the resolute possibilities
of things are forgotten; the possibilities seem to be ontologically dependent
on our willful disclosure of them, and thus seem not to be the thing's own.
Stripped of their own possibilities, the ontical peculiarity of things is
pushed into oblivion.

The stock view errs in both directions, then. It forgets the mountain's
being of the earth which lets the mountain offer possibilities resolute enough
to be taken up in our manipulative projects. At the same time, the stock view
forgets that the mountain ontically offers possibilities which distinguish it
from other things. The mountain is stripped of its thinghood and its mountain-ness.
Yet the mountain can be disclosed as stock for our purposes only because it
has been disclosed (and forgotten) as that which offers its own resolute and
determinate possibilities.

Technology discloses itself as being a means. We can see that this is
a founded mode of disclosure in another way. By calling technology a means,
we imply that it does not dictate its purposes; technology is a means for
our ends if it is a means at all. But our ends are not simply our own. They
at least depend on the context of tools and purposes which make any single
goal possible. Further, we are situated in a particular historical epoch;
within it, we respond to the call of Being, even if we respond by not heeding
it. Our purposes may best be seen as a response to something 'larger' than
us: Geschick. Technology can be disclosed as a means only within a world
which allows purposes. We can have purposes (and thus can take technology as a means) because we respond to something beyond our goals, something which grants us our purposes.

Technology is a founded mode of disclosure because its disclosure of itself as a means depends upon the disclosure of the world as the type of place that allows purposes and upon our response to Being. Disclosing itself as a means, it discloses the earth as the stockpile which serves our ends, a disclosure which rests upon the disclosure of the earth as the site of physis.

4. The Founding of Technology's Disclosure: Cause

Now we must look at how the notion of cause and effect is founded on the notion of poiesis. Our task is easier than that of Section 3, for Heidegger himself discusses this explicitly, particularly in _VAT_.

Heidegger says that the current conception of cause (as in the phrase 'cause and effect') is based on an error in the tradition's understanding of Greek causation. What we call 'cause' is supposed to be one of the four causes (namely the efficient cause) of which the Greeks spoke. But the cause we speak of today is not the same as the Greek understanding of any of their four causes. We may outline the development of modern causation, according to Heidegger, as follows: The Greeks had a notion of poiesis and of causes (which we shall henceforth call aitia to distinguish them from our modern view of causation). Modern causation has to do with the bringing-about or production of an entity. In this it is founded upon the notion of poiesis which is the root of all bringing-about. Modern causation takes bringing-about to be a merely physical process. This in turn can be traced to the rise of the metaphysical view of things as objects or substances endowed with
properties, or any of the other metaphysical views which understand beings
in terms of their material actuality while forgetting their Being and their
being possible. Modern causation, as a physical process of bringing-about
actual effects, forgets the poiesis on which it is based and actually has very
little to do with any of the four Greek causes.

Modern causation seems to involve a type of efficient aitia, but this
is a mere seeming. In fact, according to Heidegger, the aitia are types of
indebtedness, not means to the end of physical production. Thus, modern
reflection mistakes poiesis for physical bringing-about, and mistakes the
aitia in the same way. To correctly understand causation (Greek and modern),
we must see that modern, physical, efficient causation is possible only because
there is poiesis. So, Heidegger here aims to correct the view that modern
efficient causation is the same as the Greek notion of the efficient aitia,
and to show that the modern view is ultimately founded on poiesis as the
Greeks understood it.

Heidegger locates the notion of poiesis in the very etymology of the
Ge-stell (framework). He tells us that the Stellen of Ge-stell “also should
preserve the suggestion of another ‘setting’ from which it stems, namely that
producing (Her-stellen) and presenting (Dar-stellen) in the sense of poiesis
which lets what is present come forth into unconcealedness” (VA:T, 28/302).11
Bringing-forth here is more a mode of disclosure than of production. For
Heidegger, a phenomenologist, an entity’s standing before us as having been
physically produced is one way in which the entity can be disclosed. The
fundamental bringing-forth will be the one that brings something to disclosure;
within this disclosure the being can first appear as an object which has been
physically and efficiently produced in its actuality. Because bringing-forth
is a type of disclosure, Heidegger can write: "Bringing-forth takes place only insofar as something concealed comes into the unconcealed. Such coming resides and moves freely only within what we call disclosure" (VAIT, 19/293-4). Poiesis is this bringing-forth of an entity into disclosure. Because of this, "physis is poiesis in the highest sense" ("Die physis ist ... poiesis in höchsten Sinne"; VAIT, 19/293). Poiesis is a "bringing something present to appearance" ("Bringen, das Anwesendes in den Vorschein bringen"; VAIT, 18-9/293). It is not the first production of that which is present; rather, it is the bringing of something already present into the light of disclosure. This is not to say that the entity was already present as physically produced. As always, Heidegger the phenomenologist starts with the world we find ourselves already in. The primary question is not "How was the world physically brought to this state of actuality?", but is "How is the already present world brought to appearance and prominence in its various ways?"

How does poiesis make technological causation possible? The Greek notion of techne is a disclosure which "assembles in advance the look of a ship of house, and the requisite matter" ("versammelt im voraus das Aussehen und den Stoff von Schiff und Haus"; VAIT, 21/295). Before we can efficiently cause the house to be built, we must first bring the house into disclosure in definite ways. This initial disclosure of the house is a form of poiesis.

In this way, modern efficient causation is a mode of disclosure which is possible only because of a prior mode of disclosure: poiesis. But we can also see the founded nature of efficient causation by considering the Greek notion of aition.

The Greek notion of causality had "absolutely nothing to do with effectuating or bringing about" ("schlechtthin nichts mit dem Wirken und Bewirken..."
zu tun"; VA:T, 16/290), according to Heidegger. The aitia was "that which is culpable or accountable for something other, that to which something other is indebted" ("das, was ein anderes verschuldet"; VA:T, 16/290). The four aitia "let that which is not yet present arrive into presence. Accordingly, they are unifyingly governed by a bringing that brings something present to appearance", which Plato tells us is a poiesis (VA:T, 18-9/293). Poiesis brings to disclosure and appearance. The aitia let something become present, something which may already have been brought to disclosure, as a ship or house is disclosed before it has been 'caused'. The aitia let the thing be; they do not necessitate it, as modern efficient causes are thought to necessitate. The aitia are accountable because they prompt or induce (Ver-an-lassen) the thing to be. Heidegger suggests that we re-think the notion of causality by breaking the bond of necessity, substituting a relationship which makes the grounded not quite as dependent on the ground. The ground is not a necessitating ground in this case, but rather one that prompts or induces. The way Heidegger hyphenates the word 'Ver-an-lassen' indicates first that this is a letting or allowing (lassen) and second that it sets something going (anlassen), as well as a prompting or inducing (veranlassen). According to all three senses, the 'caused' entity cannot be reduced to its causes, for in some sense the caused is already there as something which can be brought to appearance by the aitia: one cannot let something be, set it going, or induce it unless there already is (in some sense) something to be let be, set going and induced. But how can there be a thing before the aitia have let it be?

There can be a thing to prompt before the aitia have let it be because a thing is by means of disclosure, not by means of physical production. That is, there is poiesis to account for the thing which is prompted by the aitia.
Poiesis brings-forth into disclosure. Many things which do not yet physically exist can be brought into disclosure. Certainly objects of fantasy can be disclosed. But Heidegger will maintain that there are more than mere phantasms at stake here. Poetry and the other arts (which, we have seen, Heidegger considers to be forms of poetry) all bring non-physical things into disclosure. Poetry brings-forth things into disclosive presence despite their lack of physical presence. When Georg Trakl invokes the snow falling at night, he is not bringing-forth physical snow; we do not have to bundle up to read his poem. Something more primordial is being brought forth, namely the truth of snow, its unconcealedness. Snow is more than its actuality and more than its availability for our uses. Music brings-forth harmony, but harmony is nothing physical and is not stock for our purposes. Poiesis brings forth entities in their possibility, enabling the aitia to prompt them into new forms of disclosure, disclosure of certain definite possibilities which had been hidden until poiesis had brought them forth.

Poiesis may here sound like the final cause, which we often take to be the idea in the mind of the creator. But it is not. The thing disclosed by poiesis is the truth of the thing, not its mere representation in the mind. To see it as a representation in the mind requires a metaphysics which places disclosure within humans instead of situating humans within disclosure.

Poiesis lets the Greek aitia be; it is the 'ground' of modern efficient causation. Technological causation is founded on an older, more original, and more primordial phenomenon, a phenomenon which is a type of disclosure, just as technology is.

Technology, considered as a means and as a type of causation, is a founded mode of disclosure.
5. What Technology Fails to Disclose

So far we have discussed technology as we normally understand it, and that upon which technology's normal disclosure depends. Now we shall consider that which technology, as a mode of disclosure, fails to disclose.

The framework obscures man "himself as the one claimed" ("sich selber als den Ausgesprochenen"; VA:7, 35308) by the framework. Man begins to understand even himself as stock. Workers seem to be nothing more than cogs, means to producing more goods. Even our bodies seem to be nothing but organic technical items.

Technological disclosure obscures things. Things, as stock, become dispensable, and this in two senses. First, things are construed as being capable of coming from dispensers. Paper cups come from the kitchen dispenser; cars come from the dispensers in Detroit. Dispensability in this sense means uniformity. Factories dispose of their 'seconds' at cut rates because they are not identical to their normal products. To be uniform now means to be perfect. To be imperfect means to be different. As things become dispensable and uniform, their individuality is obscured in order to let their uniformity shine. A useful thing of the earth is useful (it seems) to the extent to which we can impress our will upon it. If a thing brings too much of its own to the factory, it will be rejected.

Things are dispensable in the second sense in that they are disposable. The paper cup is here to serve us, and indeed only to serve us once. Our needs, no matter how petty, come to dominate. We come to think of ourselves as the sole determining condition for the existence of things. This is perhaps one reason why people often crumple cups and cans when they are through with them: the crumpling demonstrates our mastery. This type of thinking deprives
the thing of its genuine appearance of ontological independence. It obscures
the resolute possibilities of the thing which is primordially disclosed as
having-been regardless of the disclosure within which we may find it suitable
for our needs.

Seeing things as efficiently caused obscures their indebtedness to poiesis;
we have discussed this sufficiently already.

Space and time are obscured by the framework. Space becomes measurable
distance, something that can enter our calculations. Time becomes a quantity
to be efficiently used. Ultimately they become a system of coordinates. Heidegger
writes, "Their parametrical character obstructs the nature of time and space.
Above all it conceals the relation of that nature to the nature of nearness...
they remain inaccessible to all calculative thinking" (US: 213/105).14

In obscuring space and time, the framework obscures nearness. Nearness is
the nearness of the regions of the world. Where everything is set at calculated distances, precisely there
the absence of distance spreads due to the unbounded calculability of everything, and spreads in the form of
the refusal of neighborly nearness of the world's regions.
In the absence of distance, everything becomes equal and indifferent . . . (US, 212/105).15

Indeed, "Die Kehre" ends with an invocation which asks for nearness: "May
the worlding world be the nearest of all the near that brings near, in that
it brings near to the essence of man the truth of Being, and thus appropriates
man into appropriation" (K: 47/49).16 He suggests that we cannot understand
nearness directly:

What about nearness? How can we experience its essence?
Nearness, it appears, does not let itself be immediately encountered. Rather, we succeed in this by inquiring
into what is in the near. In the near are that which we
are accustomed to calling things. But what is a thing:
Man has until now thought as little about the thing as
thing as he has about the near. (VA71, 164/166).17
Obviously, the meaning of nearness is difficult to understand. In the above passage what has been translated as 'in the near' is a German idiom ("in der Nahe") which means something like 'in the vicinity' or 'in the neighborhood', where 'neighborhood' does not refer simply to a human habitation. Thus, in the Black Forest, a certain meadow may be in der Nahe although there are no houses around. It is in der Nahe if it is within walking distance. Talk of the near differs importantly from talk which calculates distances. What is in the near is what is our home, the first horizon of human experience. Our home is certainly situated in a larger world which stretches to the visual horizon and beyond. But the near is the place which is our home. Now, Heidegger tells us that the thing nears the regions of the world, the thing nears the fourfold. This means at least that the thing gathers the fourfold, but it also means more than this: the fourfold is gathered in such a way that our world comes to be, not just the world in which our world is situated. If we forget nearness we might think that the fourfold is gathered into a world which remains in a peculiar way indifferent to us: the fourfold's world is the one world in which various cultures and tribes find their homes. It is a common world and in that sense shares in some of the indifferenence which characterizes universal essences (as discussed in Chapter III). By recalling the nearness we realize that the world which the gathering of the fourfold lets be is not just the world but also our world and our home. We dwell in the global, inter-cultural world only by a reflection which abstracts us from our village and from our culture. The nearness, however, accounts for the phenomenological world in which we find ourselves, which is never just the world but is always also a neighborhood of the world with a particular geography, history, tradition, language, dialect and idiom.
Technology obscures this nearness by calculating everything. Under
calculation, our immediate region is nothing but a mathematical, geographical
boundary without real significance; under calculation it is one set of boundary
lines as significant as any others. By provoking calculation, technology
obscures the type of dwelling in which we find our neighborhood. Worse, the
technological disclosure of the fourfold finds the members to be things or
elements and misses the unity of them which first lets us properly understand
any one of the elements and which allows there to be a world which is near.

Fundamentally, technology is a mode of disclosure which fails to disclose
disclosure. "Where the framework prevails, all disclosure is imprinted by a
regulating and securing of stock. They do not even let their own fundamental
feature, i.e., the disclosing itself, come to the fore" (VA: T, 35/309).

The framework "conceals disclosure as such" ("verbirgt das Entbergen als solches";
VA: T, 35/309). Technology at first seems to be the aggregate of technical
equipment. Only thought (in this case, Heidegger's) can disclose technology
as itself being a form of disclosure.

In Gelassenheit Heidegger writes, "The meaning of the technological world
hides itself" ("Der Sinn der technischen Welt verbirgt sich"; G, 26/55).
But if we remember this, then what hides itself hides itself in approaching
us (G, 26/55). What shows itself as withdrawing itself is a mystery (Geheimnis)
(G, 26/55). As technology gains greater dominance, we forget the mystery of
technology; even the mystery withdraws itself and nothing seems so obvious as
technology. The self-withdrawing of the essence of technology is a mystery,
and the withdrawal of the mystery itself is the danger.
PART II

Technology is a mode of disclosure which does not recognize its debt to another mode of disclosure. Technology's danger is not that technological instruments may someday overpower us; it is not that the robots may revolt. Instead it is a danger posed to primordial disclosure, the disclosure of Being, the way Being makes beings present. But "the highest danger of the danger" ("Das Gefährlichkeit der Gefahr"; K, 37/37) is that the danger itself remains disguised and hidden. In Poggeler's words, "The highest danger of the danger lies in the fact it inspires the appearance of dangerousness and lack of urgency and so hides itself as the danger which it is." 20

We must discuss in greater detail the nature of technology as a founded mode of disclosure. Technology's disclosure is not a simple deception which may or may not interest us. Instead, it threatens us. We are dealing with our destiny, for technology, its danger, and our rescue are all destined (K, 37f./38f.). 21

But how can we proceed if we are ourselves part of a technological epoch which hides the nature of disclosure so thoroughly that we are not even aware (usually) that it is hidden? Technology is our epoch's form of disclosure. If the danger is due to technology's essence hiding itself so thoroughly that we are not even aware that it is missing, how can we inquire into it with confidence? And if we can inquire into it, then we remember that technology's essence has withdrawn, and this must mean that the danger lessens and we are on the road to the rescue. What are we to make of the danger and of the rescue? These questions will occupy the first part of this section.

Then we shall consider the relation of that which grants and what is granted;
this will give us insight into what it means to call technology a *founded* mode of disclosure. Heidegger tells us that what grants the danger also grants the rescue; he quotes Holderlin: "But where the danger is, waxes the rescue also" ("Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst das Retiende auch"; VaT, 36/310; K, 41/42). This seems difficult, for usually we think that what puts something in danger also does not rescue from that danger. We shall have to ask what 'granting' means. This will enable us to see the relation of the fourfold and the framework. Now that the framework is here, where is the fourfold? If the framework is founded on the fourfold, must not the fourfold be present? But if it is present, why is there a danger? And if it is absent, how could the framework be founded on it? We shall see that Heidegger's notion of ecstatic time makes possible a unitary source of danger and rescue and the withdrawn presence of the fourfold.

6. The Danger

What is the danger? Since technology is a mode of disclosure, we should surmise that it endangers some other form of disclosure. If we are to know what is in danger, then we must know this other form of disclosure. But, if we know this other form of disclosure, then the danger of it not being disclosed is lessened and we are already on the road to rescue.

It is in this sense that the lecture series "Einblick in das was ist", the original source of VaT, is not meant to be a simple-journalistic account of how things stand. In gaining an insight into that which is we must turn ourselves towards the primordial disclosure which is endangered; this turning towards it is a disclosing of it and thus begins the rescuing of it. This is the theme of "Die Kehre", "The Turning". The movement of turning expresses well the shift in perspective necessary to see the danger. As we turn we remain situated in our technological epoch; Heidegger maintains his phenomenological commitment
by not pretending to an absolute standpoint. As we turn within this epoch, we

gain insight into that which is truly uncanny:

Yet what is really uncanny is not that the world is
becoming technological through and through. It remains
even more uncanny that mankind is not ready for this
world transformation, that we are still not able to
arrive at an appropriate discussion — arrive at by
thoughtful thinking — with that which is really dawning
in this age. (C, 22/52).

We cannot escape our epoch, but we can try to see it from within. As Werner
Marx says, we "neither can nor should wish away the rule of technology. We must
so to speak go through the technical epoch. But we should under its sway
learn to see into how the presencing (Anwesung) occurs ...". The recognizing
of the danger constitutes a turning toward the rescue, which is the beginning
of the rescue.

What is threatened?

The rule of the framework threatens with the possibility
that it could be closed to man to enter into a more fund-
amental disclosing, and thus threatens with the possi-

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bility that man could not experience the address of a
truth more original than that of technology. (Viert. 36/
309)

Having to stay only within the framework's disclosure threatens our relation
to the earth, to our home and to time.

In his interview in Der Spiegel Heidegger talks of the uprooting of
men (die Entwurzelung des Menschen). Elsewhere he talks about technological
communications driving people out of their homeland (C, 17/48). We shall
take the uprooting as the uprooting from the earth, and the deprivation of
the homeland as uncanniness (the root of the German word for uncanny—
unheimlich — is home or Heim). Technology drives us from the earth and out
of our homes.
The earth is a self-secluding realm which grants the blossoming perdurance of things and which yields its fruits (as things independent of our disclosure) by which we are able to live. Technology uproots us by obscuring the earth as self-secluding and independent. It does this by offering as testimony its own supposed dominion over the earth. But, as we have seen, technology can only take the earth as a natural storehouse of stock to be requisitioned because the earth grants the resolute possibilities of stock which enable it to be useful to us. Technology uproots us by obscuring the earth in which we are rooted.

Technology drives us out of our home. We have already seen that it does this by forgetting nearness and by calculating distances instead. Particularly during the 'Thirties, Heidegger talks of home in terms of one's nation and people, possibly because by doing so he could expose the roots of the National Socialist doctrine which also talked in this way. Our home seems at first just to be that familiar place in which we already dwell. But, "The ordinary is at bottom not ordinary; it is extra-ordinary, uncanny" ("Das Geheue ist im Grunde nicht geheuer; es ist un-geheuer"; UK, 43/54). "The people and things of home seem pleasantly familiar. But as yet they are not really so. Thus they shut away what is most their own" (PH, 13/244). It is uncanny that the world is already so familiar that we can overlook it and our being at home in it. When we recognize the strangeness, we are set on the path towards dwelling on the earth in the world in a way that appropriates the strangeness of the familiar.

Föggeler says, ". . . the world grants the Own-ness as 'home'" (". . . sie gewahrt das Eigene als 'Heimat'"). Technology strips the world of its 'own-ness', disguising our special involvement in the world, replacing it with unbridled will. Because the world and the things of the earth seem
to be just what we make of them, all seems to be explicable. Heidegger, on the other hand, wants to open our eyes to the mysterious granting of a world and earth that can seem familiar to us.

Finally, time is endangered. Werner Marx says, "For Heidegger today, under the sway of technology in which according to him the actual has the character of Being of 'requisitioned stock', the present thought along with this Being has concealed into mere 'permanence'." He contrasts this concealed presence (Gegenwart) with presence as Anwesen which retains in its etymology the sense, for Marx, of the Being of that which is. The earth, as stockpile, is seen in its permanent availability; things are seen not in their own blossoming perdurability but in their permanent availability. Even their possibilities are seen as properties they permanently have, not as ways they are temporal. Temporality is forgotten as it is replaced by permanent, characterless Being. Yet there must be more to temporality than this, if only because it is Dasein's futural, projective nature which allows us to fashion the eternal into the household and dispensable.

If technology's danger is that we are threatened with being uprooted from the earth, driven out of our home, led to conceive time as a concealed permanent presence, what is the rescue?

7. The Rescue: Granting

What grants also rescues. "Every destining of unconcealedness occurs from the granting (Gewahren) and as a granting" (VA: T, 40/313). Both the rescue and the danger are types of unconcealedness and they have the same source. But how can what grants the danger also grant the rescue? If the presence of inflammable materials grants the danger of spontaneous combustion,
how can the presence of inflammable materials also rescue us from the possibility of spontaneous combustion?

Heidegger uses a cluster of words based on the root wahren, to last, continue, endure, hold out. The Gewähr is security, warrant, guarantee. The verb gewahren is to grant, accord, vouchsafe. This remarkable German root is also akin to wahren, to watch over, keep safe, preserve, and to Wahrheit, truth. The resonances of the word are just right for Heidegger’s purposes. We can distinguish four dimensions of it which will give us some idea of what Heidegger means by ‘granting’.

First, granting is to be contrasted with the necessity found in ground-grounded relations. What grants allows, not necessitates. Unlike the traditional ground, what grants does not necessarily exist before and independent of that which it grants. What grants and what is granted need each other to be.

Second, granting is a temporal term, as indicated by the root wahren, to last, continue, endure. What is granted is not some permanently present entity vouchsafed against the forces of time. Precisely the opposite: what is granted is that which is only as temporal, something that lasts and perdures. The granting is a granting of the time of what is granted. In this, Anaximander might concur.

Third, the granting has to do with truth, uncoelealedness. What is granted is the staying of the granted in unconcealment. It is granted its time in disclosure.

Fourth, and more existentially, we are pointed towards man’s role in this granting. It is man’s task to keep safe, to preserve, to spare, that which has been granted its time in unconcealment. We are involved in the uncoelealing of things. We help preserve their genuine showing of themselves and thus their
genuine unconcealment.

The granting ... is ... the rescuing. This rescuing
lets men see into and turn into the greatest dignity of
their essence. This worth consists in the sheltering of
the unconcealment and with it, from the first, the con-
cealment of all coming to essential presence on this earth.
(Va:T, 40/313)31

Heidegger tells us that the granting from which and as which destining
occurs "first carries to man that partaking in disclosure which the Ereignis
of disclosure needs" (Va:T, 40/313).32 Destining occurs as granting and
granting brings us to Ereignis. But what is Ereignis?

8. The Rescue: Ereignis

In ordinary German, Ereignis means event or occurrence. Heidegger refers
to two ways to understand the etymology of the word. On the one hand he says that
"Ereignis" = "appropriate eyeing" ("Ereignis ist eignende Fraugnis"; E, 44/45).
William J. Richardson expands on this, telling us that the root is "er-augen",
to eye. He goes on:

Even as late as Lessing, this was the spelling of the
current form (sich) ereignen.... What Heidegger cur-
cently calls Ereignis, then, suggests the correlation
of Being and thought conceived as mutual eye-ing: Being
casts its eye on man (appeal), and There-being [Daesa]
catches Being's eye in return (response).33

On the other hand, in a footnote Richardson reminds us that "We must overhear
also the word er-eignen ... and understand the process by which Being
ap-propiates to man his essence in order to ap-propriate him to himself."34
Heidegger also takes note of this second sense when he writes, in the Preface
to Richardson's book, "It is due neither to the merit of my questioning nor
to some arbitrary decision of my thought that this reciprocal bearing [of time
and Being] reposes in a mutual ap-propriaion (Er-eignen) and is called
Ereignis...[35]

We shall investigate the meaning of Ereignis by considering it as event, appropriation, and mutual eyeing.

Heidegger says in ID that Ereignis appropriates man and Being in their essential togetherness (ID, 31/38) which is to be understood primarily from the fact of their belonging together (ID, 20/29). This is Ereignis in the sense of appropriation. In this sense we think of it as that which lets two phenomena be what they are in their difference but by virtue of their sameness. Sameness does not mean identity ("das Selbe, nicht das Gleiche"; SG, 93, cf. 134, 145, 152, 175, 185). If two phenomena are the same in this sense, then the deepest nature of each is to be understood only through the other; they are appropriated to each other because each lets the other be what it is. For Heidegger this seems to mean that there is a contending, ein Streit (cf. Chapter III), and a sign of this contending is our temptation to reduce one to the other, taking one as primary.

In ID, Heidegger identifies man and Being as that which are appropriated to each other by Ereignis: "Er-eignis is the realm oscillating in itself through which man and Being reach each other in their nature, achieve their active nature by losing those qualities with which metaphysics has endowed them" (ID, 30/37). Man can only be because he is Seinsverständnis, an understanding of Being. Being can only be because it is present to that Being which understands Being. (Here, 'understanding' need not be explicit or thematic.) For example, John D. Caputo says, "As Being needs Dasein, Dasein needs Being. Dasein can enter into the truth of its essence (Wesen) only by opening itself to Being. And Being is admitted into truth only by coming to pass in Dasein." Elsewhere he writes that Ereignis is "the event of the 'mutual relation of
Being and Dasein. Werner Marx writes, "... Ereignis above all means: Being and man are 'appropriated' to each other as belonging". ("... Ereignis besagt vor allem: Sein und Mensch sind einander als zugehörige "zugeeignet").

In Was heisst Denken?, Heidegger talks of the Sameness not of man and Being but of Being and thought, and this enables us to see the contention and appropriation more clearly. What Heidegger calls Denken — what we would otherwise call 'great' or 'true' philosophizing— always attempts to think Being. First, thinking is and thus requires Being. Second, and more important, if there were no Being, there could be no Thought, for it would be no different from daydreaming. Thinking can only be what it is because there is Being to be thought. If there were no Thinking, Being could never be present as what it is as opposed to what it resembles itself as being. As the history of philosophy shows, we are greatly tempted to reduce one to the other: idealism and realism. Ereignis is the appropriation of Being and Thought, their belonging together, their only being what they are in their struggle, a struggle made possible by their original belonging-together. In this way Ereignis lets the various philosophies be; as such, it is what is most truly worthy of thought.

Some commentators understand Ereignis as appropriation, but find different phenomena appropriated. David White says that appropriation "occasions the difference between world and thing", undoubtedly using the word 'occasions' advisedly. This locates the appropriation in a site close to that which Joseph P. Fell finds:

The event of Being is the simultaneous happening of identity and difference as a unity, but this inner unity of identity and difference dissimulates itself because what shows itself in this event is beings. Beings appear as self-identical, as they are simply in and by
themselves. But they are what they are in themselves — self-identical — owing to a hidden union with the different. This means that identity and difference are not pure opposites: ... Thus 'tree as tree' means a relation of tree to itself which is other than that of empty identity: it is tree in its treeness (in its Being). This difference between the tree and its Being is the tree in its very own Being.41

Thus Ereignis appropriates Being and beings; it is the granting of the ontological difference (which is Heidegger's term for the difference between Being and beings, thought in their inner unity). The relation of Being and beings is formally similar to the relation of Being and Thought: the two can only be what they are because of the other (a being is only a being insofar as it is; Being is always the Being of some being), and we are usually tempted to reduce one to the other (Being is just some super-being; beings dissolve into their ontological source in a sort of philosophical mysticism).

In these accounts of Ereignis as appropriation, it is important to think of it not in terms simply of a relation holding between two different relata, but rather as a relation which first lets the relata be what they are. Foggeler writes that when Heidegger "speaks of 'Ereignis', be above all thinks that in this Ereignis what is in various ways properly comes to pass in its 'Own'".42 Ereignis is the appropriation into what is each relata's own, and thus it in a way precedes the relata, letting them first be what they are. It is the granting of the difference in which the relata can come to their own and be what they are. It is their source, a single source which grants each their own and their difference.

Now let us consider Ereignis as event or occurrence. Events occur in time, but Ereignis is not just this occurrence or that. It is occurrence itself, that which lets there be particular occurrences. (As we shall see, there is,
however, a genuine ambiguity about Ereignis: it is an occurrence and occurrence itself.) Thinking of Ereignis as event, and thus as something temporal, should remind us of the attempt to understand the meaning of Being within the horizon of temporality. Poggele argues, in an article significantly entitled "Sein als Ereignis" ("Being as Ereignis"), that since for Heidegger meaning is that within which something is intelligible (SZ, 151), and since Being is understandable only within its history (Seinsgeschick), the meaning of Being is its history:

Being, as the history of Being which is unavailable but always historical, shows itself in its meaning or in its openness and truth as Ereignis. Ereignis here means not what it does within the terminology of Sein und Zeit, namely a determinate happening or occurrence, but rather means the appropriating of Dasein to Being, and the dedicating of Being to the authenticity of Dasein...

... In Ereignis, time, in whose light Being has always already been understood in a hidden way, is also expressly thought.\textsuperscript{43}

Ereignis is neither time nor Being. It is the "reciprocal bearing" of the two.\textsuperscript{44} Heidegger writes, "What determines both time and Being in their own, i.e., in their belonging-together, we call Ereignis" (SD, 20/19).\textsuperscript{45}

In talking of Being as historical, Poggele refers to the occurrence of Being in time. This raises a problem for us. If Ereignis grants the history of Being (by appropriating Being and time), is Ereignis itself historical? If not, how can Ereignis 'step in' to history to serve as the rescue?\textsuperscript{46} If it is to rescue our epoch from the danger, Ereignis itself must, it seems, be something like an occurrence and not pure occurrence; it must not just grant the history of Being, but also a particular occurrence in that history, namely the rescue.

We shall consider this problem in some detail; we have already raised it by asking how that which grants the danger can also rescue, for it is not to be
thought that the danger is not also a 'gift' of Ereignis.

For another reason it is misleading to think of Ereignis as nothing but the history of Being or as that history's openness. As appropriation, Ereignis is the simple source which enables what are appropriated to each other to be what they are in that appropriation. This source is the original oneness, the simple. We are to find this source in the Greek beginning. It was there that Being and Thought, Being and man, Being and beings, were first thought in their unity and brought to explicit appearance. After that original (and originating) source, the history of metaphysics has been unable again to think the two together. Ereignis, as the original and originating source, was an historical event; it was the historical event which enabled there to be a history of Being (and thus a human history as well), for this history is the history of Being appearing to Thought. It is this source which enables Being to disclose itself. The source remains hidden to us, but this is (as always for Heidegger) also the condition for the possibility of the uncovering of Being. Without this hidden source, every appearance would be as good as every other. Ereignis is not the history of Being so much as that which enables Being to have a history. It is the original source of the unity and appropriation of Being and Thought which enables Being to be what it is; Being can only be what it is if it appears to Thought and if there is a hidden from which Being can be thought, mistaken or forgotten. Only because Being can hide itself can it have a history. Only because time and Being belong-together in the history of Being can ontic events occur: they can be in time.

Finally, let us consider Ereignis as mutual eyeing. Neither Heidegger nor his commentators have discussed this much, possibly because it is such an obscure statement. We have seen that Richardson says that Ereignis thought
in this way hints that "Being casts its eye on man (appeal), and There-being catches Being's eye in return (response)." I take er-augen to refer to a specific feature of the appropriation of man and Being: it is an appropriating in which each takes into account the needs and abilities of the other. It is a taking measure of each other, an 'eyeing up' of the two. Thus, the two do not simply embrace each other fondly; rather, as a feature of the contention between them, they keep back that which would overwhelm the other. It is important, of course, to avoid getting lost in metaphors. Let us take as an example an epoch in which theology dominates philosophy. Mortals look for Being in a particular way: Being is the Creator. And mortals find Being to be just that. In that epoch, beings are experienced (when they are experienced truly) as creatures. Now, as Richardson's apt choice of 'response' and 'appeal' indicates, this gets matters backwards, for the mortal search for Being as God is really a response to Being's addressing itself (the appeal) as being like God. It is the task of Thinking to understand the history of Being in which Being can address itself to us in this way. Ereignis as mutual eyeing reminds us that the history of Being in which Being and man are appropriated to each other is a history of various ways in which Being has presented itself. In each of these ways—the epochs—Being has held back its fulness; it appeared this way and not that. In the course of the tradition (the history of metaphysics), the appropriation itself remained hidden; it is hidden still although Heidegger thinks we may be at a turning. But not only Ereignis was hidden; specific ways of Being were hidden by destiny and thus forgotten by man.

Ereignis is the original and originating source of the unity of Being and man, Being and Thought, Being and beings, and Being and time, which allows each
of these to be what they are, different from each other, in contention and in the history made possible by the forgetting of that which was and is originally one.

The possibility of primordial disclosure is in danger. Ereignis makes disclosure possible by granting the appropriation of man and Being. Technology is a mode of disclosure and thus is granted by Ereignis; it is a destined gift of Being. Ereignis grants both the danger and the possibility of the rescue.

There is an ambiguity, which Heidegger recognizes:

The essence of technology is in a lofty sense ambiguous. Such ambiguity indicates the mystery of all unconcealment, i.e., truth.

First of all, the framework is a provocation in the fury of requisitioning which places obstacles in front of every view into the Ereignis of unconcealment, and thus endangers the relation to the essence of the truth from the start.

On the other hand, the framework occurs (ereignet sich) for its part in the granting— as yet unexperienced but perhaps to be experienced more in the future— which lets man perdure (währen) to be what is needed for the preserving of the essence of truth. In this way the arising of that which rescue appears. (VA:T, 41/314).48

On the one hand, the framework blocks every view into Ereignis. On the other hand, the frame is itself an occurrence, an Ereignis, which grants— but offers no guarantee— the possibility that we may see the need of Ereignis both for our rescue and for the very Being of the framework. Or so it appears when the rescue begins to wax.

9. The Forgetting of Ereignis and its Remembrance

Ereignis is a possibility. Our forgetting of it is an act of possibility; misunderstanding is still a mode of understanding. Our forgetting of Ereignis affects the way Ereignis occurs (in German this would be Ereignis ereignet sich.)
a form similar to \( \text{die Welt welter}, \text{das Nichts richtet} \) and \( \text{das Ding dingt} \). What is \textit{Ereignis} like when we have forgotten it? How does our forgetting affect it? This question can only be answered by going along the path of remembrance. It seems that along this path \textit{Ereignis} appears as a hint of itself. Technology appears as a prelude to it (ID, 29/36-7).

Because \textit{Ereignis} grants technology, it must be present in some way. It cannot be present as a deeper, hidden level, for in that case it would exist regardless of our thought of it; our remembrance of it would affect us but not the way \textit{Ereignis} occurs.

The most plausible alternative is to talk of \textit{Ereignis} and our forgetting of it in terms of modes. Forgetting it is a remembering of it in one mode. Beyond this forgetful remembrance, there is no \textit{Ereignis}. To think of it in this way, we must think of it as a possibility. Actual things we forget are not affected by our forgetting them. As a possibility, however, \textit{Ereignis} is in terms of how it gives itself to understanding.

The temptation to think of \textit{Ereignis} as something actual which goes on regardless of whether we forget it or remember it, is rooted in technological thinking which has no heart for possibility. Technology looks for its own foundations the way that technology looks for the foundations of buildings and for the founding explanations of what-is: it looks for something actual which is ontologically independent of what is built upon it.

This can be re cast into temporal terms. It is in fact technology's sense of time which is at issue. The actual is that which is now, present before me. Time is "understood in terms of presence and the present and therefore was thought as a sequence of present and presence or not present and not presence (past and future) now points," as Foggeler says. As we have discussed, when we
think of time as a series of now-points, we give time a fiercely disjunctive quality: something either is or is not at any particular point. Ereignis
would either be present or not present at any particular point.

But, if time is ecstatic, it loses this disjunctive quality. A dead loved
one may be present now as someone no longer present. "The early origins
show themselves to man last of all" ("Dem Menschen zeigt sich die anfängliche
Frühe erst zuletzt"; VA:7, 30/303), Heidegger says, and within ecstatic time
this can mean also that origins are present now and toward the future. To
say that Ereignis is present today as being forgotten and absent is to make
a comment about time. Ereignis is present but not in the same (temporal) way
as this typewriter is present before me. Ereignis is present as having been and
as holding the hope that it will be again. The event at the beginning is
present as opening the future, as first making the past possible. The rescue
will consist in Ereignis becoming present as that which has already opened the
future to us, and as what had already opened the past as an epoch of forget-
fulness.

We do not forget Ereignis on one level and remember it on another. If there
are levels, we are free to think that we may make an error about disclosure
on one level while 'true' disclosure continues unaffected on another level.
If this is the case, then there is no real danger in disclosing disclosure
inappropriately, for on another level disclosure continues in an appropriate way.

But there is a real danger, for there is always only the one disclosure.
To disclose disclosure inappropriately is to endanger disclosure itself.
Since a mistake about disclosure is still a type of disclosure, we may think
that 'true' disclosure still occurs, or that the conditions for the possibility
of disclosure still prevail unaffected. But because ecstatic temporality allows

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us to give sophisticated temporal characterizations of phenomena which are present in various temporal ways, we need not resort to some level of disclosure which remains univocally present throughout all particular disclosures.

Instead we can characterize disclosure in a way that accounts for its continuing presence (there is still disclosure going on, even if it is an erring disclosure) and its erring quality (the disclosure which prevails now is present as one that has withdrawn).

This enables us to account for the notion of rescue. The account rests on two notions. First, inappropriate disclosure is not a simple mistake which has no effect on a deeper level of disclosure; rather, inappropriate disclosure is a change in the very way that disclosure occurs. Second, the possibility of disclosing disclosure appropriately is always possible. Ereignis, as a possibility thought within ecstatic time, can both grant and rescue because it need not be either simply present and actual or simply not present and unreal. It can be present as withdrawn.

With the rescue of disclosure comes the rescue of all that can be disclosed. The rescue of technology does not consist in the dismantling of all technical equipment, for the essence of technology is not itself something technical. Instead,

We can even use technical objects and yet with proper use hold ourselves so free of them that we can set them free at any time. We can take technical objects into use as they must be taken. But we can at the same time leave them alone as something which does not concern us most inwardly and authentically. (G, 24/54).50

Heidegger calls this "patience towards things"("Gelassenheit zu den Dingen"; G, 25/54). In "Gelassenheit" we should hear the root "lassen", letting. Patience is an acceptable modern translation which does not capture its traditional German
use, particularly by Eckhart. 'Patience' should be taken to express our being not a willful agent but a patient. Being patient with things, in this sense, means letting things show themselves as they are instead of seeing them as products or instruments of our will. We can only have this patience if we realize that there is more to Being than our consciousness; there are also beings and Being's address to us in those beings. We are patient with things when we let them be in their own time.

With the rescue we do not dismantle what technology has put together; instead, in Borgmann's words, we think "that which remains forever unthought in the thinking of technology".51

10. Foundations and Modes

Technology is a mode of disclosure. The rescue is a modification of technological disclosure. If we wish to understand the relation of the fourfold and the frame, we must examine the meaning of modes.

Technology misunderstands the nature of its granting. It takes it to be a grounding. Thus, Marshall McLuhan can say that the style of existence of our epoch is the result of the things around us: "This is the Age of Anxiety for the reason of the electric implosion that compels commitment and participation, quite regardless of any 'point of view'."52 He writes that "the personal and social consequences of any medium— that is, of any extension of ourselves— result from the new scale that is introduced into our affairs by each extension of ourselves, or by any new technology."53 He talks as if the foundation of technology is technological in two senses: first, the foundation consists of technical artifacts. Second, technology is founded in that it is caused or necessitated by its foundation.
Since the fourfold seems to be an abiding set of ontological principles, and since technology is a founded mode of disclosure, it is tempting to think of the fourfold as the foundation of the framework. I shall maintain instead that thought which looks for a foundation of the framework remains under the sway of the framework.

To see this, let us consider the difference between a founded mode (fundierten modus) and an unfounded mode. Let us take authenticity as our example of an unfounded mode, a mode of disclosive existence. What are the grounds for the possibility of authenticity? Authenticity is possible because Dasein, as disclosive, can always understand itself as the being which understands. This possibility is open because Dasein is free, free from the necessity we find in the ground-grounded relation. If we were not free from this necessity, we could never own up to our responsibility for our mode of disclosure. Authenticity is an unfounded mode because it has no necessitating foundation.

A founded mode, on the other hand, has conditions for its possibility which are not identical with itself. Inauthentic everydayness, for example, is only possible because Dasein is the entity that understands itself as the entity that understands itself. In inauthenticity, Dasein gets modified to become the entity which is possible because it misunderstands itself in terms of it being the entity which understands itself. Inauthenticity can be distinguished from that which makes it possible. It is a founded mode because it takes something as being its ground; it attempts to found Dasein on something other than the freedom which it is. A founded mode is not fully itself; it is not free for itself. We do not dispel founded modes by giving them the proper foundation, but rather by removing their putative foundations entirely.

Technology is founded in that it attempts to give itself a foundation,
a ground. We seek to understand the age of technology in a way not entirely
under the sway of technological thinking. If we look for technology's founda-
tions and think of foundations the way technology does, then we are still
too much under the sway of technological thinking. Our aim should be not to
provide technology with a foundation but to take it as an unfounded mode.

If it is a mode, it is a mode of the fourfold. It will differ from
modes in the traditional sense of "the affections of substance", in Spinoza's
words. The fourfold is not a substance; it is not some eternal immutable
being which subtends all change and which exists independent of its disclosure.
As we saw in Chapter V, the fourfold stays only insofar as it is gathered or
modified. The fourfold is always gathered in some particular way, and there
is no fourfold apart from its gathering. If the framework is a mode of the
fourfold, then it is a gathering of the fourfold.

If the framework is a gathering of the fourfold, it must be possible to
describe technology's form of disclosure in terms of the fourfold. And surely
this is not difficult: Technology gathers the earth as a mudball in the heavens,
devoid of its own possibilities, and which takes its meaning purely from
human (mortal) will. The sky is the atmosphere, characterless, not all that
real because it lacks solidity, and sometimes useful. Mortals are advanced
calculating machines who endow the world with meaning, a meaning which can
be calculated; mortals can also be very useful. The gods are those bearded,
giant humans who never actually existed. Further, the gathering of the four
is understood in terms of actuality: everything has its necessitating ground
which accounts for the actual presence of what-is. 55

Thinking of the framework as a gathering of the fourfold enables us to
solve certain problems. As a gathering of that which does not exist apart from

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the gathering, the framework's mode of disclosure is the one disclosure which is. It is a way of understanding that misunderstands itself, but we need not say that the true understanding (which has been forgotten) is still going on somewhere underneath the misunderstanding, making the misunderstanding possible. Rather, the fourfold does not exist apart from its gathering, and there is only the one disclosure, even if it discloses itself inappropriately. Indeed, one way technological disclosure inappropriately discloses itself is by looking for a ground or foundation of itself, one that exists independently and apart from that which it founds.

This also means that there can be a rescue by that which grants the danger. The rescue is not some mode of disclosure that is going to sweep down from the skies after its long sojourn elsewhere. The rescue will be a modification of the danger. Both the rescue and the danger are modes of disclosure, granted by Ereignis which grants disclosure.

Since humans have a stake in the gathering of the fourfold, we have a stake in the danger and rescue. Our forgetting—thought within ecstatic time—is not one which lets that which is forgotten exist actually and really undisturbed by our forgetting. Our forgetting is one way in which we can gather the fourfold.

By thinking of the framework as a gathering of the fourfold, we are not tempted to think that we are dealing with two incompatible realms. Instead, we are dealing with this same earth beneath our feet, this same world in which we live. The rescue does not replace the earth with another. The rescue rescues the very world in which we live.

The fourfold and the framework are not two incompatible realms. Rather, the framework and a genuine appearing of the fourfold—a gathering which
lets the fourfold come to appearance as it is— are incompatible.

Earlier we saw what seemed to be a dilemma: what grants cannot withdraw because if it did, the granted should vanish or fall to the ground; yet if what grants the rescue is always present, it has hard to see why there should be any real danger. This dilemma, however, turns out not to be one if it is taken within ecstatic time. With ecstatic time we can say that withdrawal is not the simple absence of something, for ecstatic time, breaking the disjunctive deadlock of discrete time, enables us to say more than that something either is or is not actual at any one moment. In ecstatic time we can talk of a phenomenon's being present in its absence. To say that that which grants has withdrawn is not to say that it has packed all its bags and marched off to another galaxy. It is instead to say that it is present as something which was and as something that might be again, kept present in our forgetful memory of it.

The mountain which is technology's source of material is the same mountain after the rescue, although 'source' and 'material' will be more appropriately disclosed. This is not because there is some eternal mountain subtending every gathering of the fourfold. It is the same because the earth is gathered with the other three members, and every gathering is a gathering of the same members.

But is this adequate? Why should there be a mountain there in every gathering? In the next chapter we shall look at how things appear in the fourfold when it is gathered in a way appropriate to itself. We shall discuss the specificity of the ontology of things (mountain as mountain, not just mountain as thing or as being) and shall maintain that the mountain's phenomenological realness allows us to talk of the sameness of the earth. Things grant us the horizon within which they can appear to be the same throughout time.
VII

DAS DING

We have tried to show the development of some questions about the thing while at the same time considering how we should go about responding to those questions, for that which our questions seek to reveal and how it is to be revealed are intimately connected. We are seeking to disclose the Being of the thing and the thing seems to be that which appears (in disclosure) to be independent of disclosure. Because of this play or tension between the thing's appearance and its Being, it is appropriate that we have been occupied not just with what the thing is but how it is to be brought to appearance. Indeed, this dual question must occupy us since we are attempting a phenomenological ontology, one that maintains that the way something appears (when it is a genuine appearance) is the way that it is. The thing has threatened to break the bond between appearance and Being— and thus separate phenomenology from ontology— precisely because it appears to be independent of its appearance in disclosure.

We have maintained that the thing presents a challenge to phenomenological ontology and not a threat if it is remembered that the thing's independence from disclosure is itself disclosed, itself appears. It appears as the hiddenness of the thing. The hiddenness announces itself to us as the thing's having— been already before we encountered it and disclosed it: it was already before we disclosed it and thus was independent of our disclosure of it.

Further, we have seen that it was in particular ways. The thing seems to
have its own resolute and definite possibilities, possibilities to which we
must cut our projects. What we take up as the meaning of the thing seems also
to be the thing's own.

In this chapter we shall ask about these three characteristics of things.
First we shall look at its temporal nature, its presenting itself as already
having-been before we disclosed it. Then we shall see how deeply its own are
its possibilities. This will lead us to discuss the nature of language, for
we shall see that in a sense the thing is its meaning, its intelligibility, and
this intelligibility is linguistic in Heidegger's sense; language will in turn
be seen to lie at the heart of Being. Finally we will see how dwelling (wohnen),
as our way of existing opened up by the difference between disclosure and
Being, helps to overcome that very difference.

We shall examine Heidegger's essays "Das Ding" (VA:D) and "Bauen Wohnen
Denken" (VA:E) in which we find the fullest treatment of the problems we have
seen developed.

1. The Staying of the Thing

At the end of Chapter V, we wondered what happened to Being in Heidegger's
talk of the fourfold and decided that Being was present through hints about
time: Being is presented in its temporal horizon. The thing stays.¹ By seeing
how the thing is temporally present, we catch a glimpse of Being.

Heidegger writes, "The jug presences as a thing. The jug is the jug as
a thing. But how does the thing presence? The thing things. Thinging gathers.
It gathers, the fourfold appropriating, gathers the fourfold's stay into
that which stays: in this or that thing" (VA:D, 172/174).² In staying the
fourfold, "thinging is the nearing of the world" ("Dingen ist Nähern von Welt";
VA:D, 179-80/181). "The nearing of the near is the authentic and sole dimension

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of the mirror-play of the world" (VA:D, 180/181).\(^3\) "The fouring makes itself present as the appropriating mirror-play of the betrothed, each to the other in simple oneness. The fouring makes itself present as the worlding of the world" (VA:D, 179/180).\(^4\) In nearing the world by thinging, the thing allows the four to be united in the appropriating mirror-play, and thus allows them to be what they are.

Things stay the fourfold by allowing the fourfold to appear in the world. To stay the fourfold means at least that the fourfold is brought into the horizon of time, for it is in that horizon that temporal notions like 'staying' are intelligible. But the thing does more; I shall maintain (rather speculatively) that the thing opens the horizon of time in two senses: 1) In the thing we find an essential mode of time--blossoming perdurance--which opens the horizon of time to man in a particular way, serving as a measure for our mortal temporalizing of ourselves. 2) The thing presents the closedness of time which is essential to time's horizontal nature.

In Chapter III on "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" we talked about the earth as the site of *physis* which grants a particular mode of time: blossoming through perdurance. The thing seems to have its own appropriate temporal stretch within which it arises and corrupts in a perfectly natural way: blossoming. It is, of course, no objection to point out that the acorn may be crushed before it can sprout and thus has not blossomed; in this example we admit the force of the notion of blossoming by pointing to a case of its interruption. There can only be an interruption of that which would otherwise "naturally" have persevered.

The blossoming perdurance of things (and not just organic things: mountains have their own way of blossoming) presents *Dasein* with a mode of temporal
stretch which is not guaranteed to Dasein. As Heidegger points out in SE, Dasein, knowing that its Being is at issue, has no guarantee that it will die at a culminating point (SE, 244). We can go further: Dasein, as the groundless ground, has no guarantee that it can even head towards a culminating end.

Things can, however, for as part of physikos they follow a hidden need. Humans lack that need, for Dasein is free.

If this is so, then things open temporality in a way that Dasein does not. Dasein temporalizes itself into a temporal stretch, a way of disclosing itself. Dasein discloses things as having been even before they were disclosed; Dasein does not disclose itself this way. It is through things that the past is disclosed as that which was before disclosure. By discovering things, Dasein discovers the past of things, disclosing them as having been in the past. This discloses not just things, but also a mode of time.

Consider the difference between the temporal stretch of a thing and that of Dasein. Dasein's temporal stretch is disclosed as projective and free. The fact that it comes to an end when disclosure is no longer possible, namely at death, indicates that Dasein's temporal stretch is disclosed as being not at all independent of disclosure: Dasein's temporal stretch is a stretch of disclosure. But the temporal stretch of things (if we may be allowed this phrase) is their having-been even before disclosure. The possibility of death discloses that Dasein's temporal stretch is identical with its time of disclosure. The possibility of things discloses that there is a past which was even before it was disclosed, and that therefore the temporal stretch of things is not simply identical with the time they are in disclosure.

Dasein can temporally stretch itself the way it does because of its disclosure of the temporal stretch of things. To show this, we shall consider
Dasein's stretch as a type of perdurance (but not one that blossoms).

Let us pretend that somehow things no longer stretched themselves through blossoming perdurance. In effect there would be no things. How then could we mark ourselves as a stretch? We can only stretch ourselves if we have disclosed perdurance, if we have disclosed the possibility of there being a unity of a phenomenon through time. But how could we do this? We would lack the normal measure of perdurance, the rotation and revolution of the earth. What in us or what aspect of us could be said to perdure at all? A 'transcendental ego'? Would it disclose itself as perduring? Why? On the basis of an a priori conception of time? It would not be able to learn of it a posteriori for by hypothesis the perduring objects of experience do not exist. Even for Kant, my perception of something permanent in me "is possible only through a thing outside me." 5

We do not have to postulate an a priori sense of perduring time, for we do have things about us. I raise the possibility only to make clear that there is a real problem about how we find the possibility of stretching ourselves temporally.

Within Heidegger's phenomenology, we start with Dasein as it always already is, namely in a world; in the world we find things presenting the possibility of perdurance. It is vital to remember, however, that this is a hermeneutic situation. It is not the case that first the thing presents the possibility of perdurance and then Dasein learns from it. Further, things can perdure only within the temporality which is open to Dasein and which Dasein helps to open.

Let us be more precise in our claim. Dasein's disclosure of the thing's temporality (perdurance) makes possible Dasein's disclosure of its own temp-
orality. If *Dasein* did not disclose the thing as perduring, *Dasein* could only disclose itself as stretched if it had an *a priori* sense of time. In the world, the non-counter-factual world in which we exist, we find things opening the temporal horizon beyond the reach of *Dasein*’s disclosure. That is, things are disclosed as that which *were* before and regardless of disclosure. This expands the temporal horizon beyond that which *Dasein* holds in disclosure, or, more exactly, points beyond the horizon. Further, it gives a possibility for perduring, of being a self-same phenomenon within a temporal horizon, a possibility which *Dasein* makes its own when it temporalizes itself into a stretch.

Our own experience provides some evidence for this. In a certain sense we feel cheated by the possibility of death. We have a denied expectation of perduring forever. But why should we have this frustrated expectation? It is because we live in a world of things which perdure beyond disclosure. Why is it so humiliating to be outlived by one’s clothing? Because clothing is disclosed as perduring regardless of disclosure. If my clothing can, why can’t I? The frustration of death is due, at least in part, to the temporal possibility offered by things.

Things do not just perdure; they perdure through blossoming. The temporal possibility of blossoming also contributes to our mode of stretching ourselves, and also to our feeling of being frustrated and uncanny. The thing follows a hidden law in perduring. It is self-same but it also changes, grows, and corrupts. Our stretch takes on aspects of blossoming. It is not merely the concatenation of all events in a lifetime; our stretch is the disclosure of the change, growth and corruption of a mortal. It is our ‘story’. But unlike the thing, we only have the story we give ourselves. We have no natural story.
no natural development, no blossoming except that which we give ourselves.

The thing, then opens up the temporal horizon for *Dasein* by giving it a past before disclosure. It opens it up to *Dasein* by giving the possibilities of perduring and blossoming.

We have been using the word 'horizon' without explaining it. We shall remedy this now, and shall be led to see that the thing helps to make the horizon possible by giving the possibility of there being something beyond the horizon.

An horizon, in the ordinary sense of the word, is the border of the near, the limit of disclosure. Within the horizon is the open in which we dwell. Beyond it is something undisclosed. It is only because there is an horizon that that which is near can gather itself as the near; things are near insofar as they are within our horizon.

We tend to think of horizons in terms of space, yet all that we have said can be applied to time as well. The disclosure of time takes place within a temporal horizon. The horizon allows there to be a near in time, but only because it allows there to be a far in time beyond the horizon.

Things make the horizon of time possible. They do this by being disclosed as having-been already regardless of disclosure. In this announced independence from disclosure, the fact of the beyond-the-horizon is announced. There is only an horizon if there is something beyond it. As Thomas Langan says, horizons "always implicitly suggest the existence of 'something more' ...". We disclose horizontally only if that which is beyond the horizon is somehow disclosed (as being beyond the horizon) within the horizon. Things announce the fact that there is something beyond the horizon.

They announce this in their very perdurance. What are things, like apart
from disclosure? How were they before they were disclosed? These questions point us beyond the horizon to where we cannot go, for we always carry our horizon with us; each step over the old horizon brings a new horizon with it and we never see how things would look if they were not in any horizon at all. Still, the beyond-the-horizon must be announced within the horizon if it is to appear as an horizon at all. The thing announces this. Further, although we cannot escape our horizonal nature, we can point beyond it, and thus Heidegger does when he talks of the hidden. The pointing takes the form of hinting: letting what can not itself come fully into the horizon come into it as what is beyond it.

The thing stays in the horizon as that which announces what is beyond the horizon. Its perduring blossoming is how it stays. But we must also account for the transitive sense of ‘staying’; we turn to that which is stayed by the thing.

2. Thing and Fourfold Make Each Other Possible

The thing gathers the fourfold into a stay, and the fourfold only is what it is when it is gathered. What are we to make of this gathering?

The thing gathers the sky as..., the earth as..., the gods as..., the mortals as... The jug gathers the earth as the bearer of the grapes, etc. This as is the entering of the phenomenon into intelligibility; it grants the phenomenon meaning. We cannot gather the fourfold intelligibly without the thing for they are empty mirrors reflecting each other’s emptiness. There is nothing to be said about the ‘sky itself’ which does not surreptitiously take it to be a thing gathering the other members of the fourfold in some particular way.

When Heidegger talks about the fourfold in a ‘general’ way, he presents
it in various gatherings, not apart from all gatherings. For example, he says:

"Earth is the building bearer, the nourishing fructifier, tending water and
rock, plant and animal . . . . The sky is the sun's path, the course of the moon,
the glitter of the stars, the year's seasons . . . ." (VA:D, 176-7/178).?

Granted, non-thing gatherings are given as well. But, reflection shows that
non-things such as seasons are themselves, in a sense, gathered by things: the
seasons are the seasons of that which the earth bears.

It is impossible, then, to talk about the meaning of the four without
making a fundamental error about them. They cannot be understood apart from
their gatherings in specific things. They gain their intelligible presence
(in the world they grant) through the thing.

The thing allows the fourfold to be what it is. Heidegger gives us an
example of how the fourfold allows the thing to be: the jug can be described
in terms of its way of gathering the fourfold. This description is not one
among many; the fact that we can describe the jug in this way is not an
accidental property of the jug. Rather, the jug is made intelligible as what
it is in this description.

The thing and fourfold make each other possible. They belong together.
We cannot think this within the traditional ground-grounded relation, for
they are not ontologically independent of each other. There is a way to see
their unity, a way at which Heidegger hints when he says, for example, "In
the gift of the outpouring which is drink, mortals stay in their own way"
("Im Geschenk des Gusses, der ein Trink ist, weilen nach ihrer Weise die
Sterblichen": VA:D, 171/173). The jug, gathering the fourfold in a particular
way, discloses the sky's possibility of giving rain, sunshine and space, the
earth's possibility of retaining form and being impermeable, the mortal's.
possibility of being thirsty and pious, and the gods' possibility of being
worthy of receiving a gift of libation. The jug's possibilities are also
the fourfold's.

In this sense the jug is the gathered fourfold, not a product produced
by the fourfold which stands apart the way a factory stands apart from what
it produces. The jug is the way the fourfold is gathered. In gathering the
fourfold, the jug brings the fourfold's own possibilities into disclosure.
The two gatherings— the jug's gathering of the fourfold's possibilities, and
the fourfold's granting the jug its own possibilities— are in fact one
gathering.

3. The Source of the Thing's Own Possibilities

The thing blossoms in its own way, bringing its own possibilities to our
encounters with it. The hammer will not help no matter how desperately we need
a parachute. Marble holds its form, making it suitable for sculpture whereas
ice offers possibilities for different sorts of sculptures. These possibilities
seem to have been present in the thing before and regardless of disclosure.
How is this possible?

We have already seen that the thing's realness is the earth's realness,
its self-seclusion which cannot be penetrated. The earth's steady thöst
grants the thing its perdurance; as the site of physis, the earth grants
a blossoming perdurance. But what is the source of the earth's realness?

What does this question ask for? If it is looking for a final ground, it
is a misleading question. It is again misleading if it looks for an ex-
planation which will show how the earth necessarily resulted from certain
conditions. The best we can do is see how the earth is enabled to have (or,
better, to be) the essential possibility of realness.

The earth's participation in the fourfold enables it to be what it is. The earth's realness, its being independent of disclosure, is itself disclosed. Realness is a possibility of the earth. This possibility depends for disclosure upon the projecting of mortals; it is revealed within the plans of mortals which depend upon the realness of the earth for the reliability of that which figures in the plans. The realness is also revealed in terms of the obstacles earth puts in the way of mortal projects. The openness of the sky is revealed by the determination of the earth to hold on to its possibilities; the sky is an openness that surrounds the earth and allows projective movement on it. Because the gods have withdrawn, it is difficult to see their role. Perhaps we should say that the earth's realness is mirrored in the gods as that for which the gods are to be thanked. Or, if Vincent Vycins is right (and I am not confident that he is) in thinking of the gods as being the Greek gods, then the realness of the earth manifest in the enduring blossoming it allows is mirrored in the god of the harvest. Or, if the gods are how the holy (ke Heilige) shows itself in the world, the earth is mirrored in the gods' mysteriousness, a holiness which can sanctify even the earth. Just as the possibilities of the thing are also the possibilities of the fourfold, the possibilities of each member of the fourfold are the possibilities of the others.

We do not find a final ground, then, but a round-dancing mirror-play.

Since the thing's realness is a temporal characteristic, we can look to time in our quest for the 'grounds' of realness. We have already argued that the thing allows time to be horizontal by announcing (within the horizon) the presence of the beyond-the-horizon. We have argued that the thing's
blossoming perdurance opens the possibility of a temporal stretch for \textit{Dasein}. The thing helps to hold time open. Of course this does not mean that the thing grounds time and is itself outside of it. Rather, the thing is only possible as what it is (what shows itself as having-been) because it is 'in time', i.e. temporal. Time and thing make each other possible in that they could not be without each other. Because they are not without each other, because we are already in a world where time and thing are together, we need not demand that one ontologically precede the other. They are already together in the world in which we find ourselves.

We have talked of earth and time as sources of the realness of things. We cannot choose between these two sources, for as we maintained in Chapter VI, the fourfold endures its various gatherings, even the gathering of the framework. We cannot say that there was time before there was a fourfold (although we can say there was time before there was a framework). What is true of the relation of time and thing is true also of the relation of time and earth: it would be nonsensical to talk of a timeless earth or of an earthless time. They too belong together.

This does not end our inquiry into the ontological source of the thing's realness. Its realness is not the reality of 'pure matter'. Rather, the thing is real in that it offers resolute and definite possibilities of its own. In Chapter II we discussed the relation of possibility and intelligibility: \textit{Dasein} and the things of the world meet in possibility, and possibility is the form of intelligibility. Because we cannot meet the bruntally actual thing (except as one of the thing's possibilities), we always encounter the thing's possibilities, and we encounter them as intelligibility or meaning. Because we are always in a world, all that we meet is intelligible in one way.
or another; the thing is always meaningful and this is to say nothing but that we always encounter the thing's possibilities in the world. So, when we ask about the realness of things—and thus about its resolute and definite possibilities—we are also asking about its intelligibility or meaning. We now turn to the world in which the thing can be meaningful, and ultimately will look to language and words as the intelligibility of things.

4. World, Thing and Place

The fourfold accounts for the world as well as for things. The world is the fouring of the four. The world, as discussed in earlier chapters, is the open in which phenomena are disclosed to Dasein, a realm of intelligibility and not just the aggregate of things which are. Within the world things find their intelligibility and thus can be present as what they are. From the beginning for Heidegger, things have taken their meanings from their positions in the relational context which is the world.

The world is that place in which we find our dwelling, a place which has places. It appears to be an organized whole, the organization articulated into places which have meaning for us. As in the workshop where each tool has its place and which as a whole lets tools have places, in the world are places which have meaning for us. My immediate neighborhood is my home, downtown is a shopping place, the park is a play space, the sun porch is a resting place, the kitchen is an eating place, the corner is a turning place. Here we do not think of place as a mere geographical area measured mathematically but rather we think of places in their intelligibility in our encounters with them. It is, perhaps, what Aristotle calls topos; Heidegger refers to this in Der Kunst und der Raum, quoting Book IV of the Physics: "But topos seems to be something high and mighty and difficult to grasp, i.e.,
the place-space". 9

By casting thought of world into thought of place, we will be better able to understand the relation of world and thing, especially given remarks Heidegger makes in VA:B. (Interestingly, F.F. Strawson, in his logical analysis of material individuals, concludes that thing and place are mutually dependent.) 10 In VA:B, Heidegger says that "the bridge is a thing of its own kind, for it gathers the fourfold in such a way that it allows a site for it" (VA:B, 154/154). 11 Only something that is itself a place (Ort) can clear a space for a site (VA:B, 154/154). The bridge first makes the place a place. Here Heidegger cannot be thinking of place in a mathematical-geographical sense. More likely place is as we have discussed it, a place which has significance for us, which is a place insofar as it is significant. The place of the bridge is the bridge as crossing point. In this case at least, its meaning is also its significance as a place.

Places are not derived from space. Rather, "Things which are places in this manner, clear a site for spaces" ("Dinge, die in solcher Art Orte sind, verstatten jeweils erst Raum", VA:B, 154/155). Space is the wider and more general phenomenon. But since we are thinking phenomenologically, we begin from where we dwell, which is not in general space but in a world of places.

Since the meaning of the bridge as crossing point is also its place-ful meaning, we should suspect that there is an intimate connection between a thing and its place. Heidegger confirms this: "Things, which as places allow there to be a site, we now anticipatorily call 'buildings'" (VA:B, 155/155). 12 This should remind us of SQ in which we are told that the Zuhander can only be what it is within a workshop context, making its place ontologically determinative of it.
Similarly, we should realize that the notion of a 'place an sich' is absurd. There can only be a place within a context of other places. This context is what we call the world. But rather than thinking of it as a context, let us think of it as the place of places, or perhaps as the placing of places since it is not itself a place but is that which allows there to be places. If this is so, then if the thing is a place, the world allows the thing to be.

But is the thing a place? In *PhaP* it seems that Heidegger is talking about a special class of things, things like bridges which can be called 'buildings' and which bring out the places of the world. Of course the bridge is a place: we can go there and transverse it. But I am interpreting Heidegger to be talking more broadly: every thing is a place. How about this pen? Is it a place? At best it seems to occupy a place. But here we are thinking of place as something apart from all things, as empty space. Empty space is an abstraction that appears to reflection but not within our ordinary experience. At best, empty space appears in ordinary experience as the possibility of its being filled, as with the inside of the jug (*PhaP*, 167/169). If this counts against the objection that the pen occupies space, it must also count against the suggestion that the pen is a place in that a fly could land on it and transverse it; we cannot have recourse to the world of flies if we are determined to begin with our own experience.

If the pen is a place, it is an intelligible structure in the world. The pen is a place in that it is situated (siteuated) in the world. To be genuinely situated means to gather one's meaning from the articulated structure of intelligibility which one enters in a definite way. There cannot be just one place; there must be a context of places. A thing is a place in that its
meaning is drawn from its situation in the world; its meaning is its place in the world.

In this way, the world gives meaning to things. But it is also the case that things give meaning to the world. The places of the world are organized to a large extent around things. This is a place of solitude because the mountain peak offers that possibility. This is a place of commerce because the meeting of the rivers enables shipping to flourish.

In a less ontic sense, things give meaning to the world by allowing the world to be what it is: the 'where' of places, a structure of intelligibility.

By thinking of things as places, we see that world and thing are akin. If we think that things are lumps of matter which occupy space, it is hard to see how they could be very deeply involved with the world as a structure of intelligibility. But if we think of things as places, they seem to be of a sort with the world. We do not have two different sorts of phenomena, things and world, for which we have to supply a bridge if they are to meet. Instead, they are united in place, in significance, in meaning.

When we look at how that meaning is articulated, we find language.

5. The Status of the Species: Examples

If things are their possibilities and if these possibilities are the thing's own, it seems that different things with different possibilities are different. In D. H. Lawhead gives us an account of a thing. But for what exactly has he accounted? He takes the jug as his example. Of what is it an example? By asking this question we hope to find how far ontology reaches: to the jug as thing, to the jug as jug, to the jug as this individual jug as opposed to that? We shall see that we are led to the role of language.
Examples share a problem with traditional explanations: both view the individual in terms of something more general, thus referring thought away from the individual. In *Die Frage nach dem Ding* Heidegger writes that for a botanist a flower is always an example, never a just-this-one (das dieselbe). Heidegger is himself wary of examples. He says in *OP*, "This we shall try to show by a for-instance, an illustration (Beispiel), bearing in mind from the start that nowhere in beings is there a for-instance, an illustration, of the essential nature of Being because the essential presence of Being is the instance, or lustre, itself" (*OP*, 64/66).

The commonality of all peasant shoes which tempts us to generalize about them is a commonality, founded on the peasant's particular relation to the earth and world. If the jug can be taken as an example of thinghood, it must be remembered why the jug has something in common with all things. It is because all things are gatherings of the fourfold, each in particular ways, that they have something in common. The 'ground' of commonality is not something abstract, not some set of essential, universal and indifferent characteristics; it is the fourfold in all its presence before us.

But if the jug is an example at all, of what is it an example? Is it an example of a thing or of a jug? Heidegger talks about it both ways. He says that the thinghood of the jug consists in its being an emptiness which can hold what is poured into it (*VA-D*, 167/169), but its jug character consists in the poured gift of the pouring out (*VA-D*, 170/172, 171/172). As the essay progresses, we hear less about the jug and more about things.

But, he tells us, "The jug is a thing insofar as it things. The presence of something of the jug's kind which is present appropiatively occurs (ersieht sich) and determines itself only from the thinging of the thing" (*VA-D*, 176/177).
Here we find both strands: the jug becomes a jug only from the thinging of the thing; the thinging of the thing allows the jug to come into its own. This may imply that there is not the difference we first suspected between jug as thing and jug as jug.

If the jug is an example of all things, then we can see in the jug that which all things have in common, and what is thingly about the thing. The jug gathers the fourfold, as do all things; so far the jug is an example of a thing. But it is essential that each thing gather the fourfold in its (the thing's) own way. The way in which the jug gathers the fourfold is as unique as the jug is within the 'class' of things. So, we take the jug as an example of things only at the risk of losing sight of the fact that the fourfold can only be gathered in particular ways. Each thing gathers, but each gathers in its own way.

If we can use the jug as an example of a thing, we must not thereby think that we are aiming at a universal essence of things or jugs. Instead, as with the peasant shoes, the jug will illuminate that which lets all things have something in common. What lets all things have something in common is not a universal essence of things but a common ontological situation. When we examine this situation we find that it is part of the constitution of things that they always gather the fourfold in particular ways. Thus, we are led back from any temptation to ignore the jug in favour of that which it 'exemplifies'. We are led back to the jug which gathers the fourfold in the way that jugs do. So the 'generalization' about things to which we are led includes an anti-generalization clause: all things gather the fourfold in ways peculiar to them.

Is the jug an example of all jugs? This question is, of course, puzzling.
But it is a puzzle useful for our purposes, for it points out the unclarified status of the 'the' in the phrase 'the jug' and 'the thing'. Surely our talk all along of 'the thing' has seemed awkward. It is Heidegger's way of talking, however (and to a certain extent, the German language's way of talking also). It is awkward because the definite article makes it sound as if there is some definite thing (or jug) to which we are referring. But when Heidegger talks about 'the jug' we have no idea which jug he has in mind. One in his ski chalet? One in some Greek museum? An imaginary jug? Or should we say that he is talking of The Jug, a platonic form of jug?

We here seem torn between taking the jug as this or that individual jug or as the form or concept of jugness. It will be my contention that the jug to which Heidegger refers is that which the word lets be; between individual and concept stands the word, although this takes 'word' in Heidegger's sense. The jug is the jug in its meaning as a jug, and the word lets the jug be in its meaning. To discuss this—and to see how it enables us to answer our question about how specific ontology gets—we shall have to present a brief view of Heidegger's thought on language.

6. Language and the Thing

We find ourselves discussing language primarily because the thing, in presenting itself as having its own definite and resolute possibilities, presents itself as having a meaning or intelligibility; language has something to do with meaning and intelligibility. By some accounts, language expresses meaning. We shall see that Heidegger thinks language plays a more important ontological role than that, but even if it did not, if we are interested in meaning, that which expresses meaning would still be a good place to begin our inquiry.
Two caveats are necessary before beginning. First, in VA:D and VA:E, Heidegger talks very little about language, so we must resort to other works. Fortunately, Heidegger's writings on language have been mutually compatible. Second, in our short discussion we shall not be able to pretend to completeness. Heidegger has written volumes about language and his treatment of it is profound and controversial.

Language, for Heidegger, is not a system of sounds (or marks on paper) which stand for objects or other phenomena. His treatment of language remains phenomenological in that it attempts to account for our ordinary experience of language. In our ordinary experience we do not hear meaningless sounds which we then translate into meanings. Rather, we simply hear the meanings. Hearing is not the vibrating of the tympanum. Phenomenologically, hearing is response. If I say, "You take me for granted", and you, without looking up from your newspaper, say, "Yes, dear", then you have not heard me, for you have not truly responded to me. The idea of hearing as responding can be found in the Biblical sense of heeding or hearkening; we only hear the words of the prophet if we respond by being brought to the path of God. Those in the audience who do not take the prophet's words to heart simply have not heard them. Rembrandt's sketch of Jesus addressing the marketplace presents a remarkable picture of hearing. Many of the adults are apt, some are not.

A child plays in the dirt beside Jesus. The adults too concerned with worldly projects to pay attention to Jesus clearly have not heard him even though they stand within earshot. But the child is listening to Jesus in his own way: he responds by remaining a child even in nearness to the divine. Clearly for Rembrandt, Jesus's words are not simply sounds in the air; they are a call to which we either respond or not, and to which the response is as varied
as the audience. What Heidegger says about thinking in \textit{VAd} holds for
hearing as well, and for good reasons: he says that things "do not come without
the wakefulness of mortals. The first step towards such wakefulness is the
step back out of mere representational, i.e., explanatory, thinking and into
the thinking which responds and recalls (andenkende Denken)" (\textit{VAd}, 180/181).\textsuperscript{16}

Ordinarily we take speaking to be something that we do and hearing to
be something that happens to us. Heidegger tells us, however, that it is
language which speaks (\textit{US}, 12/\textit{PT} 190).\textsuperscript{17} Language is not a means at our
disposal; rather "it remains the master of man" (\textit{wie doch die Herrin des
Menschen bleibt}; \textit{VAd}, 146/146). Language is not the aggregate of words;
"We constantly speak" ("Wir sprechen stets"; \textit{US}, 11/\textit{PT} 189), he says. Since
it is not true that we are always moving our mouths and uttering sentences,
speaking must be something more than uttering, and language— we suspect—
is more than what is in the dictionary.

What is language, then? To put it in its briefest form: language is the
intelligibility of the world. It is because we exist in an intelligible world
that we can utter sounds which have meaning, taking language in its usual
(metaphysical) sense. John Sallis writes that discourse (which sounds uttered
language in \textit{ES}) is the "articulation of intelligibility", "a kind of finding-
one-self-throw (Befindlichkeit) which, as involving us in an articulation
of intelligibility (Verständlichkeit), is inherently linked to interpretation
and understanding (Verstehen)",\textsuperscript{18} thus showing language to be part of \textit{Dasein}'s
existential make-up. J.P. Fell goes further and in the right direction when
he says, "For Heidegger, language is the articulation of Being and is therefore
a region within which all beings are what they are."\textsuperscript{19} For Heidegger, articu-
lation (\textit{Artikulation} or \textit{Gliederung}) refers not to a speaking-out but to the

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relational structure of a whole.

If language is Being's articulation which allows beings to find their meanings, then there is a deep relation between language and Being. Heidegger tells us that *logos* is the oldest word for the rule of word (NS, 237/155). But, he says, *logos* means saying (*Sagen*) (which we may loosely take to be authentic and essential language), which is also the same word for Being, the presenting of beings (NS, 237/155). Heidegger's famous remark in "Brief über den Humanismus" ("Letter on Humanism") that language is the house of Being means at least that Being belongs in language, that there is some prior commitment of the two. The 'connection' between language and Being is profound and fundamental, a sameness in the sense in which we discussed it in Chapter VI. The sameness of meaning and Being is one of the original and originating thoughts of Heidegger; his entire corpus of work is permeated by it.

There is a relation between word and thing which is important for our purposes, Heidegger writes, "All essential saying hearkens back to this veiled mutual belonging of saying and Being, word and thing" (NS, 238/156). FELL says, "When a thing is originally named, it comes simultaneously into being, as thought and as thing. From thenceforth, the thought is that of the thing and the thing is that of the thought." 20 VA: B and VA: D contains some evidence of the relation of word and thing; for both works attempt to understand their subject by consulting the etymologies of the words involved. In VA: D, he gives the history of the word 'Ding' and discourses on the words for 'thing' in other languages. He notes the objection that he is playing an "etymological game" ("etymologischen Spielerei"; VA: D 173/174). The only defense he offers is the etymologies themselves; in them he finds an ancient meaning of the thing which illuminates the nature of things. This may help convince us that
listening to the way language has spoken is not just a game, but it does not
tell us what the relation between word and thing is such that etymologies
can shed light on that which they 'represent'. In VAEB, we get just the
slightest hint, what is really nothing more than an affirmation of his method:
"The address about the essence of a thing (Sache) comes to us from language,
provided that we respect language's own essence" (VAEB, 146/146). 21

Elsewhere he writes, "... the word does not give reasons for the thing.
The word allows the thing to be present as a thing" (US, 232-3/151). 22 In
EM he is just as explicit: "In the word, in language, things first come to
be and are" ("Im Wort, in der Sprache werden und sind erst die Dinge"; EM, 11/11).
How can words allow things to be present as things?

To be present does not mean to be actual; actuality is only one possible
way of being present. As we discussed in Chapter III, poetry makes this clear.
In his essay "Die Sprache" ("Language") in US, Heidegger discusses a poem
by Georg Trakl, "Ein Winterecho" ("A Winter Evening"). Trakl writes, "When
snow falls on the window" ("Wenn der Schnee ans Fenster fällt"), where is
this window and where is this snow? The poem calls window and falling snow
to presence, but not to actuality. The world of the poem is present to me
insofar as I hear the poem. It is present in the way that 19th century Russia
is so present to us when we read Brothers Karamazov that if the phone rings
we feel called away from a world more important to us than the contemporary one.

If the snow is not present as actual snow, neither is it present as a
mere image of snow, for we can all recognize the difference between engaging
in an imaginative exercise ("I want you now to imagine snow") and the snow
of which we hear in the poem. The snow is present in its meaning; it is present
as what it is, snow.
This is not presence without Being. Far from it. We have emphasized the importance of possibility for Heidegger. Being is not actuality. Actuality is just one possibility. When we respond to the poem, the snow is without being actual. But in what sense is? If we examine the phenomenon we see that we cannot find the Being (the 'is-ness') of the snow poetically before us without finding the snow as snow, the snow as intelligible and meaningful. In a poem there can be no pure is-ness; what is made present by the poem must also be as. With the snow made present by the poem there is no temptation to think that we have before us some being which is essentially devoid of meaning, for the snow brought forth by the poem can only be present insofar as it is its meaning. For Heidegger, the snow made present by the poem is exceptional only in that it deprives us of the opportunity to err about the relation of Being and meaning, of is and as. When confronted by actual snow we can make the error of thinking that the presence of the snow is separate from its meaning, its intelligibility. The snow of the poem does not let us make the same error, at least not as easily.

The snow is made present in its word in the poem. But what is this word? Heidegger says, as we have seen, that things first come to be and are in the word, in language (FM, 11/11). Clearly he cannot be talking about words as symbols or sound waves—what Eckhart calls "the audible word that beats the air"—for these words as expressions or symbols must come after that which they express or symbolize.

J.P. Fell finds a useful way to think about the nature of words for Heidegger, which I shall adopt and adapt slightly. Words may refer to individuals or to their concept. If I talk about the jug, I may be referring to this jug on my table or to the concept of jug. Usually in English, talk
about the jug is talk about some specific jug, but when Heidegger talks about
the jug there is no specific jug to which we have recourse. When the poet
talks about the snow on a winter's evening, the snow is present not as this
or that snow, but as snow (just as Drake need not have a specific winter's
evening in mind, one with a definite date). The word can refer to the individual
or to the concept. This is because the word is 'between' individual and
concept. The individual, through the word, is present as what it is as: snow,
jug. The concept subsumes the individuals according to what the individual
is as, and thus the individuals are subsumed through and in the word. The
as-ness, which is the word (and which first lets the word-as-sound-wave have
something to 'express'), precedes individual and concept. The individual can
appear in its presence only in its as-ness. The concept can subsume only
because there is an as-ness which lets conceptualization go forth.

The word lets the thing be if we are willing to admit that the thing's
Being includes its intelligibility, its being-as. Being is, of course, not
simple actuality. Whether a being is actual, feared, imagined, wished for,
no longer actual, logically impossible, fictional or repressed, it still is
in one of these ways (or in some other). As beings, they are beings with (or
in) meaning, they are beings which are as what they are. The unicorn which
is present, perhaps, as an example of a creature that never was actual, is
still present. It is present as a unicorn. Nothing can be present and devoid
of as-ness. It is in this way that the word lets things be.

This does not mean that word and thing are identical. Heidegger writes
that "the word . . . is not an entity" ("dem Wort . . . nichts Seiendes ist";
US, 193/87). For one thing, there may be many different jugs, but there
is only the one word 'jug'. If this were not so, then the word could not.
bring forth the unitary concept of jug; we would have only proper names and not the word. Both individual (as something which can be appropriately conceptualized) and concept (as that which finds what individuals have 'in common') are allowed by the same source, a source which is neither an individual thing nor an abstract concept: the word.

Words belong in language, they can only be words within a language. What is the relation of language, world and thing? This question arises because just as the word can only be in a language, we have seen that the thing can only be in a world. Heidegger hints at an answer to this when he says there is a \textit{dif-ference} (\textit{Unter-Schied}) between world and thing, and "The dif-ference is the dimension for world and thing, insofar as it ap-portions world and thing, each to its own. Its ap-portioning first opens up the away and to each other (\textit{Aus- und Zu-einander}) of world and thing" \textit{(US, 25/PT 203}).\footnote{In a passage difficult to translate, Heidegger writes that the dif-ference "for world and thing appropriates things in the countenancing (\textit{Gebarden}) of world, \textit{appropriates} world in the graceful stepping aside in favor (\textit{Gonnen}) of things" \textit{(US, 25/PT 202-3)}}.\footnote{It is because world and thing are not the same that they can be what they are, and this is the meaning of the \textit{appropriates (\textit{Gereignet})}. The world is neither a thing nor the aggregate of things. It cannot come to appearance purely as world, thought apart from things. Rather, things are the appearing of the world in the sense in which one's countenance, one's face, is a hint or gesture (\textit{Gebärde}) of the soul which does not come to direct appearance. Things cannot be without the world. The world countenances things—without envy lets them be (\textit{Gonnen})—insofar as the world withdraws from appearance letting the things appear instead. Only in so doing can the world appear at all, appearing as a countenance or gesture. Heidegger tacitly}
acknowledges that the word is this difference (ibid. 24/Pt 202).

World and thing are different, yet they carry each other into their own (Phenomena). How can two such different phenomena be so intimately involved? They are given to each other by the word which is the difference between

them. The word lets the thing be as what it is; it is the place of the thing.

In this as-ness, the world as the 'open of intelligibility which does not

itself appear, comes to its appropriate but hidden (gestural) appearance. This

hammer can be a hammer because it is in a world; the analysis of 87 still

holds in this regard. It can be in a world because its Being is suited to

contextual dwelling, because it is an intelligible entity. It is a hammer because

it is related to other entities in the world: nails, wood, malleable entities,

etc. The context of these entities is the world. The world can only be a world

insofar as it is a world of things. These things are things insofar as they

are intelligible entities. Between the 'pure world' which would be a context

but not a context of anything and the 'pure thing' which would be an individual

but one which would lack the context in which it could appear as a thing,

stands the word. The word is neither a context nor an entity. It is the

intelligible presence of the entity which can only be present as a thing

in the world, and which can only be intelligible within a world of things.

According to this interpretation, then, language would be the dimension

which grants words, for just as things can only be things in a world of things,

so a word can only be a word in the context of language. Language speaks

"by calling the called, thing-world and world-thing, to come to the between

of the difference" (ibid. 28/Pt 206), 27 that is, by calling world and thing
to words.

Language is the destined intelligibility of the world that is. The world...
is the intelligible countenance of the epoch's intelligibility. This countenance is the appearing and appearance of things. Within the dimension of language and between the world and things which are, stands the word.

Language, thought in this way, is that which allows entities to be present as what they are, as intelligible and meaningful. However deeply, language is involved with Being, the meaning of an entity and its presence as something which is are also deeply involved. We have maintained that they are the same, in Heidegger's sense. This sameness can be seen either by considering the ancient Greek idea of logos which means both saying and Being, or by thinking about how poetry—language used essentially—makes present things as things. Although this sameness is not an identity, it at least means that nothing is present without being present as something.

This helps us to see how far ontology can reach. Ontology, the logos of Being, can go no further than logos goes. Logos goes to the word. When we recognize the role and rule of the word, the "je diessel" character of the thing— the jug is always this jug or that— appears different. The individual jug (the one on my table) can be a jug, and thus can be present as what it is, because of the word. We can talk ontologically about hammers as opposed to jugs because the word reaches that far. But there can only be this individual jug because it can appear as a jug through the word. The individual thing always achieves its appearance as what it is (or, in dissemblance, as what it is not), and the as-ness is its character as word.

The attempt to find the ontological source of individuals, then, has two possibilities. First, it can take the individual as stripped of its meaning as what it is. But if we strip the individual of its meaning we have made a fundamental error which closes the possibility of genuine ontology.
the only individuals which would count any more would be individuals whose Being is that of actuality; to strip an entity of meaning is to strip it of its possibilities and thus to forestall its being present in any way except that of a meaningless, brutal actuality. This would be a fundamental error about the nature of Being, Heidegger would argue, and any 'ontology' which makes this error is not a quest for the meaning of Being at all. Further, if individuals are stripped of their meaning as what they are, it becomes impossible to think of them as individuals, for individuals can only be individual insofar as they have some meaning; if this jug is not in fact a jug or anything else, there is no residue of a 'this' which is an individual. There is no residue at all.

Second, we can take the individual as we find it, and already have found it, in our world. Here the individual appears as what it is as. The attempt to strip it of meaning now appears to be the act of an ontology which has already made up its mind about Being, and thus one which is not willing to let the phenomenon show itself as it is.

In proceeding to the word, ontology proceeds to the ontological basis of the individual. Our question about the ontological status of 'species' of things—hammers, jugs, nails, etc.—is answered by the word, for the word is the pre-conceptual species of the thing.

The fact that ontology stops with the word and does not account for the pure thatness of concrete individuals is no criticism. It would be a criticism if it were the case that individuals are found in isolation from their meanings. It would be a criticism if the subject matter of ontology were settled in advance, settled in such a way that individuals were taken to be the primary subject matter of ontology. But to be reawakened to the need for
the question about Being means, among other things, that there is a question not just about Being but about that for which Being is supposed to account. To begin with the individual is to have decided too much about Being in advance. For fundamental ontology to begin, we must not begin with an idea fixe about what beings are, for this is the very question which ontology asks.

7. Dwelling with Things

Heidegger writes:

Staying with things is the only way the fourfold. (vierfältige) staying in the fourfold (vierfältig) is accomplished at any time in simple unity. Dwelling preserves the fourfold (vierfältig) by bringing the fourfold's essential presence into things. But things themselves shelter the fourfold only when they themselves as things are let be in their essential presence. (VAE. 151-2/151)28

Dwelling therefore preserves the fourfold and lets things be. But what is this dwelling?

Understanding, for Heidegger as for Kierkegaard, is not one act among many performed by a subject. We are our understanding. We should expect, then, that to understand things appropriately will be to exist appropriately with them. If our understanding is transformed, then we are transformed as well. Coming to understand things will also be coming to exist in the world differently.

This thought is expressed by dwelling (wohnen). Heidegger finds, however, that building (bauen), in its etymological root Bauen, also means dwelling:

The way that you are and I am, the manner in which we men are on the earth, is Bauen, dwelling. To be human means to be on the earth as mortal, which means dwelling. The old word bauen which says that man is insofar as he dwells, however, also means at the same time, to preserve and care for, specifically to till the soil, to cultivate the vine. (VAE. 147/147).29

Dwelling is not something symbolic or something rare and exceptional. It simply
indicates man as dwelling—dwellling in his real concrete world, "Veynar
writes. 30 It is a particular way of Being-in-the-world, a way that preserves
and cares for the things of the world.

In dwelling we find a number of Heidegger's thoughts coming together.
Dwelling is a way of disclosing. Disclosure is not merely something that man
does; it has an ontological dimension as well: disclosure and Being are not
independent. It is for this reason that dwelling can be said to be a preserving.
As a preserving it has something to do with the very Being of that which is
disclosed. In the preserving we hear another of Heidegger's fundamental thoughts:
we are always already in the world. The world is here before us—before us
both temporally and in the sense of all around us—and it is our task to
preserve that which already is. We are to preserve not actualities, but
rather the possibilities and meanings of things.

Dwelling first makes clear the meaning of 'letting be' and 'freeing things'.
In letting things be, we admit that they are more than our disclosive creations.
We admit that they already were there. Yet we also acknowledge the ontological
import of disclosure, for we let them be; without us and our disclosure they
cannot be. At least they cannot be what and as they are, they cannot be freed
as what they are. Letting be, then, enables us to affirm two themes running
throughout this dissertation. On the one hand, we have wished to acknowledge
the seeming ontological independence from disclosure of things. On the other,
we have wished to acknowledge the ontological importance of disclosure. With
letting be, both wishes are fulfilled, for in the simple letting of something
is acknowledged the thing's independence from us, and at the same time it is
acknowledged that we have an important ontological role in the Being of things.
Dwelling clarifies the notion of 'letting be' by steering us away from the
temptation to think that letting be is some activity we do. Like dwelling, letting be is a mode of existence, not itself an activity. It is a way of existing which ceases willful manipulation of things—a patience (Gelassenheit) with things—and is not itself a willful manipulation. Dwelling is not 'something we do; it is a way we are, or can be. So, those of us who find letting be to be an attractive notion and who wonder what set of procedures to follow in order to succeed at letting things be will find no set of procedures. The idea of dwelling tells us we cannot will ourselves into the activity of letting be. Instead, our mode of existing must be transformed; only then are things let be, freed for what they are.

How then do things appear to a mortal who dwells appropriately? This question asks for thematic reflection although it is more a question to be answered through existing than through reflecting. On the one hand, this entire dissertation has attempted to answer the question, for we have tried to understand the Being of things, and this is precisely that in which mortals dwell. On the other hand, one answers the question most genuinely by actually dwelling. There is no procedure for doing this except to strive to respond to Being in a way that hearkens. For philosophers, this striving must be accomplished through thinking. The mode of existence which is dwelling does not replace reflective, philosophical thought; it rather grants its genuine possibility.

8. Phenomenology and the Thing

At the beginning, the question of the thing seemed to pose a particular challenge to the possibility of phenomenological ontology and thus to phenomenology itself. Since (according to a phenomenological description)
the thing is disclosed as that which is independent of disclosure, the thing seemed to break the bond between appearance (disclosure) and Being which first makes phenomenological ontology possible. If phenomenology cannot be ontological, it becomes a doctrine of appearances, and thus becomes a type of subjectivism or psychologism and not yet very philosophically compelling. But from the outset it has been manifest that the fact that the thing's independence is itself disclosed provides phenomenology's access to the Being of the thing. We have striven to avoid saying that this realness (its announced independence from disclosure) is just an appearance, for this would vitiate the thing's independence. We have tried to maintain that the appearance of the thing as real is not a dissemblance or illusion. It instead forms the heart of thingness. This fact must be accounted for, not vaporized into a simple seeming. The thing is what it seems to be, or is at least what it seems to be when it is brought to appearance by careful disclosure.

Now the problem of the thing can be seen to be not an obstacle to phenomenological ontology but part of the conditions for it. Phenomenology is only necessary if things are not necessarily what they seem. In a perfectly straightforward world, there would be no call for a mode of thought which lets things show themselves as they are in themselves and from themselves; we only need this if things do not always show themselves in that manner. Phenomenology is only useful if some appearances are dissembling. Things can only dissemble if they can also show themselves genuinely: if there is no possibility of real money there is no possibility of counterfeit. Phenomenology is only possible if there is a way that phenomena are as what they are in themselves (an ihm selbst) and from themselves. With phenomena which are things we find an 'in themselves' and 'from themselves' which
are definitely the phenomenon's own. In contrast, it is hard to see how one could distinguish between genuine and dissembling appearances in a daydream of some wished-for object of fantasy. But things bring themselves to our encounter with them as entities which have something of their own, something independent of their disclosure. Things manifest hiddenness. It is this hiddenness which lets phenomenology go forward, for without it there would be no reason to prefer one disclosure over another. With the hidden it is possible to recognize that we have disclosed an entity as being what it was all along, even when it was undisclosed and hidden. In short, the hidden lets there be truth, for it enables some disclosures to unconceal and others not to, and in things we find the unavoidable presence of the hidden.

A phenomenological 'doctrine' of things which takes their realness, and thus their hiddenness, seriously, enables phenomenology to escape the charge of idealism, subjectivism or psychologism. If we take the realness of things seriously, we cannot possibly think that we are the ground of things; thus we escape subjectivism and psychologism. If we take the realness of things seriously, we cannot possibly think that the Being of things is exhausted in their presence to disclosive consciousness; thus we escape idealism. To take realness seriously means nothing but to affirm that things are real—hidden, independent of disclosure, were before and regardless of disclosure—even though this realness is itself a disclosed realness. To affirm in this case means to search for the Being of things which are characterized by realness. In this case the search is a phenomenological ontology. Phenomenological ontology should, then, provide phenomenology's way out of the traps of idealism and subjectivism.

With the problem of the thing, phenomenology meets a challenge not to
phenomenology proper, but a challenge to a phenomenology which loses sight of Being in its concern with appearance. This latter type of phenomenology should not and does not survive the challenge. But phenomenological ontology, which is phenomenology proper, comes to itself in the problem of the thing. It may come to itself in other ways. But thought about the thing is one good way phenomenology can rid itself of its own forgetfulness of Being.
NOTES TO CHAPTER I


3If the reader finds himself disagreeing with (for example) my taking "that which has substance" to be a thing, that reader shows that he already has a preliminary idea of what is meant by the word 'thing'; he thus does not need my references to traditional philosophy to get a preliminary 'sighting' of things.

4Ibid., pp. 10-11. (See Reference Key at front for an explanation of the symbols referring to Heidegger's works.)

5Being and Time has been translated as Being-there and There-being. Both terms, while maintaining the German etymology of the word (Da-Sein = there-Being), are so cumbersome that the German word is as good a token as a cumbersome English translation; thus I shall leave it untranslated. This has become conventional in any case. Further, translations which capture the etymological roots lose its ordinary German sense of 'existence'. The word will be familiar to those least acquainted with Heidegger's thought. For those completely unfamiliar with it, Heidegger uses it to refer to one kind of entity, one we would normally call 'human' or 'conscious'. These latter two ways of characterizing the entity under discussion, however, contain assumptions Heidegger wishes to challenge. Da-sein is, for Heidegger, that entity that understands that its Being is at issue; it is a pre-jective entity which has its Being in-the-world (Da-sein-is its 'there'). Da-sein finds itself already to be in the world, not isolated or apart from it.


7Thomas Langen, The Meaning of Heidegger, (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1961), p. 239. See also his "Transcendence in the Philosophy of Heidegger", The New Scholasticism, XXXII (1958), 55-60. I believe Heidegger has more to say on this topic than the passage cite credits him with.

8Metaphysics. Zeta, particularly chapters 6-8.

9This leaves out of account Die Frage nach dem Ding which, despite its title, is really a Kant interpretation, although the opening sections pose interesting questions about the nature of the thing. Only the title, not the content, of this work requires us to explain why it is not a major source for us.
We shall not, therefore, assume that there is a turn (Kehre) in Heidegger's thought, although we shall be alert to its possibility. The assumption of consistency is always a proper first assumption when dealing with a thinker. This does not mean that we shall assume that there are no changes and developments in his thought; in aiming to follow Heidegger's path we admit the presence of change and development. This need not signal the type of major shift expressed by a Kehre.
NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1 As with all of Heidegger's works to which we shall be making repeated reference, we shall refer to Sein und Zeit henceforth by an abbreviation: Sz. See the Reference Key at the front for an explanation of the abbreviations. See the Bibliography following this for complete information about the works cited. Short quotations translated from the German will be immediately followed by the original German text; longer translations will be footnoted and the German will be found in the Notes to each chapter.

2 For the reasons we shall leave 'Dasein' untranslated (see Footnote 5, p. 257), we shall leave these two terms untranslated. It is impractical and unnecessary to change the endings of these words depending on their function in the sentence; as one would in the original German. It should be noted, however, that whereas Zuhandeneheit and Vorhandenheit are 'abstract' nouns, Zuhanden and Vorhanden are simple nouns which are characterized by their abstract forms. When it is necessary to refer to the simple nouns in the plural, we shall follow the German practice of adding an 'a' to them: Zuhandene and Vorhandene. Finally, zuhanden and vorhanden (notice the lower case) are adjectives. Thus, we might say that two Zuhandene are zuhanden because they are characterized by Zuhandeneheit; grammatically this would correspond to the English sentence: Nobles are noble because they are characterized by nobility.


4 Føggeler, Topology, p. 111.

5 "Ein Zeug ist strenggenommen nie. Zum Sein von Zeug gehört je immer ein Zeugen..."

6 "Das Eigentümliche des zunehmenden ist es, in seiner Zuhandeneheit sich gelichsam zurückziehen, um gerade eigentlich zuhanden zu sein.

7 "je weniger das Hammerding nur begünstigt wird, je zugreifender es gebraucht wird, um so ursprünglicher wird das Verhältnis zu ihm, um so unverhüllter begegnet es als das, was es ist, als Zeug."

8 "In der Auffälligkeit, Aufdringlichkeit und Aufsässigkeit geht das Zuhandene in gewisser Weise seiner Zuhandeneheit verlustig. Diese ist aber selbst in Umgang mit dem Zuhandenen, obwalt unmathematisch, verstanden. Sie verschwindet nicht einfach, sondern in der Auffälligkeit des Unverwendbaren verabschiedet sie sich gleichsam."

9 In GF, Heidegger seems to want to leave open the possibility that something
zuhanden might be entirely missing without it being vorhanden. He claims that missing equipment, which is abhanden, does not really announce a new category of being, for Abhandenheit is just a mode of Zuhandenheit (SP, 432). We may speculate that he says this to avoid having to say that there can be an entity which is both vorhanden and not present; it is hard to see how a missing hammer could be vorhanden in either Heidegger's sense or in the normal German sense of the word. This supplements the account in SP where a missing tool is considered in light of its effect on the other items involved in the project (the missing hammer renders the nails vorhanden), but not in light of the status of its own being. In SP we learn that something vorhanden can withdraw in the second sense without having to withdraw in favor of Vorhandenheit. We have, then, a sophisticated doctrine of withdrawal in Heidegger's thought about Vorhandenheit and Vorhandenheit.

10 Existentialia besagt ontologisch soviel wie Vorhandensein, eine Seinsart, die dem Seienden von Charakter des Daseins wesensmässig nicht zuzuschreiben ist.

11 Ist der Titel für die Seinsweise der Naturdinge im weitesten Sinne.

12 Weil bislang die ontologische Problematik das Sein primär im Sinne von Vorhandenheit (Realität, `Welt'-Wirklichkeit) verstand, das Sein des Daseins aber ontologisch unbestimmt blieb, . . .

13 vorangegängen Grund in einem Schon-bei-der-Welt, als welches das Sein von Dasein wesensmässig konstituiert.

14 auf dem Grund der Seinsart zur Welt, die das innerweltlich begegnende Seiende nur noch in seinem reinen Aussehen (eidos) begegnen lässt ... ist ein ausdrückliches Mißstand auf das so Begegnende möglich, das hiermit ist jeweils eine bestimmte Richtungnahme, auf . . . ein Absolviere des Vorhandenen. . . In sogenanntem Aufenthalt — als dem Sicherheit von jeglicher Benützung — vollzieht sich das Vernehmen des Vorhandenen.

15 Arthur O. Lovejoy says that “there is, plainly, in the natural men a wish to attain an acquaintance with entities as they would be if unknown, existences not relative to the cognitive status — in short, with things as they literally are in themselves” ("Natural Dualism", in Twentieth Century Philosophy: The Analytic Tradition ed. Morris Weitz [New York: The Free Press, 1966], p. 57). For Heidegger, such a wish is founded on a metaphysical view and is to be explained as part of Dasein’s fallensness. The quest for what lies beyond the ‘cognitive situation’ is really the quest to go beyond the human situation; Lovejoy has taken cognition as our fundamental way of being in-the-world.

16 Sie darf jedoch nicht als bloßer Auffassungsscharakter verstanden werden, als würden das zunächst begegnenden, Seienden! Solche 'Aspekte' aufgeredet, aufgebaut und in der Wahrnehmung subjektiv gefühlt. Eine so gerichtete Interpretation übersteht, dass hierfür das Seiende zuvor als pures Vorhandenes verstanden und entdeckt sein und in der Folge des entdeckenden und anhegenden Umgangs mit der 'Welt' Vorweg und Führung haben müsste. Das widerstreitet aber schon dem ontologischen Sinn der Erscheinung, das
wir als fundierten Modus des In-der-Welt-seins aufgezeigt haben." (Emphasis removed in translation.)


18. "In solchem Entdecken der Unverwendbarkeit fällt das Sein auf. Das Auffallen gibt das zuhandene Sein in einer gewissen Unzahndenheit. Darin liegt aber: das Unverwendbare liegt nur da, es zeigt sich als Zeugding, das so und so aussieht und in seiner Zuhandheit als so aussehendes ständig auch vorhanden war. Die pure Vorhandenheit meldet sich am Sein, um sich jedoch wieder in die Zuhandheit des Besorgten, d.h. des in der Wiederfindungsetzung befindlichen, zurückzunehmen. Diese Vorhandenheit des Unbrauchbaren entbehrt noch nicht schlechthin jeder Zuhandheit, das so vorhandene Sein ist noch nicht ein blosse Dingveränderung, ein lediglich vorkommender Wechsel von Eigenschaften an einem Vorhandenen.

19. "Zulose Davorstehen entdeckt als definitiver Modus eines Besorgens das nur-nach-Vorhandensein eines Zuhandenen.

20. "Die Angst gibt als Seinsmöglichkeit des Daseins in eins mit dem in ihr erschlossenen Dasein selbst dem phänomenalen Boden für die explizite Fassung der ursprünglichen Seinsamkeit des Daseins."

21. See Section 40 of SZ.


25. We can adduce a shaky textual argument to support this. Heidegger says that facticity is Dasein's way of being vorhanden (SZ, 55) and that facticity's roots are in the past (SZ, 289). But, of course, thinglike Vorhandenheit may be different from Da-seins.

26. "Der Möglichkeitsscharakter entspricht jeweils der Seinsart des verstandenen Seienden."

28. "Die Möglichkeit, an der Tafel entlang geführt und abgenutzt zu werden, ist nichts, was wir zu dem Ding nur hinzudenken. Es selbst, als dieses Seiende ist in dieser Möglichkeit, sonst wäre es keine Erschei... Entsprechend hat jegliches Seiende in je verschiedene Weise diese Möglich bei sich... Sie selbst hat eine bestimmte Eignung zum bestimmten Gebrauch an ihr selbst."


33. "Denn wie auch in der weiterdringenden ontologischen Interpretation die Zuhandeneheit sich als Seinsart des innerweltlich zunächst entdeckten Seienden bewähren, mag sogar ihre Ursprünglichkeit gegenüber der puren Vorhandenheit sich erweisen lassen--ist dem mit dem bislang Explozierten das Geringste für das ontologische Verständnis des Weltphänomens gewonnen?"

34. "Im Modus der Vorhandenheit zeigt sich Seiendes, über seine ontologische Genese aus der Zuhandeneheit hinaus zurückweisend, als das vorgängig schon Vorhandene. Dann muss aber doch wohl dieses Vorgängige sein des Seienden als des Vorhandenen der ursprüngliche Grund für die Möglichkeit des Umschlags in den Modus der Vorhandenheit sein...?" (Emphasis removed in translation.) Müller-Lauter, p. 79.

35. "Im Modus der Vorhandenheit wird das Seiende hinsichtlich dessen enthüllt, dass es 'vor' seinen Welteinhang schon real 'war'. . . . Das 'was war' deutet darauf, dass sie in der Erscheiner der Gewesenheit gründet. Die hier genannte Vorgängigkeit liegt aber nun 'vor' der Sorge und daher 'außerhalb' von dem seitlichen Sinn." Müller-Lauter, p. 80.

36. "Der zeitliche Sinn der Modifikation des unsichtigen Besorgens zum theoretischen Entdecken des innerweltlich Vorhandenen."

37. "Die Zeittlichkeit des In-der-Welt-seins noch konkreter nachzuweisen. In dieser Absicht verfolgen wir die 'Entstehung' der theoretischen Verhaltung zur 'Welt' aus dem unsichtigen Besorgen des Zuhendene."
38. "Nach der ontologischen Genese der theoretischen Verhaltung zuchend, fragen wir, welches sind die in der Seinsverfassung des Daseins liegenden, existenzial notwendigen Bedingungen der Möglichkeit dafür, dass das Dasein in der Weise wissenschaftlicher Forschung existieren kann?"


40. "dass sich in der modifizierten Rede ihr Vorüber, der schwere Hammer, anderes zeigt?"

41. "Das Seinverständnis, das den Besorgenden Umgang mit dem innerweltlichen Seienden leitet, hat umgeschlagen."

42. "Die Thematisierung... 'setzt' nicht erst das Seiende, sondern gibt es so frei, dass es 'objektiv' befragbar und bestimbar wird."


45. "einer unkritischen, aber immer wieder sich eindringenden Interpretation des Daseins am Leitfad der Idee von Realität."

46. "Wenn der Titel Realität das Sein des innerweltlich vorhandenen Seienden (res) meint — und nichts anderes wird darunter verstanden —, dann bedeutet das für die Analyse dieses Seinsmodus: innerweltliches Seiendes ist ontologisch nur zu begreifen, wenn das Phänomen der Innerweltlichkeit geklärt ist."

47. "Realität ist als ontologischer Titel auf innerweltliches Seiendes bezogen. Dient er zur Bezeichnung dieser Seinsart überhaupt, dann fungieren Vorhandenheit und Vorhandenheit als Modus der Realität. Lässt man aber diesem Wort seine überlieferte Bedeutung, dann meint es das Sein im Sinne der puren Dingvorhandenheit..."

48. "Realität ist in der Ordnung der ontologischen Fundierungs zusammenhänge und der möglichen kategorialen und existenziellen Ausweissung auf das Phänomen der Sorge zurückversetzt. Dies Realitätontologisch im Sein des Daseins gründet, kann nicht bedeuten, dass Reales nur sein könnte als das, was es an ihm selbst ist, wenn und solange Dasein existiert." (I added the roman numerals.)
“Die gekennzeichnete Abhängigkeit des Seins, nichts des Seienden, von Seinverständnis, das heißt die Abhängigkeit der Realität, nicht des Realen, von der Sorge, sichert die weitere Analyse des Daseins vor einer unkritischen, aber immer wieder sich eindrängenden Interpretation des Daseins am Leitfaden der Idee von Realität.”

“Denn in diesem Ansprechen des Seienden als 'Ding' (res) liegt eine unausdrücklich vorgefunde ontologische Charakteristik. Die von solchen Seienden zum Sein weiterfragende Analyse trifft auf Dinglichkeit und Realität.”

“waren vor ihm weder wahr noch falsch, kam nicht bedeuten, das Seiende, das sie entdeckend aufzeigen, sie wovon nicht gewesen. Die Gestze wurden durch Newton wahr, mit ihnen wurde für das Dasein Seiendes an ihm selbst zugänglich. Mit der Entdeckung des Seienden zeigt sich dieses gerade als das Seiende, das wovon schon war.”
NOTES TO CHAPTER III


5. "Das ist bestimmt... die Anordnung des Stoffes. Nicht nur dies, sie zeichnet sogar die jeweilige Artung und Auswahl des Stoffes vor! Undurchlässiges Geschirr, hinreichend Hartes für die Art, Festes und zugleich Biegames für die Schuhe. "Die hier waltende Verflechtung von Form und Stoff ist überdies für die Schuhe ausgereizt aus dem, worauf Krug, Art, Schuhe dienen."


8. "Gemeins des abendländischen Denken bisher des Seins des Seiendes gedacht hat."


11. "Es lichtet... jenes, worauf und worin der Mensch sein Wohnen gründet. Das ist die Erde... Die Erde ist das, wo das Aufgehend alles hende und sogar als ein solches zurückkehrt. In Aufgehenden war die Erde als das Bergehende."

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13 "Sagt das von sich aus Aufgehende (z.B. das Aufgehen einer Rose), das sich eröffnende Entfalten, das in solcher Entfaltung in die Erscheinung-Treten und in ihr sich Halten und Verbleiben, kurz, das aufgehend-Verweilende Welten.

14 J. P. Fell, Heidegger and Sartre: Being and Place, MS, to be published by Columbia Univ. Press, New York, Chapter VII, p. 9.

15 Fall, Chapt. VII, pp. 9-10.

16 "Offen gelichtet als sie selbst erscheint die Erde nur, wo sie alle wesenhaft Verschlossene gewahr und bewahrt, die vor jeder Erschliessung zurueckweicht und d.h. ständig sich verschlossen hält.

17 "Die Erde ist das wesenhaft sich Verschlossene. Die Erde her-stellen heisst: sie ins Offene bringing als das Sichverschliessende."


19 "Seiendes versagt sich uns bis auf jenes Eine und dem Anschein nach Geringste, das wir am ehesten treffen, wenn wir von Seienden nur noch sagen können, dass es sei."

20 "Seiendes scheint sich vor Seiendes ... das Seiende erscheint zwar, aber es gibt sich anders, als es ist."

21 "das, 'worin' ein faktisches Dasein als dieses 'lebt'. Welt hat hier eine vorontologisch existenzielle Bedeutung."

22 "Welt als Ganzeheit 'ist' kein Seiendes, sondern das, aus dem her das Dasein sich zu bedeuten, zu welchem Seienden und wie es sich dazu verhalten kann. ... Die Welt hat den Grundcharakter des Unwillen von ... und das in dem ursprünglichen Sinne, dass sie allerst die innere Möglichkeit für jedes faktisch sich bestimmende Deinetwegen, seinetwegen, deswegen usw. vorgibt."

23 "hat die 'Bauerin' eine Welt, weil sie sich im Offenen des Seienden aufhält. Der Zeng steht in seiner Verlasslichkeit dieser Welt, eine eigene Notwendigkeit und Nähe. Indem eine Welt sich öffnet, bekommen alle Dinge, ihre Weite und Eile, ihre Ferne und Nähe, ihre Weite und Einge."


25 "Die Welt trachtet in ihrem Aufhören auf der Erde, diese zu überhören. Sie duldet als das Sichöffnende kein Verschlossenes. Die Erde aber zeigt dahin, als die Bergende jeweils die Welt in sich einzuberieben und einzubehalten. Der Gegeneinander von Welt und Erde ist ein Streit. ... In wesenhaften Streit jedoch haben die Streitenden, das eine ja das andere, 'in die Selbstbehaftung ihres Wesens'. ... Im Streit trägt jedes das andere über sich hinaus. Der Streit wird so immer strittiger und eigentlicher, was er ist. Je härter
der Streit sich selbständig übertreibt, umso unnachgiebiger lassen sich die Streitenden in die Inmitten der einfachen Sichgehörens los."


27. "die Verlässlichkeit des Zeugens gibt erst der einfachen Welt ihre Geborgenheit und sicher der Erde die Freiheit ihres ständigen Andringens."


29. "Im Zentrum der Seienden im Ganzen west eine offene Stelle... die leuchtende Mitte selbst umkreist wie das Nichts, das wir kaum kennen, alles Seiende.

30. "Das Seiende kann als Spiendes nur sein, wenn es in das Gelichete dieser Lichtung herein- un hinaussteht."


36. See Reference Key. All the essays in US but one are translated in On the Way to Language. "Die Sprache" is translated in Poetry, Language and Thought. The number following the slash refers to the former English translation, except when the number is preceded by 11 which indicates that it refers to the latter translation.

37. "Fragenden: Das Entzücken ist von der Art des Fort- und Hin- und Her-
"Japaner; der Vink aber ist die Botschaft des lichtenden Verhüllens.
"Fr: So hätte alles Anwesen seine Herkunft in der Anmut im Sinne des
reinen Entzückens der ruhenden Stille."

For convenience's sake, I have dropped the dialogue form when translating
passages from this work.

32 "Nun ist diese Auslegung der Dinge der Dinge jederzeit ebenso richtig
und belegbar wie die vorige. Da genügt schon, um an ihrer Wahrheit zu zweifeln."

32 Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung, p. 32. Existence and Being, 271.

40 "Als solches gilt gewöhnlich jenes Gemeinsame, worin das Wahre
überreinkommt. Das Wesen gibt sich im Gattungs- und Allgemeinbegriff, der das
Eine vorstellt, das für Vieles gleich gilt. Dieses gleichgültige Wesen . . .
ist aber nur das unwesentliche Wesen . . . das wesentliche Wesen von etwas
. . . beruht es in dem, was das Seiende in Wahrheit ist. Die wahre Wesen
einer Sache bestimmt sich aus ihrem wahren Sein, aus der Wahrheit des je-
willigen Seienden."

41 "Die Einrichtung der Wahrheit ins Werk ist das Hervorbringen eines
solchen Seienden, das vordem noch nicht war und nochmals nie werden
wird. Das Hervorbringen stellt dieses Seiende dergestalt ins Offene, dass
das zu Erbringende erst die Offenheit des Offenen lichtet, in das es hervorkommt."

42 "Die Erde ragt ins Werk, weil das Werk als solches west, worin die
Wahrheit am Werke ist, und weil Wahrheit nur west, indem sie sich in ein
Seiendes einrichtet."

43 See Reference Key.

44 "Dort, wo der Künstler und der Vorgang und die Umstände der Entstehung
des Werkes unbekannt bleiben, tritt dieser Stoss, dieses 'Dass' des Geschaf-
tseins ans reinsten aus dem Werk hervor."

45 "Der Fels kommt zum Tragen und Ruhen und wird so erst Fels; die Metalle
kommen zum Hitzeln und Schimmern, die Farben zum Leuchten, der Ton zum Klingen,
das Wort zum Sagen."

46 "The Principles of Philosophy", Part I, Principle LIII, in The Philosophical


48 "muss auf die Zugehörigkeit des Dinges zur Erde gehen. Das Wesen der
Erde . . . enthält sich jedoch nur im Emeinragen in eine Welt, in der
Gegenwêndigkeit beider. Dieser Streit ist festgestellt in die Gestalt des
Werkes und wird durch dieses offener."

49 "Dass wir von Dinghaftigkeit nie geradezu und wenn, dann nur unbestimmt wissen,
also das Werk bedürfen, das zeigt mittelebar, dass in Werkein des Werkes das
Geheimnis der Wahrheit, die Eröffnung des Seienden am Werk ist."
"Im Werk der Kunst hat sich die Wahrheit des Seienden ins Werk gestzt. ‚Setzen‘ sagt hier: zum Stehen bringen. . . . Das Sein des Seienden kommt in das Ständige seines Scheinens."

"Wo die Hervorbringung eigens die Offenheit des Seienden, die Wahrheit, bringt, ist das Hervorgebrachte ein Werk."

"Alle Kunst ist als Geschehenlassen der Ankunft der Wahrheit des Seienden als eines solchen im Wesen Dichtung.‘‘ (Emphasis added in Philipp Reclam ed.).

"Sage und Sein, Wort und Ding gehören in einer verbüllten, kaum bedachten und unausdenkaren Weise zueinander.
"Jedes wesentlich Sagen hört in dieses verbüllte Zueinander gehören von Sage und Sein, Wort und Ding zurück."

"Das Walten des Wortes blitzt auf als die Bedingnis des Dinges zum Ding. Das Wort hebt an zu leuchten als die Versammlung, die Anwesendes erst in sein Anwesen bringt.
"Das älteste Wort für das so geschechte Walten des Wortes, für das Sagen, heisst logos, die Sage, die zeigend Seiendes in sein es ist erscheinen lässt.
"Das selbe Wort logos ist aber als Wort für das Sagen zugleich das Wort für Sein, d.h. für das Anwesen des Anwesenden."

"bringt solches Nennen des Seiende erst zum Wort und zum Erscheinen. Dieses Nennen erneint das Seiende zu seinem Sein aus diesem."

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV


2. Hempel, p. 50.


6. John M. Anderson, "Truth, Process and Creature in Heidegger’s Thought", in Heidegger and the Quest for Truth, ed. Manfred S. Frings (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968), p. 41. James Buchanan agrees, adding "For entities to be grounded — within the metaphysical tradition — means that their relation to an all perfect source is revealed." Actually, this is true of explanations and not strictly true of grounds, for within the tradition an entity may be grounded without its relation to the ground itself revealed. This small error, however, helps support the point that grounds and explanations are intimately related. James Buchanan, "Heidegger and the Problem of Ground", Philosophy Today, XVII (1973), 232-45, p. 232.


10. "zeigt sich nur, wenn sie unentbergen und unerklärt bleibt. Die Erde lässt so jedes Eindringen in sie an ihr selbst erscheinen."


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15. "In diesem übernimmt die Transzendenz des Daseins die Ermöglichung des Offenbarmachens vor Seiendem an ihm selbst, die Möglichkeit der ontischen Wahrheit."


17. John D. Caputo suggests that the three groundings are identical with Verstehen, Befindlichkeit and Sorge in SZ. There is merit in this suggestion, for identifying the third grounding with Sorge helps to make clear the connection with the Undeutlich. I think it slightly better, however, to think of this last grounding in terms of Dasein's freedom, which is part of its Being-at-issue, for this allows Dasein to be present as irruption, as questioner, as the 'Why?'. However, because Dasein is only at issue because it cares (Sorge), neither interpretation need be ruled out. See Caputo's "The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Study of Heideggerian Self-Criticism", Southern Journal of Philosophy, XIII (1975), pp. 421-2.

18. 84ff. See Caputo's Principle of Sufficient Reason for a discussion of this bit of Heideggerian self-criticism.

19. "Die Ros ist ohm warum; sie blühet, weil sie blühet,
Sie acht nicht ihrer selbst, fragt nicht, ob man sie siehet."


21. "Wenn wir das Wort 'Geschick' von Sein sagen, dann meinen wir, dass Sein sich uns erschöpft und sich lichtet und lichtend den Zeit-Spiel-Raum einräumt, worin Seiendes erscheinen kann."


23. James Buchanan, in an article based largely on a mis-reading of SZ—according to which all projective understanding "renders entities as objects" (p. 236)—goes so far as to argue that the turn from 'Heidegger II' to 'Heidegger II' was necessitated by a change in Heidegger's view of grounds. "Heidegger and the Problem of Ground", Philosophy Today, XVII (1973), pp. 232-45.

25 "Die formal existenziale Idee des 'schuldig' bestimmen wir daher auch: Grundsein für ein durch ein Nicht bestimmtes Sein— das heisst Grundsein einer Mächtigkeit."

26 "Als modale Kategorie der Vorhandenheit bedeutet Möglichkeit das noch nicht Wirkliche und das nicht jemals Notwendige. Sie charakterisiert das nur Mögliche. Sie ist ontologisch niedriger als Wirklichkeit und Notwendigkeit. Die Möglichkeit als Existenzial dagegen ist die ursprünglichste und letzte positive ontologische Bestimmtheit des Daseins; ..."

27 That Heidegger's thought of possibility is difficult is shown by the fact that Sartre, in his discussion of death in Being and Nothingness, seems to have missed this existential understanding of possibility. Sartre seems to construe death as impossible because we can never encounter our own death as an actuality (for to encounter it means to die, and as dead we no longer encounter anything). But that death is forever non-actual for us does not mean that we do not encounter our death; we encounter it as a possibility. See Part IV, Chapter I, III, pp. 531-553 in Hazel Barnes's translation (New York: Philosophical Library; 1956). Magda King also misses Heidegger's sense of possibility when she talks of the 'not' of possibility, taking the 'not' of the future of possibilities as a negation of actuality, thus leaving actuality the upper hand. See her Heidegger's Philosophy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), pp. 96-9.


29 "Im Werfen die Möglichkeit als Möglichkeit sich vorwirft und als solche sein lässt. Das Verstehen ist, als Entwerfen, die Seinsart des Daseins, in der es seine Möglichkeiten als Möglichkeiten ist.


31 "Sinn ist das ... Woraufhin des Entwurfes, aus dem her etwas als etwas verständlich wird." (All emphasized in the original.)

32 "Das Phänomen der Gleichursprünglichkeit der konstitutiven Momente ist in der Ontologie oft missachtet worden zufolge einer methodisch ungesügeltenden Tendenz zur Herkunftsachweisung von allem und jedes als einem einfachen 'Ugründ'."

33 S., 5, 62, 76, 83, 135, and passim.

34 S., 41, 52, 151, 180-1, 232.

35 "Das primäre Phänomen der ursprünglichen und eigentlichen Zeitlichkeit ist die Zukunft." (All emphasized in the original.)

36 "Die ekstaticale Zeitlichkeit lichtet das Da-ursprünglich. Sie ist das primäre Regulativ der möglichen Einheit aller wesenhaften existentiellen Strukturen des Daseins." (First sentence emphasized in the original.)
"sprengt immer schon das Phänomen, und es ist aussichtlos, dieses je wieder aus den Sprengstücken zusammensetzen."

Third Meditation.

"Es liegt nämlich ein Mangel an peideia vor, wenn man nicht weiss, wofür ein Beweis zu suchen ist and wofür nicht." This translates *Metaphysics* Gamma 4, 1006 a 6.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V.

1 Ottó Pöggeler notes this also. Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, (Pfullingen: Gunther Neske, 1963), p. 248.


3 Indeed, John D. Caputo asks, "What are we to make of the 'gods' in the foursome? Is Heidegger altogether serious about them? Or are they not an instance of mythic play, a means the author employs, tongue in cheek, to signal something he 'cannot put into straightforward, rational language'? "Being, Ground and Play in Heidegger", Man and World, III (1970), p. 41. Vincent Vycinas maintains that the gods are the Greek gods, drawing many exact parallels but failing to convince mainly because it seems implausible that Heidegger is that committed to the Greek world, committed that literally. In identifying the gods so precisely, Vycinas does not give sufficient credence to their mysterious withdrawal: we should not be able to bring them to presence as easily and clearly as Vycinas does. Earth and Gods, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969). Thomas Langan says that they stand for the dimension of the holy (das Heilige), "the grace of Being, a theoletheia itself", The Meaning of Heidegger, (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1961), p. 271. But what is the holy? This question deserves thought. We shall very briefly discuss it in Chapter VII. For our purposes, however, we shall be content to glean what we can of the meaning of the gods—and the meaning of their absence—from the hints Heidegger gives us when discussing the fourfold, chiefly that the gods deserve our thanks for that which is present before us.

4 "Die Erde ist doch nicht das, was den Menschen zu Füssen liegt, der Himmel nicht das, was über seinem Kopfe ist, denn Erde und Himmel sind überhaupt nichts Seltenes, sondern 'Weltgegenden'," Pöggeler, Denkweg, p. 249.

5 "Unser Verhalten zum Naheliegenden seit je stummt und dumpf. Denn der Weg zum Nahen ist für uns Menschen jederzeit der Weitesten und darum der Schwersten," Sö, 16.

6 "Die Einheit, die als die Einfall der Vierung die Vier zusammenhält, ist nicht starre Identität, sondern bewegter Reigen und Tanz ... " Pöggeler, Denkweg, p. 253.

7 "Erder, wie Himmel, die Gottlichen wie die Sterblichen sind niemals allein für sich, sondern zusammen mit den anderen, sie sind nur in der Einfall, dem Tanz und Reigen der Vier, dem Weltspiel." Pöggeler, Denkweg, p. 248.

10. "Die Vierung west als das Welten von Welt. Das Spiegel-Spiel von Welt ist der Reigen des Ereignens. ... Ereignend lichtet er die Vier in den Glanz ihrer Einfalt. ... Das gesammelte Wesen des also ringenden—Spiegel-Spiels der Welt ist das Gering. Im Gering des spiegelnd-spielenden Rings schmieglen sich die Vier in ihr einiges und demnoch je eigenes Wesen. Sehn- und fügig-fügig fügen sie sichsam weltend die Welt."

11. "Jedes Ding verweilt das Geviert in je Weiliges von Einfalt der Welt."


13. "Die Welt als das Geviert ... ist nicht von einem ausserhalb ihrer liegenden 'Grund' her und auch nicht dadurch zu erklären, dass eins ihrer Strukturmomente als das alles Begründende aus dem Geviert selbst herausgerückt wird. Das verbergende Erstbergen, das in der Welt waltet, bleibt ein abfrömmiges Grunde, für das kein letzter Grund sichergestellt werden kann. So ist die Welt das Spiel, in dem jede Begründung versinkt (Sg 188)." Pöggeler, Denkweg, pp. 252-3


15. "Sg. 93. This can be compared, however, with "Die Kehre" in Heidegger's Die Technik und die Kehre, Opuscula series (Kehl; Neske, 1976) in which he writes: 'Only Being 'is', only in Being and as Being occurs that which we call the 'is'; that which is Being from its essential presence' ('Nur das 'Sein', nur im Sein und als Sein ereignet sich, was das 'ist' nehmend, das, was ist, ist das Sein aus seinem Wesen'; p. 45). From the quotation marks around 'is' we can see that Heidegger is aware of the problem. Rather than saying that Being is, we should say that it occurs (ereignet sich). In Die Kehre he is saying that the 'is' which is the occurrence of Being applies to beings and yet is not unrelated to Being."


Thomas Langan, in *The Meaning of Heidegger*, attempts to identify the members of the fourfold with the temporal ectases: the earth is the present, the sky the past, the mortals the future, and the gods are the "something more", the nothing, the unity of the other three (pp. 122ff.). Although I support the attempt to think of the fourfold as temporal, I find the identification of the members with the ectases to be unconvincing. For example, it seems to me that the earth could just as well be the past, and I find no compelling reason for choosing one interpretation instead of another. The fourfold is temporal certainly, but this does not mean that it itself is time, as Langan's suggestion seems to indicate.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

1 "Ge-stell heisst das Versammelnde 'jenes Stellens,' das den Menschen stellt, d.h. herausfordert, das Wirkliche in der Weise des Bestellens als Bestand zu ent bergen. Ge-stell heisst die Weise des Entbergens, die im Wesen der modernen Technik wartet und selber nichts Technisches ist."


5 "sich die Natur in irgend einer rechnerisch feststellbaren Weise meldet und als ein System von Informationen bestellbar bleibt."

6 "Das in der modernen Technik waltende Entbergen ist ein Herausfordern, das an die Natur das Ansinnen stellt, Energie zu liefern, die als solche herausgefördert und gespeichert werden kann."

7 "ist im echten Sinne der technic das anfängliche und ständige Hineinsehen über das je gerade Vorhandene."

8 "solches, was sich nicht selber her-vor-bringt und noch nicht vorliegt, was deshalb bald so, bald anders aussehen und ausfallen kann."

9 "Das Entbergen entführt ihn selber seine eigenen, vielfach verzweigten Bahren dar durch, dass es sie steuert. Die Steuerung selbst wird ihrerseits überall gesichert. Steuerung und Sicherung werden sogar die Hauptsache des herausfordernden Entbergens."

10 The fact that the stock answer sounds like a scientific one leads to conjecture about the relation of science and the technological disclosure of the world. Harold Alderman, in "Heidegger: Technology as Phenomenon", Personalist, II (1970), distinguishes the scientific and technological approaches to a mountain. "For the science of geology, a mountain is viewed as a conjunction of substance and historical processes which can be scientifically described" (p. 540). The technologist loses this 'objectivity' by regarding the mountain "simply as a repository of ore" (p. 540), that is, as an item of stock to be used. The distinction is real. Yet it seems that technological man tries to take science as the ground of explanations. This only happens..."
When technological man becomes reflective in less reflective experience, science is disclosed technologically as itself, being stock, stock which brings us more and better stock. When William Loewitt—in “A Gespräch mit Heidegger on Technology”, Man and World, VI (1973)—suggests that “perhaps science and technology are one”, he overshoots the mark. His suggestion is tempting because technology claims science as its own, although this need not be a justified claim (p. 6).

11 „soll zugleich den Anklang an ein anderes ‘Stellen’ bewahren, aus dem es abstammt, nämlich an jenes Her- und Dar-stellen, das im Sinne der poiesis das Anwesende in der Unverborgenheit hervorkommen lässt.“

12 „Her-vor-bringen erheben sich nur, insofern Verborgenes ins Unverborgene kommt. Dieses Kommen beruht und schwingt in dem, was wir das Entbergen nennen.“


14 „Der Parametercharakter versteht das Wesen von Zeit und Raum. Es verbirgt vor allem das Verhältnis ihres Wesens zum Wesen der Nähe . . . unzusammenhängend bleiben sie allem rechnenden Denken.“

15 „die Nahnis der Weltgegenden . . . wo alles in berechnete Abstände gestellt wird, macht sich durch die losgelassene Berechenbarkeit von Jünglichem gerade das Abstandlose breit, und zwar in der Gestalt der Verweigerung der nachbarlichen Nähe der Weltgegenden. Im Abstandlosen wird alles gleich-fühlig . . . “

16 „Dass Welt, weltend, das Nächste sei alles Nahen, das naht, indem es die Wahrheit des Seins dem Menschenwesen näher und so den Menschen dem Ereignis vereinigt.“

17 „Wie steht es mit der Nähe? Wie können wir ihr Wesen erfahren? Nähe lässt sich, so scheint es, nicht unmittelbar verfinden. Dies gelingt eher so, dass wir dem nachgehen, was in der Nähe ist. In der Nähe ist uns solches was wir Dinge zu nennen pflegen. Doch was ist ein Ding? Der Mensch hat bisher das Ding als Ding so wenig bedacht wie die Nähe.“

18 „Wo das Ge-stell waltet, pragen Steuerung und Sicherung des Bestandes alles Entbergen. Sie lessen sogar ihren eigenen Grundzug, nämlich dieses Entbergen als ein solches nicht mehr zum Vorschein kommen.“

19 “All emphasized in the original.

20 “Das Gefährlichste dieser Gefahr liegt darin, dass sie den Anschein der Gefahr- und Notlosigkeit erweckt und sich so als die Gefahr, das sie ist, verbirgt.” Pöggeler, Denkweg, p. 246.

22 "Dabei ist jedoch das eigentlich' Unheimliche nicht dies, dass die Welt zu einer durch und durch technischen wird. Wirklich unheimlicher bleibt, dass der Mensch für diese Weltdenker nicht vorbereitet ist. dass wir es noch nicht vermögen, beispielsweise denken in eine sachgemässe Auseinandersetzung mit dem zu gelangen. was in diesem Zeitalter eigentlich herauskommt."


24 "Die Herrschaft des Ge-stell's droht mit der Möglichkeit, dass dem Menschen versagt sein könnte, in ein ursprüngliches Entbergen einzukehren und so dem Zuspruch einer anfänglicheren Wahrheit zu erfahren."  


26 "Menschen und Dinge der Heimat muten vertraut an. Aber sie sind es noch nicht. Also verschliessen sie das Eigenste."


29 "Jedes Geschick eines Entbergens ereignet sich aus dem Gewahren und als solche."


31 "Das Gewahrnehmen . . ist als solches das Batten. Denn dieses lässt den Menschen in die höchste Würde seines Wesens schauen und einkehren. Sie beruht darin, die Verborgenheit mit ihrem zu vor die Verborgenheit alles Wesens auf dieser Erde zu huten."

32 "tragt dem Menschen erst jenen Anteil am Entbergen zu, den das Ereignis der Entbergen braucht."

33 Richardson, p. 614.

34 Richardson, p. 614.
35"Es ist weder das Verdienst meines Fragens noch der Machtverschuld meines Denkens, dass dieses Gehörte und Erbrachte in Er-eigenen beruht und Ereignis heißt...". Heidegger's Vorwort to Richardson's book, p. xxi. I am leaving "Ereignis" untranslated for no suitable English translation is available.

36"Das Ereignis ist der in sich schwingende Bereich, durch den Mensch und Sein einander in ihrem Wesen erreichen, ihr Wesendes gewinnen, indem sie jene Bestimmungen verlieren, die ihnen die Metaphysik geliehen hat."


39Marx, in Freiburger Universitätsvorträge, p. 35.


41J. F. Fell, Heidegger and Sartre: Being and Place (to be published by Columbia Univ. Press), MS, Chapter 12, pp. 10-11.

42...vom 'Ereignis' spricht, dann denkt er vor allem daran, dass dieser Ereignis das, was ist, in unterscheidlicher Weise in sein 'Eigens' fügt." Otto Pöggeler, Philosophie und Politik bei Heidegger. (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1972), p. 61.

43"Sein als das unverfügbar, jeweils geschichtliche Seingeschick zeigt sich in seinem Sinn oder in seiner Offenheit, und Wahrheit als Ereignis, Ereignis meint heis nicht, wie noch innerhalb der Terminologie von Sein und Zeit, ein bestimmtes Geschehen oder Vorkommnis, sondern die Vereinigung des Daseins in das Sein und die Zeigung des Seins an die Eigentlichkeit des Daseins... Es bestimmt den Sinn von Sein selbst."


45Richardson, p. xxi. See note 35 on this page (261).

46"Was beide, Zeit und Sein, in ihr Eigenes, d.h. in ihr Zusammengehoren, bestimmt, nennt wir das Ereignis."[Emphasis removed in translation.]

47This question must be distinguished from those posed by Karl Löwith in "W. Heidegger: Denker in dürftiger Zeit" in Die Neue Rundschau, (1952), pp. 1-27. Löwith asks how a fully historical Being can account for 'non-historical' phenomena such as nature. The fourfold helps to account for the 'non-historical'. Löwith seems to treat Seingeschick as something essentially apart from beings and wonders how the history of Being can ever determine beings. Ereignis is...
meant to address itself to just these problems.

Richardson, p. 614.


"Zum anderen erkennt sich das Ge-stell seinerseits im Gewährenden, das den Menschen darin währen lässt, unerfahren bislang, aber erfahrener vielleicht künstig, der Gebrauchte zu sein zur Wahrheit des Wesens der Wahrheit. So erscheint der Aufgang des Rettenenden."

"von der Anwesenheit und Gegenwart her verstanden und so gedacht als eine Folge anwesender und gegenwärtiger oder nicht anwesender und nicht gegenwärtiger (vergangener oder zukünftiger) Jetztpunkte." Pöggeler, Denkgew., pp. 250-1.

"Wir können zwar die technischen Gegenstände bemühen und doch zugleich bei aller sachgerechten Benützung uns von ihnen so freihalten, dass wir sie jederzeit loslassen. Wir können die technischen Gegenstände im Gebrauch so nehmen, wie sie genommen werden müssen. Aber wir können diese Gegenstände zugleich auf sich beruhen lassen als etwas, was uns nicht in Innersten und Eigentlichen angeht."


53 McLuhan, p. 23.


55 John D. Caputo says much the same in "The Rose Is Without Why".
NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

1 As discussed in Chapter V, I am using 'stay' in its rare transitive sense in which we can legitimately say that the stays of a mast stay the mast.

2 "Der Krug west als Ding. Der Krug is der Krug als ein Ding. Wie aber west das Ding? Das Ding dingt. Das Dingen versammelt. Es sammelt, des Geviert ereignend, dessen Welle in ein je Weiliges: in dieses, in jenes Ding."

3 "Das Nahern der Nahe ist die eigentliche und die einzige Dimension des Spiegel-Spiels der Welt."

4 "Die Vierung west als das ereignende Spiegel-Spiel der einfältig einander Zugetreuten. Die Vierung west als das Welten von Welt."


7 "Die Erde ist die bewand Tragende, die hängend Fruchtende, hegend Gewässer und Gestein, Gewächs und Getier... "

8 See note 3. Chapter V.


11 "Die Brücke ist freilich ein Ding eigener Art; denn sie versammelt das Geviert in der Weise, dass sie ihm eine Stätte verstattet."

12 "Dinge, die als Orte eine Stätte verstaffen, nennen wir jetzt vorzüglich Deuten."


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14."Dies sei durch ein Beispiel versucht, wobei im voraus zu beachten ist, dass es für das Wesen des Seins nirgends im Seienden ein Beispiel gibt, vermutlich deshalb, weil das Wesen des Seins das Spiel selber ist."


16."aber auch nicht ohne die Wachsamkeit der Sterblichen. Der erste Schritt zu solcher Wachsamkeit ist der Schritt zurück aus dem nur vorstellenden, d.h. erklärenden Denken in das endenke Denken."


19."J. P. Fell, Heidegger and Sartre: Being and Place. To be published by Columbia Univ. Press. MS, Chapter 11, p. 5.

20."Fell, Chapter 12, p. 3.

21."Der Zuspruch über das Wesen einer Sache kommet zu uns aus der Sprache, vorausgesetzt, dass wir deren eigenes Wesen achten."

22."Das Wort begrundet das Ding nicht. Das Wort lässt das Ding als Ding anwes:"n


24."See Fell, Chapter 11. I first heard Professor Fell present this idea at a seminar at Bucknell University, January 1970. For this thought and for many others, I am deeply indebted to Professor Fell both in his capacity as a teacher and as a writer."

25."Der Unter-Schied ist die Dissension, insofern er Welt und Ding in ihr eigenes er-misst. Sein Er-messen eröffnet erst das Aus- und Zu-einander von Welt und Ding."

26."Für Welt und Ding ereignet Ding in das Gebarden von Welt, ereignet Welt in das Gönnen von Dingen."

27."finden sie das Geheissene, Ding-Welt und Welt-Ding, in das Zwischen des Unter-Schiedes kommen heisst."
"der Aufenthalt bei den Dingen ist die einzige Weise, wie sich der vierflüchtige Aufenthalt im Geviert jeweils einheitlich vollbringt. Das Wohnen schafft das Geviert, indem es dessen Wesen in die Dinge bringt. Allein die Dinge selbst bergen das Geviert nur dann, wenn sie selber als Dinge in ihrem Wesen gelassen werden."

"Die Art, wie du bist und ich bin, die Weise, nach der wir Menschen auf der Erde sind, ist das Bauen, das Wohnen. Mensch sein heisst: als Sterblicher auf der Erde sein, heisst: wohnen. Das alte Wort bauen, das sagt, der Mensch sei, insofern er wohne, dieses Wort bauen bedeutet nun aber zugleich: hegen und pflegen, nämlich den Acker bauen, Reben bauen."

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